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ABSTRACT
The State Politics of Congressional and Judicial

Reform:

Implementing Criminal Records Policy

Thomas Carlyle Dalton, B.A., Ohio University
M.A., Ohio University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Kenneth

M.

Dolbeare

This study examines Supreme Court civil liberties and

Congressional criminal records policies in order to understand the
politics of state implementation of federal criminal justice guidelines.

Analysis of state responses to the Mapp and

Mi

randa decisions

leads to identification of salient interests and factors influencing

policy outcomes.

Evidence of these interests and factors is sought in

the analysis of national patterns of state response to the criminal

records privacy mandate established by
Control Act.

a

1973 amendment to the Crime

The author presents an intensive case study of implemen-

tation of the mandate in Washington state, using interviews to probe
factors raised by national patterns.
of the criminal

Overall, the state implementation

records privacy guidelines parallels the response to

Mapp and Mi randa in that there was extensive procedural compliance
but little change in performance.

Alternative conceptual frameworks are used to explain these
consequences of LEAA's attempt to regulate criminal justice processes.
If the apparent lack of success is explained by unclear laws involving

the delegation of too much discretion to state and local officials,

then the outcomes are easily understood using existing pluralist frame-

works stressing dissagregation

,

interest group conflict and compromise.

A better explanation lies in the dynamics of power structural conflict

which stresses elite indifference, under-enforcement and constitutional
constraints to changing criminal justice processes.
political

The underlying

realities uncovered in this explanation involve judicial

opposition to executive encroachment and local law enforcement resistance
to state regulation.

Recognizing these realities provides greater

purchase in understanding the common factors influencing Congressional
and Court originated criminal justice reform.

Procedural policies with structural

implications threaten to

alter underlying patterns of power and preference, producing noncompliance and efforts by implementing organizations to restore the
political status quo.

This means the preservation of control by

criminal justice officials over the process.

Factors internal to the

criminal justice system contributing to these outcomes include main-

tenance of organizational autonomy and stability.

External

factors

involve the separation of powers and public sentiment for law and order

compared with the relatively weak demand for minority rights.
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CHAPTER

I

REGULATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS:
THE LIMITS TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGICAL REFORM

Over the last fifteen years, the federal government has

undertaken new, ambitious initiatives to reduce crime through experimentation and innovation, involving the creation of state and local
agencies to plan and coordinate criminal justice policy.

The Mapp

(1961) and Miranda (1966) decisions and the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act (1968) noted the onset of

a

period in which the

Supreme Court, and Congress through the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration (LEAA), greatly enlarged their role in policy development and oversight of the administration of criminal justice.

Significantly, the Crime Control Act was used not only to
advance

a

reform agenda (e.g., through appropriation of block grant

money for allocation to the states), but to bring about increased
innovation and coordination and limited regulatory control

conditions of aid) of criminal justice processes.

(through

Congressional

regulation of criminal justice information systems was initiated by
an amendment in the early 1970's to improve the management,

the quality, and control

purpose of that policy

is

the exchange of criminal records.

increase
A central

the enlargement of privacy protections and

due process rights for subjects of criminal records.

1

In many respects,

this intervention parallels similar efforts

by the Supreme Court in the 1960's and early
1970's to enunciate

national

policies for defendent

criminal justice process.
a

'

s

due process protections in the

Both Court and Congressional policies were

part of a broader movement to strengthen policy making and
account-

ability mechanisms at the state and local level.

Yet, the policies

were initiated in contrasting political environments, involving

different underlying institutional relationships and functions.

The

Supreme Court decisions involving suspects' and defendants' rights
in the 1960's were made in spite of

widespread opposition to the

increased "federalization" of state court procedure.
Court civil

The Supreme

liberties decisions were intended to increase federal

control as well as to strengthen state court authority over lower

court behavior.
In contrast,

the regulation of criminal

records management

was one of many conditions of aid which accompanied

a

widely supported

injection of resources to state and local criminal justice agencies
through state block grants.

These grants were intended not only to

stimulate innovation but increase state and local discretion and
control of policy making processes.
A significant feature shared by the federal

criminal history

records policy and Supreme Court decisions protecting due process
rights is that they mark the federal government's first attempt to

regulate the administration of criminal justice.
some novelty for intergovernmental
the last two decades.

This has presented

relations in criminal justice over

On the one hand, the Department of Justice has

assumed

a

de facto regulatory role through LEAA, and,
on the other,

the Supreme Court and lower courts have greatly
enlarged their policy-

making and supervisory role over the administration of
criminal
justice.

Thus, to the extent that both LEAA (following Congressional

mandate) and the courts have exercised regulatory control over
the

administration of justice, they have become involved in the implementation of intergovernmental policy.
In addition,

these Congressional and Court initiatives are

broadly rooted in the administrative reform tradition.

The primary

strategy of this tradition, which dates back to Woodrow Wilson and
the Populist and Progressive reform movements, has been to strengthen
the professional management of government agencies and make them more

accountable to the public.
on structural

While the focus of past reforms has been

change (e.g., at-large elections, council -manager form

of government, executive budgeting, judicial appointment and court

unification), contemporary reforms place greater reliance upon
technological change (e.g., computer processing of information) as
the vehicle for reform.

Recent observers have suggested that, like

previous reform movements, information technological reforms serve
political as well as technical agendas (Kraemer and Dutton, 1979).

Those who control the implementation of information technologies
are thought to exert leverage over the distribution of power and

impacts associated with such innovations and, thus, serve some

interests as opposed to others.
It is evident from the literature on information technological

reform, that although the adoption of information innovations in

criminal justice has not intended to change the
intergovernmental,

interjurisdictional relations, policy management and
governance
structures, nonetheless, the effects of information
technological

innovations may bring about such changes (Laudon, 1974).
a

Moreover,

combination of political and organizational factors has influenced

the level of support or resistance by criminal justice agencies
to
criminal justice policy innovations at the federal, state and
local
level

and,

thus, may suggest factors likely to affect the creation

and regulation of national criminal justice information systems.

Study Focus:
State Implementation of the Federal
Criminal Records Privacy Amendment

In 1973,

the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

1968 was amended to provide for privacy, security and dissemination

controls and safeguards of criminal history record information.
Federal

guidelines promulgated by the LEAA in 1975 mandated that

each state initiate

a

planning process and strategy to bring state

and local criminal justice agencies into compliance with federal

requirements.

The state of Washington responded to federal

law

through passage of comprehensive legislation in 1977 which invested

administrative authority in the State Planning Agency.

Thus, the

state privacy law set in motion the implementation of an inter-

governmental policy.
This study undertakes a close examination of the implementation of privacy guidelines for criminal justice information systems
in

order to address several related issues:

What are the politics of

5

state implementation of federal guidelines in the
criminal justice
area?

comes?

What are the interests involved and what factors influence
outAnd finally, what do such findings imply for

a

more general

understanding of policy implementation?
This study bears a close relationship to and is rooted in

studies about the politics of implementation and regulation of infor-

mation technological

reforms (e.g., automation of records systems) in

criminal justice and other policy areas; studies which assess the

implementation and impact of federal legislative and Supreme Court
policy regulating law enforcement activities and the administration
of criminal justice; and studies of policy implementation which explore
the role and significance of guideline development as

a

variable in

explanatory theories of policy implementation processes.
The policy implementation literature has identified several

factors which may increase the likelihood of compliance to policies

originated by legislatures and courts.

The state implementation of

Supreme Court civil liberties decisions

in

Mapp and Miranda provides

the closest policy analog to understanding factors likely to affect

federal

regulation of criminal justice processes.

Therefore, salient

findings of Court impact studies are briefly summarized as they bear
upon the conditions of effective implementation and their significance
for understanding the politics of intergovernmental regulation.
The remainder of Chapter

I

consists of

a

discussion of the

importance of the criminal record in relation to the growth of infor-

mation technology in criminal justice,

a

description of judicial and

legislative attempts to regulate that technology and efforts by LEAA

to underwrite and influence the direction of
information technological

reforms undertaken by criminal justice agencies to
satisfy federal

regulations.

A variety of political

factors are identified which now

constrain the full development and comprehensive regulation of
national, computerized criminal history record system.
the end of this chapter,

a

a

Finally, at

method is specified in more detail of how

state and local performance under the federal privacy mandate will be

assessed and explained.
The subsequent analysis of state implementation of federal
criminal history records regulation consists of four parts.
national

First,

patterns of state response are presented in order to determine

how performance in Washington compares to that of other states.
a

Second,

case study of the processes by which the state of Washington converted

federal

regulations into state policy

is

interests and factors shaping outcomes.
basis for

a

presented in order to identify
Third, the case forms the

subsequent analysis interpreting the significance of

political factors which contribute to an explanation of national patterns of state response.

Finally, common factors are identified which

influence the politics of state implementation of Court and legislative
policies designed to regulate the administration of criminal justice.

The Growth of Criminal Justice
Information Systems

All

criminal justice agencies have common information needs

because of the interdependence involved in processing cases to conclusion.

Importantly, information needs continue after cases reach

7

final

dispositions and thus reinforce interdependence.

The criminal

history record, among other criminal justice case
documents,

is

in-

tended to serve an important short-hand function
to satisfy some of

these common information needs.
The criminal
known) consists of

a

history record (or rap sheet, as it

As such,

it contains a record of arrest

charges and court disposition or sentencing information.
a

commonly

summary of an individual's contacts with the

criminal justice system.

record is used for

is

variety of purposes:

The criminal

pre-arrest investigation by

police and prosecutors (the most frequent use), arrest and bail decisions (based on the severity of police charges), plea bargaining,

court case preparation, witness verification, juror qualification,

corrections assignment, and probation and parole decisions to estimate
likelihood of escape.
uses.

The criminal

record is not limited to these

It is also used for employment purposes, licensing of particular

professions and security investigations.
to states for criminal

justice organizations.

Almost 20 percent of requests

record information come from non-criminal

While this constitutes the extent of legal

uses, there is also a black market of uncertain proportions for such

material

(Laudon, 1980; OTA, 1982a).
The number of criminal

is

records maintained in the United States

enormous and growing at an alarming rate.

SEARCH Group, Inc. (1976a)

estimated that there were approximately 195,000 criminal records in
1975.

In a recent study by Laudon, estimates were placed at 216 million

records (1980: 52).

As local

criminal history files are automated, the

number is expected to increase by another 10 to 15 percent by 1985.

8

Perhaps nearly half of these files are inactive
(e.g., because of age
of data subject or lack of contact with the
system).

Yet,

the Depart-

ment of Labor estimates that 30 percent of the
labor force has
criminal

a

record.

Criminal history records are maintained in differential
propor-

tions between federal, state and local agencies.

Of the 216 million

records, 21.4 million are held by the FBI and 195 million
are held by

more than 64,000 state and local criminal justice agencies.

Of these,

29.2 million are held by state repositories with only 4 million of
that

number computerized.
state and local

Approximately 150 million, or three-fourths of

files, are held solely by local criminal justice

agencies (largely police departments) and in manual files (Laudon,
1980:

52).

Although numerous opportunities have arisen as

a

result of the

introduction of information technology in criminal justice, it

is also

evident that these innovations increase the potential risks to individual privacy.

Such risks stem principally from the enhanced

capabilities of the speed of exchange and proliferation of dissemination of data enabled by computer technology.

What makes the capability of speed damaging

is

the slowness of

update processes compared to the rapidity and frequency of dissemination.

This creates the potential

for injustice in

a

variety of

criminal justice decision-making contexts before the stale or otherwise

incomplete data is updated or corrected.
contextual

By introducing factual

or

inaccuracies the criminal record may convey an erroneous

impression of the data subject's past or present conduct which may
result in false arrest, inappropriate sentences, and so forth.

9

The combination of remote terminal access and message
switching

capabilities (e.g., inquiries to
a central

a

given location may be routed through

switching point to another user) now make it possible to send

and receive messages through multiple ports of entry.

If the informa-

tion is inaccurate or incomplete, exchanges between criminal justice

users can create

a

spreading effect to perpetuate unjust decisions,

lost time and inefficiency.

Federal court antecedents to
Congressional action
Federal and, particularly, state courts have shown
to intrude upon police discretion in the use of criminal

Judicial

a

reluctance

records.

review has been largely confined to issues pertaining to

identification and record maintenance.

Much less attention has been

focused upon exchange and dissemination practices, record reporting

responsibilities and utilization of records in case-related decision

making contexts.

Thus, court review of criminal records management

has differed from those decisions by the Supreme Court (e.g., Mapp and
Mi

randa ) which regulate the methods by which convictions are obtained.

Moreover, federal and state courts have been unable to agree upon

standards which should govern records handling practices, nor have they

clearly enunciated where the balance should be struck between the protection of individual privacy and due process rights and effective law
enforcement.
In

many ways, Menard vs. Mitchell

difficulties.

In

(1971), typified these

its decision, the Federal

District Court in

Washington, D.C., acknowledged the problems inherent in the dissemination

of incomplete and inaccurate records in the conduct
of police work.

While

a

student at UCLA, Dale Menard was arrested for burglary, finger-

printed, detained and subsequently released without charge.

subsequently received

a

The FBI

record of the detention but failed to note his

release without charge.

Menard demanded that the record be expunged

from both local and FBI files thereby preventing both the maintenance
and dissemination of the record.

The Federal

District Court ruled

that an arrest alone did not justify maintenance of fingerprints or

records by either the state repository or the FBI and that the FBI

must limit disclosure of such records to law enforcement agencies
only (Marchand, 1980: 139).

What was exceptional about the Menard decision was its willing
ness to question the propriety of commonly accepted records management

practices in

a

period of time when rapidly expanding computer tech-

nologies not only made these practices anachronistic but greatly magni
fied the potential adverse impact of the exchange and dissemination
of inaccurate and incomplete information.

It was precisely the recog-

nition of the complexity of information systems in record management

processes that prompted the federal court in this decision to insure

adequate protections for the data subject's privacy rights.
Unlike previous court rulings addressing the issues pertaining
to criminal

records, the Menard decision was particularly unequivocal

about enunciating the rights of the subject of

Importantly, in drawing

a

a

record.

criminal

firm legal distinction between

a

record of

arrest and conviction, the federal court challenged law enforcement

conventions which heretofore had drawn no such clear-cut distinction.

Not only have arrest records always been considered
an important tool
in police investigative work, but the private
sector (e.g., banks,

insurance companies, credit companies and employers) have
considered
access to police records essential to the security of their
businesses.
Yet, at least at the federal

level, the court found no statute which

authorized FBI dissemination of arrest records for non-criminal
justice
purposes (Marchand, 1980: 140).
Given the potential adverse impact upon privacy and reputation,

Judge Gezell argued in Menard that the FBI must show

necessity" to disseminate

authenticity in

a

a

a

"compelling

record that revealed episodes of doubtful

person's life.

The determination of "public necessity"

was considered by Judge Gezell to rest not with the executive branch but

with the Congress.

A case by case approach was not considered accept-

able and had so far not solved the problem.

Rather, Judge Gezell

considered that Congress was more properly responsible and uniquely
capable (Marchand, 1980: 140).
Interestingly, the Menard decision did not apply to internal
criminal justice use of arrest and conviction records.

Thus, in

contrast to Mapp and Miranda decisions, Judge Gezell did not really

challenge the adequacy of procedures available to insure the integrity
of records exchange practices.
of criminal

Rather, he concluded that any misuse

records within the criminal justice system could be

rectified by the courts.

In

subsequent regulations (1975), however,

LEAA broadened the term "dissemination" to include the exchange of

information between criminal justice agencies.

Consequently, criminal

justice agencies can now be held liable for the quality of information

12

exchanged between agencies for decision making purposes.

As subsequent

chapters indicate, the control of dissemination of criminal
history
record information within the criminal justice system has proven
to be

extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
There have been two other decisions after Menard which suggest

increased intervention by federal courts in police record use in

decision-making.
In Tarlton vs.

Saxbe (1974) the Court of Appeals in Washington,

D.C., further amplified the Menard decisions by declaring that the FBI

was not just a passive recipient of records supplied by state and
local

agencies but had

a

duty to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate

arrest and conviction records.

In

addition, the FBI was ordered to take

administrative steps to insure the accuracy and completeness of criminal
history record materials submitted to the National Crime Information
Center by state and local justice agencies (OTA, 1982a).
A federal
a

court in New York in Tatum vs. Rogers (1979) has shown

willingness to review the effects of the utilization of incomplete

criminal

record information (arrest data) in law enforcement internal

decision making processes.
of Constitutional

The U.S. District Court cited violations

rights when incomplete criminal records information

was used in setting bail decisions (OTA, 1982a).

Significantly, there have been no cases which have focused on
the extent of responsibility that state and local agencies have for

insuring accuracy and completeness of criminal history record information.

However, it is inevitable, given increased state regulation of

criminal record management practices that
civil suites will be brought
to test the states'

commitment to implement federal regulations.

Although the Menard decision constituted an
important step in
the direction of defining data subject rights
with respect to public

dissemination and avenues available to protect these
rights (i.e.,
access and review), it deferred to Congress for the
resolution of

complex administrative issues involved in the regulation
of the management and utilization of criminal history records.
In short, with increasing availability of fingerprints,
technological developments, and the enormous increase in
population, the system is out of effective control. The
Bureau needs legislative guidance and there must be a
national policy developed in this area which will have
built into it adequate sanctions and administrative safeguards.
It is not the function of the courts to make these
judgments, but the courts must call a halt until the
legislature acts (Marchand, 1980: 140-141).

Yet, because of unresolved conflicts between federal

competing for control of

a

national criminal

bureaucracies

history records system,

and tensions regarding the distribution of federal and state respon-

sibilities. Congress has been unable to reach

a

consensus on

comprehensive approach to criminal records privacy policy.
a

a

Instead,

temporary measure was devised in which LEAA's responsibilities under

the Crime Control Act were expanded to include implementation of

a

privacy mandate in which brevity of detail invited extensive administrative interpretation and conflict.
The amendment reads as follows:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or
disseminated through support under this title shall contain,
to the maximum extent feasible, disposition as well as
arrest data where arrest data is included therein. The
collection, storage, and dissemination of such information
shall take place under procedures reasonably designed to

ensure that all such information is kept
current therein;
the Admimstration shall ensure that
the security and
privacy of all information is adequately
provided for
and that information shall only be used
for law enforcement
criminal justice and other lawful purposes
In
addition, an individual who believes that
criminal
history information concerning him contained
in an
automated system is inaccurate, incomplete or
maintained
in violation of this title, shall,
upon satisfactory
verification of his identity, be entitled to review
such
information and to obtain a copy of it for the
purpose
of challenge or correction.
Any person violating the
provisions of this section, or any rule, regulation,
or
order issued thereunder, shall be fined not to
exceed
$10,000 in addition to any other penalty imposed by law
(Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968Section 524B).

m

The passage of the amendment constituted

LEAA and

a

substantial

a

limited victory for

setback for the FBI in the struggle for control

over standards designed to govern the management of state and
local
criminal records information systems.

While the Bureau retained

management control over the computerized criminal history program,
it was now subject to LEAA regulations (Title 28).

Moroever, both

the Menard decision and criminal records privacy mandate have provided

important levers to LEAA in its efforts to fund and influence the

direction of information technological reforms undertaken in criminal
justice.

Improving information technological capacity
of criminal justice agencies
LEAA attempted to increase the extent of informational coor-

dination between criminal justice agencies in order to improve the
quality of criminal records exchanged and disseminated in the criminal

justice process.

The success of that effort depended upon LEAA's

capacity to influence at least three factors:

the processes by which
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information innovations are diffused; the organizational
structures,
practices and interorganizational relations involved

in

justice process; and intergovernmental relationships.

the criminal

These efforts

have had only limited results and have exacerbated
problems of

record quality, privacy protection and Constitutional rights.
The infusion of LEAA assistance between 1968 and 1980
appears
to have greatly accelerated the diffusion of information technology
in criminal

justice.

Marchand reports, for example, that in 1968

only ten states had automated, state-level criminal justice information systems.

By 1972, forty-seven states had automated at least one

component of their criminal justice systems.

At that time, 46 percent

of the computerized systems were state-level and 54 percent local
(Marchand, 1980: 73).
local

By 1980, there had been substantial

computerized systems: 66 percent (of

a

growth in

survey of over 600

systems) were local and only 34 percent involved state-level applications.

Importantly, 73 percent of the computerized criminal history

files added since 1976 are in local rather than state systems (U.S.

Department of Justice, 1980: 2-3).
In addition,

LEAA encouraged state and local criminal justice

systems which include joint use or participation by two or more

components of the criminal justice system.

In a national

1972, LEAA determined that nearly 28 percent of the total

survey in
systems

surveyed (151) had automated information systems which served two or

more organizations.

follow-up survey in 1976,

In a

sample of systems surveyed showed
to 25 percent.

However,

a

a

small

a

slightly larger

decline in combined systems

third survey completed in 1980 showed a
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significant decline in the number of shared or
combined systems.
a

Of

little over 600 systems included in this survey,
only sixty (10

percent) combined two or more functions (U.S.
Department of Justice,
1980: 4).

Organizational effects
LEAA has attempted to influence the organizational contexts

within which information technology

is

utilized by police, offices of

prosecution and state courts through special demonstration programs
designed to alter the ways in which information
and utilized in decision making.

is

collected, exchanged

These efforts had to contend with

important differences in organizational structures, transactions and
informational needs.

Computerization has progressed unevenly in criminal justice
agencies and has had differential organizational effects (see Table 1).
LEAA had

a

somewhat stronger influence over the use of information

technology in law enforcement than in other components of the criminal

justice system, but this has resulted in unintended effects.

organizations have demonstrated
and criminal

a

Police

willingness to use identification

history information in applications closely related to

functions central to organizational

apprehension, arrest).

purposes (e.g., investigation,

However, there is some limited evidence that

such applications reinforce "legalistic" approaches to law enforce-

ment, depersonalize patrol activity, and narrow the scope of judgment
and discretion, and thus magnify problems resulting from the reliance

upon incomplete and inaccurate criminal

records.

Significantly,

automation of police arrest records has greatly outstripped the

availability of court disposition information, making
law enforcement
agencies the primary information intermediaries of
the entire system
(Colton, 1978).

Table 1
Extent of Utilization of Information Technology
Criminal Justice.
.

in

Information Systems

Pol ice

Prosecutor

State Courts

Extent of diffusion

Extensive

Moderate

Limited

Integration

Extensive

Limited

Limited

Number of uses

Extensive

Moderate

Moderate

Extent of use in
processing

Extensive

Limited

Limited

Efficacy or integrity
(e.g., accuracy, completeness, privacy and
dissemination safeguards)

Limited to
Moderate^

Moderate*^

Limited^

^Colton, 1978; MITRE, 1977a.

^SEARCH Group, 1976a; Weimer, 1980.
^Hays, 1978; SEARCH Group, 1975.

LEAA also sponsored and funded information innovations in

offices of prosecution.

These initiatives have been advanced in order

to increase the effectiveness of prosecution by increasing clearance

rates, structuring discretion (i.e., plea bargaining) and focusing

resources on the trial and conviction of repeat offenders.

These

efforts have had little success because of organizational resistance,

inability to reduce complex decisional factors to data contained in
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criminal records, and the strength of informal
collaboration between

prosecutors and police in charging and case disposal

(Jacoby, 1980;

Weimer, 1980).

Attempts to influence state and lower court organizational

structures through information innovations have proven to
be equally
ineffective.

Not only does the complexity of tasks and court struc-

ture constrain the possibilities of information-based
organizational

change, but resistance by lower courts to centralization of management, which state court information systems represent, make acceptance

difficult to achieve.
to consider criminal

Moreover, state and lower courts do not appear
record information

priority data element for

a

case management and thus do not consider information coordination with

police or the central state repository

a

compelling priority (Berkson,

Hays and Carbon, 1977; Hays, 1978; SEARCH Group, 1975).

Enlarging state and local
participation in NCIC
Along with its efforts to influence the growth and use of

information technology, LEAA attempted to standardize and centralize
the collection of criminal history offender data.

consisted of
central

a

This LEAA program

two-pronged strategy to upgrade the capabilities of

state repositories and to develop

a

national network capable

of routing inquiries between federal and state systems which fit

within the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
First, LEAA assistance greatly improved and increased state

repository record maintenance capabilities.
1969 when this LEAA program commenced on

a

As Table 2 indicates,

in

demonstration basis, none
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of the states had established automated name
indexes and the same

number had computerized all criminal history
records.

By 1982, twenty-

seven states had fully operational computerized
criminal history records

with seven having automated name indexes.

There is evidence to in-

dicate that the twenty-seven states with complete
computerized records

generated far more record disseminations than states with
manual records (OTA. 1982a: 46).

In 1979,

for example, disseminations from

states with automated criminal history files constituted more than
half
of all

records maintained by state repositories, but less than one-fifth

of all

state records.

Table

2.

Development of Central State Repository.

Completely
Automated
1969

Automated
Index

Manual

0

0

50

1975^

17

17

16

1982'^

27

7

16

^SEARCH Group, 1976a: 8,
"^OTA,

File

25,

1982a: 48.

Second, LEAA reinforced the fledgling development of the NCIC

through grants to the FBI, states and localities designed to upgrade
records collection and exchange capabilities.

principally of two major files:
File.

The NCIC consists

an Identification and Criminal

History

The Identification file consists of arrests, warrants, stolen
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property and other data.

It is considered a "hot" file and used
to

facilitate investigative and police field work.

The Criminal History

file consists of records of arrests and convictions
submitted by
central

state repositories.
The number of NCIC automated Identification files and
the

number of users has grown extensively since its inception largely
with
the assistance of LEAA.

For example, the NCIC data base has grown from

23,000 records in two files consisting of wanted persons and stolen

property with approximately ten thousand daily inquiries in 1967, to
ten files which contained over nine million records by 1981
1982a:

33-34).

In addition,

(OTA,

the NCIC averaged 342,000 daily inquiries

and over ten million information exchanges per month.

Similarly, the number of user agencies has increased from
fifteen in 1967 to an estimated 64,000 federal, state and local agencies
in 1981

(see Figure 1).

agencies have

a

Although only seventy-nine state and federal

direct line to the NCIC, numerous other criminal

justice agencies are entitled to the information.

In a

OTA found that thirty-four states reported

of 900 terminals at

state and local

a

total

1979 survey,

levels with access to state records and to NCIC/CCH

data (1982a: 49).

Indirect access to NCIC files is facilitated primar-

ily by a message-switching service provided by the National

Law

Enforcement Telecommunications Network to other state and local users.
An OTA state sample shows that access

is

widely, although unevenly,

distributed between police, prosecutors and courts.

For example, court

access to NCIC files ranges from as much as 47 percent in New York to
13 percent in Minnesota

(OTA, 1981: 43).
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Other

Federal
level

Federal users and
interstate users

Stale
level

49 State identification bureaus,
o1 which 27 have a CCH file
and 7 have an automated name index

Local
level

•'Street'

level

Type

r Date

of

Name

criminal
history
information

/

Arrest

Disposition

Charges
Sentence

assignment
Release date
Initial

Charges

generated

mgerprints

(illustrative)

Figure
SOURCE:

1.

Overview of Criminal History Records System.
OTA, 1982a: 23.
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In

criminal

contrast to the NCIC Identification file, the
computerized

history file component (CCH) has grown at

a

much slower rate.

There are currently only 1.5 million computerized criminal
histories
in the NCIC/CCH.

As of 1981,

CCH message traffic accounted for 3.5

percent of the NCIC total monthly traffic while transactions for
stolen property and wanted persons accounted for nearly 90 percent of
the monthly NCIC totals.

The maximum number of states who have chosen

to participate in the NCIC/CCH has never exceeded thirteen; in 1981,

only eight states were participating.

Thus, in the OTA 1981

survey,

the eight states fully participating in the NCIC/CCH accounted for only

about 24 percent of all criminal fingerprint cards submitted to the

Identification Division.

Moreover, 67 percent of the message traffic

from state and local agencies originated from these eight states, thus

further limiting the value of the CCH file to the vast majority of
states.

Thus, an important reason for the limited participation by

the states in the NCIC/CCH is the inability of most states to provide

complete and accurate records, making utilization of the NCIC/CCH of
limited usefulness to states and localities.

Competing proposals for upgrading the national CCH
The exact network configuration, administrative and account-

ability mechanisms of

a

national computerized criminal

history record

protracted policy conflict

system (CCH) has been the subject of

a

between LEAA, the FBI and Congress.

That debate, discussed in detail

elsewhere by Marchand (1980), has directly impinged upon the substance
of criminal

history regulatory policy.
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Beginning in 1969, LEAA sponsored

a

program for the interstate

collection and exchange of computerized
criminal history records.
Instead of funding the random development
of local criminal history
systems (precluded by fund limitations),
LEAA decided to fund

a

demonstration project (called Project SEARCH)
by which to test the
feasibility of

a

computerized criminal offender file which
involved

the exchange of standardized data between
the states.

Even though the

project successfully demonstrated the feasibility
of the concept,
conflicts arose as to what infomration should be
maintained in the

system and who should operate it.

Although evaluation and debate was

inconclusive, in December 1970 the Attorney General decided
that the
FBI

should manage the system.

Although numerous hearings have been held, several legislative
proposals advanced and successive studies conducted since 1970
to

determine technical feasibility costs and possible safeguards,
Congress
has been unable to reach a consensus on a national

hensive legislation.

policy and compre-

Bureaucratic conflicts in the Justice Department

between the FBI and LEAA with respect to system configuration and

governance have largely accounted for this impasse.
Both the FBI and LEAA have advocated proposals for

a

nationwide

computerized criminal history system which differ in several respects.
The most salient differences pertain to record maintenance and control

responsibilities; standards governing data quality and privacy; and,
importantly, system governance.
First, the FBI proposal

involves maintenance of records per-

taining to all federal offenders and data subjects with multi -state
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offenses in the NCIC central repository.

Currently, the FBI maintains

records of single state, multi-state and federal
offenders of fully

participating states.

Under the single-state, multi-state
plan, the

states would retain possession of single-state
offender records while
the FBI would maintain multi-state records and
utilize

index system and

a

a

"pointer" or

message switching capability which would enable

the NCIC to route inquiries from one state to another
for single-state

records.

The index file would consist of only the name or equivalent

identification of individuals with an arrest record.

Complete

criminal history records information would be provided by the
state

from which the record originated.

Second, the Bureau proposes

voluntary state and local compliance to privacy, security and other
measures to ensure the integrity and quality of criminal history data.
Third, the FBI suggests that its NCIC Policy Advisory Board (currently

composed primarily of federal and state law enforcement officials)

exercise policy and management control over CCH.
Two recent developments with respect to FBI proposals are

noteworthy.

First, Congress was officially advised by the FBI in 1980

of a project to test a national

CCH index using the Florida central

state repository as the message switching point for inquiries to the
NCIC files.

Congress approved the demonstration as long as the FBI/

NCIC did not operate message switching during the demonstration.

However, when it was discovered that the Florida computer equipment
was unable to handle widely divergent request formats of participating

states, the FBI subsequently utilized its NCIC/CCH in

switching role (OTA, 1982a: 114).

a

message

The OTA has challenged the FBI's authority
to operate message

switching even for the purposes of

a

demonstration (OTA, 1982a: 115-117).

Moreover, it is not entirely clear, according
to

a

discussion in 1982

with a staff member involved in the OTA study,
that the FBI has ceased

using the message switching capability.

Therefore, it is possible

that the FBI may be retrieving criminal history
record information

from state repository files without the knowledge of
state officials.
In addition,

the FBI has also significantly increased the

amount of duplication between Ident and CCH files.

For example, the

NCIC/CCH records also held in Ident increased from 44 to 58
percent
from 1979 to 1982 (OTA, 1982a: 196).

While this duplication between

files reflects the FBI's need to develop an automated fingerprint

capability, such duplication would also enable the development of

a

computerized criminal history file technically outside Congressional
control
It is evident from these two related instances of FBI dis-

cretionary decisions that there may be
gressional control over

a

national

a

variety of ways that Con-

CCH may be circumvented.

The LEAA/CCH concept differed substantially from the FBI
version.

One important difference resides in its concept of federalism.

LEAA has insisted that the NCIC maintain only criminal records for
federal offenses; central

state repositories would maintain single and

multi-state offense records.
national

Second, LEAA has favored

a central

NCIC

index or "pointer" system maintained by the states by which

inquiries are routed from the index to the originator of the record.
The National

Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) currently
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operates

a

message switching system which routes inquiries
received by

the NCIC index back to the appropriate state.
FBI

proposal

LEAA contended that the

to operate message switching is tantamount
to giving the

Bureau the capability to develop

a

central criminal

history file be-

cause it would give the Bureau access to state
and local files.
FBI

The

has tried unsuccessfully (in 1973 and 1979)
to persuade Congress to

authorize implementation of

a

message switching capability but so far

has been refused because of unresolved policy issues
regarding impact

on federal-state relations and surveillance potential.

More recently,

the FBI has been willing to reconsider its support for a
single-state,

multi-state plan for
to retain control

a

national

index, if the latter enables the FBI

over message switching.

Next, LEAA has consistently promoted (through SEARCH Group,
Inc.)^

decentralized, state control of

a

CCH system.

In essence,

each

state would establish an independent commission to develop, monitor
and enforce criminal

records management and privacy regulations.

addition, each participating state would be represented on

a

In

board

which would formulate national policy and user standards (SEARCH
Group, 1978).

LEAA first used the term SEARCH to label its 1969 demonstration project for the development of a national computerized criminal
history system.
"The acronym 'SEARCH' originally stood for 'System for
That expanElectronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories.'
sion of the acronym was dropped in 1972, when it ceased to be
descriptive of the corsortium's range of activities, but the acronym
In March 1974, the consortium became a nonitself was retained.
profit California corporation called 'SEARCH Group Incorporated'"

(Zenk.

1979: 3).
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There have been several reasons why LEAA
has proposed an

essentially decentralized CCH.

Its control

(now limited to state statistical

over block grant money

programs funded by the Bureau of

Criminal Justice Statistics) facilitated close
contact and observation of state records system problems, needs
and capabilities.

LEAA

has long contended that the lack of participation
by the states in

the FBI/CCH system stems from both political as
well

constraints.

as technical

States and localities are not eager to surrender manage-

ment control to federal authorities.

Moreover,

decentralized records

a

management system has made good political sense because

it

has been

consistent with the revenue sharing strategy of devolving decision
making to the state and local governments.
Comparisons of surveys conducted over

ten year period to

a

determine support for various technical configurations has shifted
markedly from centralized approaches (single-state, multi-state) to
decentralized, state-focused approaches (national index only) (see
Table 3).

Significantly, the emergent consensus concerns only

technical configuration

.

Opinion is still divided on issues per-

taining to management, regulation. Constitutional rights and

governance processes.
All

proposed alternative configurations of

(i.e., national

a

national

CCH

repository; single-state, multi-state; National

or Regional System) require the development of

a

decision-making body (i.e., board or commission).

Index

policy-making and
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System Alternative

Single-State
Multi-State
FBI

NCIC Advisory Policy Board

Index

throughout 1970's

since 1980

early mid 1970's

since 1978

States (DOJ Survey of 10 states)
States (OTA Survey)

National

1978
1979 (11

SEARCH Group, Inc.
1

states)

970-1978

1979 (24 states)
1979 to present

NLETS, Inc.
1981

Attorney General's Task
Force on Violent Crime

U.S.

SOURCE:

OTA, 1982a:

iqoi

164.

Thus far, the NCIC Policy Advisory Board is composed of
twenty

elected and six appointed members.
state and local law enforcement:

The twenty elected members represents

nine from state police or patrols;

seven from state bureaus of identification; and four local

county) police.

(city or

The six appointed members include two members each

from judicial, prosecutorial and correctional components.

three-fourths of the representation is law enforcement.

Thus, about
The LEAA and

others have challenged the restrictiveness of representation and have

suggested much broader representation within and outside the criminal

justice system.

The FBI favors

a

slightly altered NCIC Policy Advisory
Board

whereas LEAA and SEARCH Group prefer an
independent federal

mation board.

infor-

Most state and local officials appeared to
support

the FBI proposal at that time.

Since that time, surveys of state

criminal justice officials (conducted by the
Department of Justice)
(OTA, 1978) and Office of Technology Assessment
(1982a)

indicate that

support for two alternative governance configurations has
become in-

creasingly divided.
The Department of Justice survey found that state officials

considered an agency other than the FBI to be

a

more viable governance

entity in the long term and criticized organizational separation between IDENT and CCH components of the NCIC (OTA, 1982a: 171).

An OTA

survey in 1979 indicated that while twenty-two state repository

officials favored FBI management control, there was extensive variation in support for governance configurations.

Respondents urged

that states be given increased policy control and that some other

entity such as NLETS, SEARCH Group or board be given policy and

enforcement powers.

Table

4 on

the following page presents the re-

sults of the OTA 1979 survey, showing the relationship between system

structure and policy control.
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^\ ^^''^ Preferences of State Repository Personnel
rt^ri,unnei
rru
eJ^^J!
CCH QSystem
Structure and Policy Control.

for
tor

Policy Control

.

FBI

System
Structure

FBI

National
repository

with
revised
board

Independent
board

No

preference

FBI

or
NLETS

SEARCH
or
NLETS

No

response

Totals

1

1

Singlestate/
multi-state

8

1

1

National
index

6

6

6

11

Regional
systems
Total

decentralization
No

4

preference
Totals

_^
15

SOURCE:

7

7

OTA, 1982a:

4

]

i

1972.

NOTE:
Forty- two states responding by telephone and/or mail to an
OTA survey conducted in mid-1979.

Political

Constraints to Regulating Criminal
Justice Information Systems

The foregoing discussion has shown that it is now technically

possible to create
system.

In

a

national, computerized criminal history record

fact, the United States already has

a

national criminal

history network, partly manual and partly computerized, which includes
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(1) criminal records; (2) fingerprints and
repository maintained by the
NCIC/IDENT and forty-nine state identification
bureaus; (3) twenty-seven

state CCH files; and (4) an interstate
exchange system utilizing the
U.S.

mail, the NCIC and the NLETS communication
networks.

Thus, many

of the necessary elements of the computerized
criminal history system
are already operational.

Nonetheless, there are several political
factors which have
prevented the complete development of that
system thus far.

These

factors are important to examine in that
they reflect larger political
issues and interests involved in the
regulation of criminal justice

information systems:
1.

Constitutional rights and discrimination--surveillance

potential
2.

Law enforcement practices--the conduct of investigations

versus individual access to records;
3.

Privacy versus the public right to know;

4.

Separation of powers--executi ve regulation of the courts;

5.

Federal ism--the balance of authority between federal, state

and local government;
6.

System governance--system accountability and representation

processes; and
7.

Record content, management and oversight.

Constitutional rights
and discrimination
There has been

a

longstanding concern by civil rights interests

that the creation of a national

CCH might be used by law enforcement
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agencies-particularly the FBI, for monitoring
or surveillance of lawful
activities of individuals and
organizations.

This concern was rein-

forced by revelations of FBI conduct
of domestic political, intelligence
and surveillance activities against
anti-Vietnam war leaders and groups.
In fact, the NCIC had been
used for intelligence purposes for
which it
had no Congressional

authorization.

Although the FBI has assured

critics that these practices were
anomolous and have ceased, the Justice

Department and FBI have most recently (in
September 1982) approved but
not yet implemented use of the
NCIC/CCH for intelligence and surveil-

lance of persons judged by the U.S.
Secret Service to represent a

potential threat to the President (OTA,
1982b: 25).

The American Civil

Liberties Union, National Lawyers Guild, other
civil liberties groups,
and those advocating a variety of political
views critical of the

status quo who often use public demonstrations
as

a

method of drama-

tizing their views, are strongly opposed to
police collection of

intelligence on such activities and have steadfastly
opposed the

expansion of the NCIC for this reason.
The investigation and intelligence applications of criminal

records also tend to have
tions, especially blacks.

a

discriminatory effect on minority populaStudies in Philadelphia by Miller (1979)

and in California by the Bureau of Criminal

Statistics (1981) show that

blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested and account for

disproportionate number of releases without charges.

a

Moreover, NCIC

records indicate that in 1980 blacks accounted for nearly 29 percent
of all records in this CCH file, almost triple the percentage of blacks
in the

population (OTA, 1982a: 141-142).
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Private sector use of criminal
history records in

variety of employment and licensing
decisions

evidently extensive proportions.

is of

a

wide

uncertain but

An American Bar Association
survey

in 1974 identified 1,948 separate
federal

and state statutes governing

the licensing of persons with
arrests or convictions (OTA, 1982a:
193).
Also, it has been estimated that
between 40 and 80 percent of private

sector employers request criminal
history information in job applications (Miller, 1979: 20-23).

Federal Title 28 regulations now permit

dissemination of federal criminal history
records if permitted by
state and local

law.

As Chapter III

indicates, there are extensive

variations in state and local laws covering
access to such information.
Yet, a SEARCH Group study (1981) suggests
that access to such infor-

mation held by local police is rarely denied.
Limiting job opportunities on the basis of

(especially

a

a

criminal

record

simple arrest without conviction) involves added
punish-

ment for conduct for which the subject may have been
vindicated.
in

Thus,

response to such issues of potential discrimination from
the pre-

employment use of arrest records, state Human Rights Commissions,
under
pressure from national black organizations such as the NAACP, Urban
League and local affiliates, have adopted state policies limiting the
use of such information.

Law enforcement practices
The implementation of criminal justice policy necessarily

involves reconciling conflicting values.
of Supreme Court civil

For example, implementation

liberties decisions has had to strike the

balance between the individuaTs
right to fairness, due process
and
effective law enforcement. Similarly,
while the national CCH concept
greatly enhances records collection
and exchange capabilities essential
to investigative activity,

it also

presents special problems of record

access, dissemination and confidentiality.

While the national CCH

would facilitate an extensive exchange
of criminal records between
state and local jurisdictions, the data
subject must have access to
that data for the purposes of review
and/or challenge and correction
of inaccurate information.

Law enforcement officials contend that data
subject access to

criminal

records should be limited to "rap" sheet information
only.

This is so because access to a variety of
intelligence information

would tend to undermine the efficacy of the investigative
process.

Importantly, criminal history information retrieved from
other juris-

dictions in the process of an investigation
and confidential

1978).

is

considered privileged

(American Friends Service Committee,

1979-,

and O'Toole

The effect of this operating presumption is to deny access to

records pertaining to the data subject other than those originated by
the agency.

Consequently, the data subject

is

unable to challenge or

correct erroneous information exchanged between criminal justice
agencies used as

a

basis for decision making.

Civil

liberties groups

oppose these limitations on an individual's access to his own record
in part because of their concern that information from inappropriate

police surveillance might be included in such files without the sub-

ject being aware of it.
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Privacy versus the public
right to know

Another contested issue which constrains
efforts to limit access
to federal,

state and local criminal

history records

is

between individual privacy and the public right
to know.

the conflict

Policies for

the protection of privacy rights with respect
to information systems
and other areas have been preceded by at least

a

decade of federal

policies designed to greatly enlarge the accessibility
of governmental
records.

It is therefore not surprising that efforts to
limit certain

information made accessible to the public by prior policy
would be

controversial.

Given policies with cross-cutting objectives such as

these, the conditions of compliance are uncertain and policy
success is

problematic (O'Brien, 1980).
The Menard decision (1971) and other similar cases involving
the adverse effects of the publication of inaccurate record information

underscored the need to control the dissemination of information
utilized

in

the administration of criminal justice.

Federal and state

courts are divided, however, as to an appropriate policy response to
the problem.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Paul vs. Davis (1976) held

that police have a right to publicize

a

record of an official act, such

as an arrest, without exposing state or federal

for civil

rights invasions.

officials to law suits

Accordingly, the fact that the record may

be incomplete does not constitute a prohibition to its dissemination
in accord with normal

procedures.

In

its decision, therefore,

the

Supreme Court clearly had to balance competing rights and chose to
weigh the public right to know more heavily in the balance.
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Tho press has been
for

presumption

t.h.

in

int.ro-A which ha. consi.L.nLly
pressed

oru>

favor of disclosure of public
records, especially

records of criminal proceedings.
its first amendment rights

is

The press contends that, exercise
of

necessarily curtailed by any recjulafions

limiting access to public records.

strongly opposed to any form

ol

Consequently, they have been

regulations which

and/or expose them to liable suits.
press'

bof.h

limit access

As we see in Chapter III,

the

interest in maintaining open access to and
publication of

criminal

records has undermined LEAA's attempt to
implement

national

a

uniform

policy limiting dissemination of criminal records.

Separation of powers
One of the persistent tensions in our constitutional

government

is

the maintenance of an independent judiciary,

interference from executive or Congressional regulation.
ment of

a

national

CCIl

form of

hv.. from

The develop-

presents tensions in this doctrine.

The effectiveness of the national

substantial participation by courts

in

CCIl

necessarily requires

the timely submission of final

disposition information of state and federal repositories.

However,

the separation of powers doctrine; has made attem|)ts to legislate court

participation

in

a

national

regulations unsuccessful.

CCIl

and observance of records management

While local trial courts are dependent upon

information generated by pol ice and prosecutors for

a

variety of

decisions, state and local courts have proceeded with caution with

respect to enlarging participation

in

state and local criminal justice

information systems which entail executive erosion of judicial

independence.

Thus far, although state
court interests (e.g., the

National

Center for State Courts) have
not opposed the development
of
a national CCH, they have not
been supportive of federal
policies
which involve regulation of courts
using the NCIC or other criminal

justice information systems.

Moreover, efforts by state courts to

develop integrated information systems
for trial courts have not been

particularly successful in mandating
participation in such information
technological reforms.

Federal

sm

i

The formulation and implementation of
federal policy typically

Invites conflict over the acceptable balance
of authority between
federal, state and local governments.

The attempt to develop

a

national

policy for the collection, exchange and dissemination
of

criminal

history records is no exception.
First, tradition dictates that the criminal justice
system is

highly decentralized both in political and functional
terms.

Like

education, law enforcement and the administration of criminal
justice
is

considered

a

matter of local control; leadership of most of the

major elements of local criminal justice (e.g., police, prosecutors
and courts)

is

selected through general elections.

Thus, criminal

justice officials represent diverse and overlapping constituencies.
The relative political

independence of each component sustains and

reinforces differences in perspective on appropriate policy responses
to crime,

and thus limits the efficacy of federal

Efforts to create

a

national

policy intervention.

CCH imply a centralization of regulatory
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authority over state and local law
enforcement and other criminal
justice agencies which heretofore
has not existed.
Moreover, law

enforcement interests do not constitute
political

force.

a

monolithic or unitary

Federal, state and local law
enforcement interests

are often divided on policy issues
which require consensus on gover-

nance and management because of strong
differences over functional

responsibilities, roles, jurisdiction, and
so forth.
Second, the development of

a

national criminal

information

exchange system necessitates increased
state authority and/or enforcement of policy which presents some novelty
for most states.

Only four

states now exercise any regulatory control
over criminal justice

activities including information system processes
(Skoler, 1977).
is

it

not entirely clear what role state and local
elected officials should

assume under

a

national

CCH and what agency or agencies should assume
an

enforcement or oversight role.

Moreover, it is not self evident how

uniform policy might take shape under conditions of
state decentralization in criminal justice leadership.

For unlike the relationship

between federal and state courts, criminal justice agencies are
not

clearly linked in either

a

formal

or informal

hierarchical

structure.

Thus, the configuration of the criminal justice system and power con-

flicts pose important constraints to the implementation and enforcement
of

a

national

CCH.

System governance
Not only does the national

CCH pose problems for federalism,

but it raises issues central to democratic governance processes.
of the difficulties involved in the regulation of criminal justice

One
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information systems is to find an
appropriate regulatory authority.
Since its participation in the
development of a national CCH,
SEARCH
Group, (a major contractor and
consultant to LEAA) has promoted
a twotier governance system.
The first tier would consist
of representatives from each of the fifty
states to constitute a governance
body

with authority to make policy
decisions and enforce compliance with
national standards.
The representatives would be
appointed by state
governors and would not necessarily
have law enforcement backgrounds.
The second tier would consist of
independent state commissions

with responsibility for state policy
development, regulation and

enforcement of national and state criminal
justice information system
standards, including privacy.

Other functions of state boards might

include audit responsibility, appellate review
of disputed record

challenges, and coordination of standards with
other state information
systems.

The state board or commission would be broadly
representative

of public and private sector interests including
law enforcement.
LEAA (along with liberal academics and civil liberties
groups)
has generally favored the SEARCH Group proposals
and has consequently

strongly advocated that states consider an independent
commission as
the preferred alternative to other approaches such as
state law

enforcement agencies.

This approach, however, has not gained much

support from either state executives and legislatures nor from state
and local

law enforcement officials.

In an era of

deregulation and

greatly reduced public intervention, with few exceptions (e.g.,
California, Massachusetts) governors have been reluctant to create
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new commissions, especially when
conflict with law enforcement
interests
is a likely consequence.

State law enforcement is not eager
to surrender even partial

jurisdiction over state standards to
non-criminal justice interests.
Likewise, local criminal justice
officials are not eager to see the

enlargement of state regulation, regardless
of its source or composition.
Finally, the FBI considers the two-tier
concept to be inimical
to its

interests as

a

national

investigative agency whose responsibil-

ities include policy leadership in
criminal justice and maintenance of
a

strong moral authority in the eyes of state
and local law enforcement.

Record content, management and oversight
Any national

CCH system must necessarily include guidelines
for

record management processes by users, establish
limits to file size and

content, establish standards for record quality and
oversight for audit

mechanisms.

Such guidelines are essential

to ensure the integrity,

security and privacy of criminal history record information.
Record management procedures include file structure, data

collection and maintenance practices, exchange and dissemination procedures, monitoring and transaction logs and so forth.

There

is

little

uniformity across criminal justice agencies in jurisdictions with
respect to record management practice.

Consequently, the interstate

transmission of criminal record information involves potentially wide
variations in the care and restrictiveness with which it
and utilized.

is

maintained

LEAA grants have been used to support greater standard-

ization but with only limited success, in part because standardization

41

was considered equivalent to
centralization of policy control
and Lettre, 1981

(Folan

)

Also, agreement must be reached among
federal, state and local

law enforcement groups and national
civil

size and content of a national criminal

liberties groups as to the

history record file.

Numerous

alternatives have been identified and assessed
by OTA (1982a), but
there is little agreement on these proposals.

File size would be

dictated by the system configuration or structure
(i.e., national

repository versus index).

For example, if a national

CCH is limited

to violent and serious offenders, file size
would be approximately

8.6 million records, whereas a national

index consisting of federal

and single-state, multi-state offenders would be
20.5 million.

ally, the larger the size of the national

Gener-

files, the greater the

likelihood of problems of record quality (i.e., inaccuracy and
incompleteness).

Consequently, technical

involve unresolved political

issues.

For this reason, and given the

greater potential for surveillance that
civil

issues such as these necessarily

a

larger file size entails,

liberties and minority group interests have generally opposed

enlarging the NCIC along the lines of

a

national

repository or utiliza-

tion of an FBI-controlled message switching service between the states.

System audit mechanisms are also necessary but again, political
factors limit consideration of approaches which ensure adequate control.
The GAO has most recently been proposed by OTA for nationwide audit

responsibility, but criminal justice interests contend that outside
auditors lack expertise, necessitate security clearances and are unable
to guarantee confidentiality of findings.
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Structure of Analysis

According to the policy implementation
literature there are
number of variables which strongly
influence the likelihood of

compliance to policies originated by
legislatures or courts.
II

consists of

a

a

Chapter

review of that literature and
alternative conceptual

frameworks with which to understand
the relative significance of
factors influencing state and local
In

implementation processes.

Chapter III, national data is presented
to identify patterns

of state policy response to the
criminal records privacy regulations

(Title 28) and effects on records quality
and management processes.

Chapters IV through

VI

consist of

a

case study of state guideline

development and implementation processes

in

Washington state.

The case

study identifies interests involved and other
factors influencing state

performance which contribute to an explanation of
national patterns of
state response.
Finally, Chapter VII develops and assesses alternative
explana-

tions of the Washington case and identifies common factors
influencing
the politics of state implementation of court and legislative
policy.

Introduction to the
Washington case
Chapters IV through

VI

consist of

a

case study which documents

how the federal criminal records privacy mandate was converted into

state policy; how guidelines were subsequently developed; how imple-

mentation occurred and how state and local criminal justice agency
practice was affected.

Chapter IV focuses principally on the role of
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state officials, the state planning
agency and other interests involved
in the passage of

comprehensive state legislation.

Chapter

V

examines

the guideline development process in
some detail, focusing particularly
on interests and factors involved
in

federal

a

committee review process by which

policy was translated into state guidelines.

Then, Chapter VI

examines the impact upon state and local
criminal justice organizations
and interests and their response.

The case documents factors precipi-

tating subsequent efforts to bring about
legislative amendments and

regulatory revisions.
The case study covers the time period from late
1976, when

a

state security and privacy plan was developed along with draft
legislation, to the summer of 1981, over

a

year after the State Patrol assumed

regulatory authority for administering the law.
this interval

The significance of

resides in the fact that during this time two different

state agencies (the State Planning Agency and State Patrol) exercised

administrative authority and thus two different processes and versions
of state guidelines resulted.

The period under investigation involves

events covering two different presidential and gubernatorial administrations (in Washington) and two different implementing agencies (the SPA

exercised administrative authority from 1977-1979, at which time the
State Patrol assumed administrative control).
The reconstruction of the legislative, guideline development
and implementation processes is based,

in

personal observations and recollections as

processes from 1976 through 1978.

part, upon this author's
a

participant in these

From 1976 to 1977,

I

served as

a

staff member to the Governor's Committee on Law and Justice, through
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the State Planning Agency (SPA),
and developed long range plans
and

standards for information systems.

In

1977,

I

was involved in the

legislative process which then passed
state legislation implementing
the Title 28 privacy regulations.

Subsequently,

I

was appointed by

the Governor's Committee as administrator
of the Security and Privacy

Program with responsibility for guideline
development and implementation.

Thus.

I

have drawn upon personal

experience, official documents,

correspondence and other state records for
documentation and corroboration of events.

During 1980 and 1981,

I

conducted

a

series of twenty-two

intensive interviews with criminal justice and other
officials and
individuals not only to help reconstruct processes involved

in

state

implementation and their effects but to probe factors of
particular
interest to this study.

Those factors included perceptions of federal

and state policy objectives, attitudes towards regulatory
requirements,

expectations about and actual effects of the law and regulations on
existing practice, and consequences for inter-agency and state-local
relationships.

The following criteria were utilized in the selection

of interview respondents:

(1)

participation in and familiarity with

state guideline development processes; (2) position and influence in
state and local criminal justice agencies and professional associations;

(3)

institutional and geographic representativeness; and (4) non-

criminal justice interests familiar with and involved in the development
and implementation of the policy.

When

I

report information from these

Interviews in Chapters IV through VI, publicly known officials are

identified by name and title, otherwise

I

refer to individuals only
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by their general

region, position, role or
relationship to the Security

and Privacy program in order to
protect their anonymity.

There are some potential sources of
bias in utilizing this

approach.

My participation in both legislative
and implementation

processes may inhibit the candidness and
truthfulness of the responses.
However, this difficulty was circumvented in
part for the following
reasons:
Patrol

my involvement in the program terminated
in 1978; the State

has subsequently assumed administrative
control

(February 1979);

the controversy surrounding passage of the
law has grown dormant; and

federal enforcement action has slackened
considerably with substantial

reduction

in

LEAA funded activity.

In

addition, this study sought an

explanation, not an evaluation, of performance

(a

potentially less

threatening focus) with potential technical assistance benefits
to the
criminal justice community.

Also, the interviews did not require, in

most instances, departmental approval and confidentiality of the
responses was maintained where requested.

The case approach
The case study approach is a useful strategy when complex

phenomena must be examined in real world contexts.

mentation of

a

federal mandate presents such

a

The state imple-

context for there are

numerous factors and interests at work which shape responses, ultimate

outcomes and impacts of federal policy.

A study limited solely to

available data on patterns of national compliance would not provide

a

sufficient basis by which to explain why things happen the way they
did.

The processes by which policy gets implemented are perhaps best

understood through

a

case study approach because it is
extremely

difficult to separate or distinguish
between the factors influencing
implementation and the context in which they
operate or interact.

Although it may be difficult to precisely
assign causal relations between factors, case analysis facilitates
construction and testing of

alternative explanations (Yin, 1981).
To be sure,

there are inherent weaknesses to

a

case approach.

First, the number of variables involved in
implementation processes
can be extremely large, thus limiting analytical
precision.

aspect requires selectivity and qualitative judgment

significance to variables affecting outcomes.

in

This

assigning

Such problems can be

dealt with by utilizing retrospective interviews to
reconstruct key
events in ways which identify factors suggesting

a

common explanation.

Second, an analysis of one state's response, although suggestiv
of similar factors producing national patterns of state response,
does
not provide an exclusive explanation of such patterns.

There may be

factors idiosyncratic to the Washington case which limit applicability
to an explanation of national

performance.

Thus, the findings of the

case are limited to other states whose experience is most comparable
with respect to statutory approach, technological capacity, and other
features.

However, in conjunction with nationwide data, the case

approach provides depth to enrich our understanding of the political

significance of national patterns.

CHAPTER

II

ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL POLICY
STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL MANDATES

The conventional wisdom of the policy
implementation literature

holds that there are several conditions
conducive to effective (successful)
to be

implementation and compliance.

Such conditions are generally held

invariable regardless of the policy characteristics,
nature of

the policy system, organizational

structure and implementing environment.

Therefore, this chapter begins with
these factors which include:

a

brief review and assessment of

minimal threat of change, clarity of

mandate, support of state and local elites, and possibility of

enforcement.
Next, the comparison of state responses to legislative and court

policy to regulate the administration of criminal justice may help to

determine the potential relevance of these factors to the criminal
justice system.

Supreme Court policies regulating law enforcement

(specifically the Mapp and Miranda decisions) provide this study with
the closest policy analogs with which to understand the politics of

implementation of criminal records privacy policy.
A study of the effects of Supreme Court criminal

procedures

policy on lower courts, especially state courts, contributes to our

understanding of the significance of guideline development as
47

a

factor
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which influences implementation
processes and subsequent outcomes.
The
fact that state courts and
administrative agencies both exercise
similar
supplementary rule-making functions
suggests a potentially fruitful

avenue of exploration of the relative
capacities of courts and legislatures to influence implementation.

Studies of the Map£ and Miranda

decisions, for example, have focused
upon the supplementary policy

making functions that state courts employ
to translate Supreme Court
policy into state practice (Canon,
1973; 1977; Manwaring, 1972; Romans,
1974; Tarr, 1977).

This comparative analysis necessarily
focuses upon state courts

and legislative-bureaucratic policy
makers/impl ementers because state

courts and, in most cases, state legislatures
and administrative

agencies are the intermediate recipients of
intergovernmental policy.
The factors which shape state officials' responses
to policy enunciated
by their federal

superiors in the intergovernmental system may have

important consequences for the way that policy

is

understood and

interpreted as well as transmitted and communicated to lower level
impl ementers.

Legislatures and courts do differ fundamentally with respect
to processes by which polices are made.

Also, courts and legislatures

exhibit other differences as well, such as organizational structure,
and implementing environment.

However, an exhaustive review of

similarities and differences between the institutions originating
these civil

liberties decisions and the criminal records privacy

mandate is neither necessary nor desireable.

Such

a

comparison

is

unnecessary because what we wish to learn from the civil liberties

policies, which happen to be
Court-initiated,

is

what they suggest are

the salient factors and interests
involved in the implementation
of

policies assigned to regulate the
administration of criminal justice.
In addition, the desireabil
ity of such an approach is
questionable

because of the likelihood that the
inquiry would become preoccupied
with invidious comparisons of strengths
and weaknesses of institutional

policy-making capacities.

While efforts of this kind are
illuminating

about potential policy boundaries
between courts and legislatures
(see Baum. 1981; Horowitz. 1977;
Youngblood and Folse, 1981), they tell
us little about political

factors shaping the responses of criminal

justice officials to federal policies.

Moreover, as Baum asserts:

The difficulties involved in the
implementation of judicial
policies are far from unique.
If problems of implementation
are common in the judiciary, these problems
are chiefly the
result not of special conditions in the judicial
system but
Of the universal weaknesses of organizational
superiors
(Baum, 1976a: 108-109).
[Emphasis added.]

Therefore,

a

review of state responses to and effects of these
two

important civil liberties decisions may be suggestive of
the likely
results of the state implementation of

a

Congressional mandate advancin

similar objectives.
What the ensuing analysis of state responses to the Supreme
Court civil

liberties policy suggests is that elite support and willing

ness to enforce compliance are significant factors involved in the

implementation of

a

national

tion of criminal justice.

policy designed to regulate the administra

These factors appear to account for

significant variations in compliance between states.
say that the other factors are unimportant.

appears to have

a

This is not to

The extent of change

secondary, but nonetheless important relationship
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to elite support and local

compliance while policy clarity and

specificity have, if anything, precisely
an inverse relationship to

compliance and change.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a
review of recent

conceptual frameworks advanced to show the
relationships among the

factors identified above and other variables
influencing the implemen-

tation of policy in the federal system.

Such frameworks seek to

provide the basis for explanatory theories of
policy implementation
processes.

As such,

they attempt to specify causal

relationships

between factors likely to increase compliance
regardless of differences
in characteristics of policy systems,
organizational

structure and

process and implementing environments.

Common Conditions of Effective Implementation

Minimal

threat of change
Most of the implementation literature holds that judicial and

legislative policies which involve extensive change are less likely to
be effectively implemented than those in which change is minimal.

Significantly, while courts may be less constrained than legislatures
by political-environmental

social

factors in making rulings involving profound

change, they are no less affected by problems in implementation.

Policies which involve extensive change but low goal consensus
are more likely to encounter difficulties in implementation than

policies with little change and high goal consensus (Van Meter and
Van Horn,

1975).

This is so because policy is largely

a

product of

incremental decisions; current policies build on past ones deviating
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only slightly from prior goals and practices.

Legislative policies

involving extensive institutional change
require an enormous amount
of initial

public support and continuous special

interest support

over time to ensure they are faithfully and
effectively executed.
This support is especially vulnerable to
dissipation over time and

subsequent erosion of initial statutory success

is a

likely byproduct

(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981).

Unlike legislative policy, court decisions can involve
extensive change with little public support.

Therefore, implementation

processes depend less on interest group support over time than
on

other factors internal to the judicial process and organizational

context into which the decisions are injected (Baum, 1981).
Regardless of these important institutional differences, the

amount of change does have

a

bearing on the extent of compliance.

There are at least three factors which reinforce the importance of

change in influencing policy outcomes.

These factors include:

complexity of organizational process involved, stability of the policy
system, and the values, attitudes and expectations of impl ementers
First, policies which entail

extensive organizational change

and interorganizational coordination are likely to be perceived by

implementers as involving more extensive change than those minimizing
such effects (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).

Even policies involving

high goal consensus are likely to be ineffective if they also require

organizational change.
Next, policies involving policy systems characterized by

instability and fluctuation will generally be less capable of
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effectively implementing policy
involving extensive change than
systems
which are stable and tightly coupled
(Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein,
This is so because consensus
and decision making processes
are
more likely to be weak in
"loosely-coupled" systems than in those
which
are not.
Extensive bargaining and compromise
is necessary before
1976).

policies can reach execution stage
with the predictable result that
as the policy nears the execution
stage, ambiguity replaces clarity

and specificity.

Finally, the values, attitudes and
expectations of implementers
can be important factors influencing
the extent of policy change.

implementers do not share values underlying

a

If

decision or statute,

perceived changes are likely to be greater than
if policy values are

compatible with implementers" beliefs.

Moreover, policies involving

extensive change of values may affect the intensity
with which the
policy is supported or opposed by target groups.

Policies involving

extensive change which produce intense opposition are less
likely to
be effectively implemented than those involving
neutrality or more

weak opposition (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975).

Expectations also

affect the way the magnitude of change is characterized.

For example,

court decisions which are not anticipated by target groups may produce

greater expectations of change than decisions and trends which build
slowly over time (Wasby, 1970).

Importantly, regardless of the actual

amount of change, policies can produce expectations about policy outcomes which differ markedly from actual effects.
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Unambiguous mandate

Another tenet of successful
implementation

is

that the policy

objectives should be stated clearly,
intended behavior identified and
performance specified (Van Meter and
Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and
Sabatier, 1981).

Clarity of policy is important for
three reasons.

implementers what

is

expected of them and provides

a

It tells

way to deter

deliberate distortion or misrepresentation
by those seeking to evade
compliance.

In addition, an unambiguous policy
provides a resource

to supporters of the policy (i.e.,
clients and special

interests) to

influence implementation processes (Mazmanian
and Sabatier, 1981).
Judicial opinions are somewhat more limited
than statutes in
the potential

for clarity.

While statutes provide general rules for

action, judicial decisions typically justify certain
acts and there-

fore are deliberately narrow in scope.

Little is said about alterna-

tive behavior.

However, the complexity of legislative processes and necessity
for compromise make intentional

vagueness and delegated discretion

inevitable elements of statutes (Van Horn, 1979).

To the extent that

both courts and legislatures face similar problems of complexity,

intermediate and lower level

implementers are given responsibility for

the development of more detailed guidelines to provide the clarity

lacking in original

policy (Baum, 1981).

Further, clarity of policy affects the processes by which

policy

is

transmitted from superiors to subordinates.

In this respect,

courts are less able than legislatures to control the way decisions are
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transmitted.

Courts are more dependent upon
communication processes

controlled by numerous participants in
the judicial process (Wasby.
1970;

1973).

Consequently, clarity

to distortion by lower level

is

essential

implementers

.

to limit vulnerability

In contrast,

the special

difficulties legislatures face concern
loss of control over guideline

development processes to federal and state
agency implementers.
the exercise of oversight powers is
essential

Thus,

to obtain feedback as to

bureaucratic fidelity to legislative intent.

Supportive state and local elites
Next,
is

initial and continuous support by state and
local elites

crucial to effective implementation of federal

policy.

There are

two sources from which elite support may emerge
to influence compliance

processes:

governors, legislators, judges and local elected

(1)

officials; and (2) state and local agency administrators.
State and local elite support is especially important to the
success of

a

federal

intergovernmental policy because such officials

exercise more direct control over agency resources and activities.
Conflicting policy objectives from federal and state sources are most
likely to undermine compliance with federal
Sabatier, 1981).

policy (Mazmanian and

While support for federal programs over time is

determined largely by national political forces, strong initial support
for state adoption and compliance is especially crucial

success.

A "fixer"

(a

to short term

legislator or executive official who controls

resources important to the program) should be readily available to

intervene on

a

continuous basis in order to protect the program from

destruction (Bardach, 1977a).

In this

regard, in recent years the
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devolution of decision making to state
and local elected officials
has been urged as

a

strategy to increase elite support by
strengthening

accountability and representation processes
at state and local levels.
Another way in which state executives and
legislators can
influence policy implementation processes is
through their power to
interpret policy intent and objectives to
lower level

implementers.

Such interpretations can decisively influence
attitudes of subordinates
in the policy system.

As Dolbeare and Hammond (1971)

predispositions toward

a

found, elite

policy can reinforce misinterpretations of

policy in which the lack of positive action is
rationalized away.
In

addition to state executives and other state officials,

state and local agency administrators with direct
responsibility for

implementation can influence the degree of compliance.

Federal

policies

which create new agencies and organizational processes by which
policy
is

implemented are more likely to achieve initial policy objectives

because implementers may be chosen who are supportive of the aims and

statutory purposes.
ful

In

addition, agency administrators must be skill-

in the use of resources and

mobilization of interest group support

to persuade sovereigns to continue to support efforts towards com-

pliance.
in

If these skills are lacking little success can be expected

securing compliance (Rourke, 1976).
One final factor significant in determining whether support

of agency administrators will occur is the extent to which statutory

goals are consistent or compatible with their utilities or preference

rankings (Brown and Stover, 1977).

Policies which impose costs with

little payoff for administrators with respect to continued interest
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group support and long term
agency survival will find
little support,
so non-compliance becomes
an acceptable alternative.

Enforcement possible
As Richard Neustadt declares,
decisions are not "self-

executing" and policies adopted by
legislatures and courts are no
exception (I960).
Any policy will encounter some
indifference or

resistance which must be overcome to
achieve goals and objectives.
Therefore, effective policy implementation
requires that some means
be available to ensure that intended
policy objectives get implemented.

Here, the implementation of legislative
and court-originated policy

differs in

a

fundamental respect.

Legislative policy objectives are

primarily enforced through an inducement
system in which conditions are
attached to grants of aid.

In

contrast, courts must rely primarily

upon sanctions to enforce compliance to its
decisions.

Inducement and sanction systems differ in important
respects.
The allocation of resources is intended to
make compliance to policy

more attractive; the benefits of compliance are
meant to outweigh the
costs.

Factors likely to affect the efficacy of policy inducements

to increase compliance include policy salience
and support,

relative

deprivation of loss of funds and likelihood of actually
suffering
the loss of funds.

Sanctions, on the other hand, are meant to make

response less attractive.

a

negative

Sanctions increase the cost of non-compliance

without altering the benefits of compliance (Baum, 1976a: Brown and
Stover, 1977).

substantial

To be effective,

sanctions must entail the threat of

loss and credibility of use; that is, the recipient must
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value the object forfeited
and must perceive that
the sanction is
Hkely to be inflicted for
non-compliance.
Factors likely to affect
the credibility of the
sanction and likelihood of
compliance therefore, include zone of
acceptance, intensity of enforcers'
demand
(Krislov, 1971); number of
target groups affected (Brown
and Stover,
1977); and number and intensity of
groups willing to challenge
Officials for non-compliance
(Brown and Stover, 1977;
Scheingold, 1982).

There are several means available
to legislatures to enforce
compliance with policy decisions.
Obviously, one of the most important
is

the control over and potential
withdrawal of federal

compliance.

Another

is

funds for non-

the direct intervention by
superiors in the

activities of subordinates.

Yet, such direct means are
rarely employed

and in fact, need not be because
there are

a

variety of other indirect

but effective approaches to achieving
compliance (Van Meter and Van

Horn, 1975).
The statute itself constitutes an
important source of leverage
to legislators and bureaucrats to
enable enforcement.

New agencies

may be created or existing ones designated
for policy execution that
are sympathetic to the policy objectives,
likely to build professional
and client alliances and pursue aggressive
agendas.

Decision rules of

implementing agencies (e.g., grant allocation
formulas and regulatory
procedures) can also be structured to minimize
veto points and ensure

organizational consistency with intended objectives
(Mazmanian and
Sabtatier, 1981).
In

addition, grant-in-aid programs secure advance compliance

by requiring detailed plans for the administration
and allocation of

funds.

Along with plans, detailed
guidelines may be promulgated
to
carefully specify eligible
expenditures, intergovernmental
and inter-

agency responsibilities and
relationships, reporting requirements
and
other areas (Van Horn. 1979).
Regulatory intrusiveness may
therefore
be an important surrogate
for the direct hierarchical
control lacking
in a federal system involving
decentralization of power and state
and
local

autonomy (Nieman and Lovell,
1981).
Finally, exchange strategies
which try to maximize shared

values between superiors and
subordinates can also be an important

substitute for approaches based upon
power-dependence (Gray and
Williams, 1980).

Funding can be used to foster policy
innovation and

demonstration projects designed to
cultivate mutual support for change.
Moreover, to the extent that state and
local officials can be encouraged to address common problems through
federal
for active enforcement is diminished.

initiatives, the need

Thus, recent federal policies

have emphasized the strengthening of
state and local

relations under

revenue sharing in order to devolve
accountability and thus, enforcement to lower levels of power.
Recent studies of state court policy making
in the aftermath

of the Warren Court suggest that states have
assumed increased leadership in extending Supreme Court-originated
rights protections into

other areas.

Therefore, it is contended, decentralization of policy

making to state courts

is

likely to increase the prospects of further

alignment and enforcement of state policy with constitutional
requisites
In

this respect, the devolution of decision making to state
courts is

considered

a

key factor in increasing the possibility of enforcement

(Porter and Tarr, 1982)
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Implementing Mapp and Miranda
In

its decisions on Mapp vs.

Ohio in 1961 and Miranda vs.

Arizona in 1966, the Supreme Court enunciated
national guidelines for
police observance of suspects' and defendants'
due process rights which
have had far reaching political

hailed the rulings as

a

implications.

Civil

liberties groups

significant step towards curbing police power

and abuses while criminal justice interests and
other sympathetic public

officials decried them for undermining effective law
enforcement.

The

decisions also precipitated controversy between
states-rights proponents and interests advocating

rights policy.
in order to

Therefore,

a

a

thoroughgoing federalization of civil

brief review of the decisions

is

necessary

understand the political environment surrounding the

implementation of these Supreme Court policies.
The Miranda ruling involves an attempt to specify the conditions

under which

a

suspect's statements may be considered voluntary.

certain designated warnings have been given to

a

Unless

suspect by police

(e.g., the right to remain silent, have an attorney present during

interrogation) the statements cannot be considered voluntary and thus
cannot be introduced as evidence by the prosecutor.
In addition,

Miranda requires that officers take positive

actions to acknowledge suspects' rights.

The warnings are to be in-

corporated as an integral part of the formal process by which an

offender

is

taken from arrest to final adjudication.

In most circum-

stances, suspects must be given an opportunity to exercise or waive

Miranda rights at the point at which they are taken into custody.

Thus,
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the Miranda ruling does not alter
police roles or functional activities;

rather, it establishes limits on how
far the fact-finding process may

proceed before an individual

is

given an opportunity to withdraw
from

further involvement in that process.
The Miranda decision is a model of
clarity and specificity,

providing little leverage for alternative
state court interpretations.
Police use of confessions as investigative
tools
aged.

is

clearly discour-

Moreover, the warnings are not to be employed in

or ritualistic way but given in "unequivocal

a

perfunctory

terms" (Milner, 1971a: 40).

The Mapp decision applied the so-called exclusionary
rule for

searches and seizures to law enforcement officials
in states, holding
that illegally seized evidence could not be used
in state criminal

proceedings.

positive but

In
a

contrast to Miranda

,

the Mapp decision

involves not

a

negative injunction; police are not to collect evidence

through methods contrary to the right to privacy, and courts
are not to
admit evidence which involves use of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Some observers see the Mapp decision primarily as an attempt
to deter police abuse of investigative powers.

advise

a

broader reading of Mapp as

a

In contrast,

others

rule to guide judicial decisions

regarding admissibility of evidence and the adjudication of guilt or
innocence of the accused (Horowitz, 1977).

clear why Mapp must be considered either
lower court conduct but not both.

a

But it is not altogether

regulation of police or

Moreover, understanding both Mapp

and Mi randa decisions as an extension of the supervisory responsibility

state courts have over trial court procedure suggests the importance
of their leadership in securing police compliance.

What is common therefore, to both
decisions

is

that the Court

determined that the credibility and
fairness of trial outcomes was
seriously undermined by admitting
evidence or testimony secured by
police in fact finding processes
which involved unreasonable
invasions
of individual privacy or coercive
custodial environments.
The Court

clearly attempted to advance at least
two objectives by this decision.
First, the Supreme Court intended that
the police not only

discontinue certain practices associated
with investigation such as

warrantless searches and custodial

interrogation but expected police

to devise other methods by which
evidence could be collected.

Second, the lower courts were expected to
utilize these

policies as standards governing decisions on
admissibility of evidence
and, significantly, with Mapp judges were
expected to directly par-

ticipate in decisions regarding the need and
appropriateness of the
issuance of search warrants.

Thus, the policies involved structural

implications; courts are directly implicated in

a

supervisory function

which expands their responsibilities in the criminal justice
process.
The methodologies employed to determine the impact of the

Supreme Court civil liberties decisions vary in significant ways.

Scholarly opinion

is

consequently strongly divided about the results

and efficacy of the decisions, especially in the case of Mapp

attempt is made here to participate in this debate.

Rather,

.

No

I

have

tried to draw broadly from representative studies in the literature in

order to determine what it tells us about factors affecting state and
local

responses.
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The expectations and
realities of change

What Is striking about initial
responses of criminal justice
officials to the Ma££, and Miranda
decisions is the common expectation
that if Implemented, they would result
in extensive, adverse change
in the

conduct and outcomes of the criminal
justice process.

The

observance of defendant's rights was
expected to constrain law
enforcement investigative functions. Impede
effective prosecution
and produce judicial outcomes contrary
to findings of factual guilt.

Subsequent studies suggest, however, that these
beliefs or perceptions
were greatly exaggerated; the actual effects
of the policies have
varied substantially from initial expectations.

Although the response by the criminal justice community
was
largely negative and consistent with public opinion,
neither decision
was unexpected by criminal justice officials.

Twenty-two state courts

had already adopted some form of the exclusionary rule prior
to Mapp

.

Moreover, federal courts had been operating under the rule since
Weeks in 1914.

Yet,

interestingly, police in states operating under

the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp perceived greater
disruption of

existing practice (Murphy, 1966).

Pre- Mapp rule states also showed

a

greater likelihood towards non-compliance than non-rule states,
although compliance would be unlikely to involve much policy change
for pre- Mapp rule states.

The Miranda decision also was preceded by several prior Supreme

Court decisions involving

a

gradual but unmistakeable enlargement of

defendants' due process protections.

Miranda simply consolidated the
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several

Incremental

steps the Court had already
taken to ensure adequate

and uniform due process
protections in the states.

In fact, the decision seems to have been better
anticipated by police than Escopedo
(Wasby. 1970: 155).
Yet once the complete panoply
of defendantsrights was fully specified and
embodied in a concrete procedure,
the

perceived extent of change was
greatly magnified.
Studies of the impact of Ma££ and
Miranda generally suggest
that expected effects were
greatly overdrawn.

Changes have occurred

but not necessarily in either
intended or anticipated directions.
Formal

compliance does not carry the onerous
consequences expected by

police and prosecutors, nor do the
decisions appear to close avenues

available to bypass or evade compliance
(Baum, 1979; Wasby, 1970).
The issuance of Miranda warnings, for
example, has not endangered the

likelihood of conviction (see Seeburger and
Wettick, 1967; Wald et al.,
1967).

And both decisions have generally revealed
the resilience,

adaptiveness and pervasiveness of informal
practices (e.g., plea
bargaining) which limit policies designed to
formalize procedures and

structure discretion (Horowitz, 1977).

In this regard,

the Miranda

decision, more so than Ma££, lends itself to literal
compliance.

These findings underscore the limited behavioral change
required
to achieve compliance, yet the general

desired objectives.

lack of efficacy in achieving

The importance of the decisions for our under-

standing of the relationship between extent of change and compliance

therefore suggests that policies may impose cognitive costs for role
bearers who must comply with policies for which they have no underlying
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belief or support.

The actual extent of behavioral
change necessitated

to achieve policy compliance
may be far less important in
determining

policy efficacy than the extent
of dissonance resulting from
compliance
to mandates which create
inconsistencies in perceived role
bearing
functions

Procedural clarity and
perfunctory response
One of the novel attributes of the
Supreme Court civil

liberties

decisions, contributing no doubt to the
general image of profound policy
change, was the attempt to specify
police and trial court behavior in

detailed terms.

In

this regard, the Miranda decision
constituted

a

model of clarity and precision, atypical
of most court decisions as
well

as legislative policy.

In

addition, both policies were clearly

intended to minimize the variations in state
court criminal defendant

guidelines and limit the leverage lower level
implementers might have
to either evade, avoid or fail

to comply with the policies.

Studies of the impact of these Court-originated policies
suggest
however that there may be an inverse relationship between
the extent of
policy concreteness and compliance.
of lower level

The attempt to limit the leverage

implementers by making procedural adoption unavoidable

may make change in informal processes especially likely to sustain
non-

compliance.

Policies limited to procedural objectives may increase the

probability of perfunctory responses and thus limit the probability of
change in actual performance.
The Mapp and Miranda policies offer contrasting profiles of

compliance which strongly suggest that Miranda has resulted in patterns
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of literal and perfunctory
compliance while the l.v.
has produced differential

responses (Bauin,

.

Maj,p

rulin,

while the majority

l')/-)).

of police may now be using the
Miranda warnings

pn.:i....

they have developed

variety of subtle, informal methods
by which to adapt to Miranda
and
avoid its consequences.
The tight focus of the decision
on
discrete
point in the investigative process
has evidently invited exploitation
a

of marginal

situations in which custody

is

ambiguous.

In contrast,

the exclusionary rule, given the
absence of procedural

prescription

has produced far more uncertainty
among police and others about the

likelihood that non-compliance will go
unnoticed or unchallenged.

Compliance to

Maj.jj

is

therefore dictated largely by the nature
of the

case and the importance of obtaining

When response to the civil

conviction (Canon, iq74a).

a

liberties decisions is enlarged to

include the prosecutorial stage, compliance is
more problematic.
informal

practice of plea bargaining

justice process.

There are in fact,

a

variety of ways

which prosecutors may deal with problems of evidence;
compared to

these alternatives, the likelihood that
a

pervasive in the criminal

Consequently, the overwhelming majority of cases are

disposed of through guilty pleas.
in

is

The

a

case will go to trial,

successful motion to supress evidence and lead to sanctions

ol

involve

police

practices is rather slim (Horowitz, 1977).
In

addition to these problems, unambiguous Court-originated

policy mandates have not produced uniform state court rulings.
are,

in

fact,

a

number of ways in which stat(} courts may respond

Supreme Court policy.

There
to

Many such responses are not clearly categorized

as either compliant or non-compliant.

State courts

in

some

insLarices
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have chosen to qualify, limit or
even expand Supreme Court civil

liberties policies (Kramer and Riga,
1982).

The specificity of the

decision has, for example, produced
state court responses which
clearly divide along ideological lines
(Romans, 1974) and show wide
Mij::anda

variations in the scope of permissible
behavior defined to fall inside
or outside interrogation policy
guidelines (Cimino, 1973).
Moreover,

occasions of state court non-compliance
appear related less to clarity
and substance of policy than to the
importance of state practices they

seek to invalidate.

State courts are less likely to comply
when long

standing state practices are threatened (Tarr,
1977).
Finally, the communication of Court-originated
policies

undergoes distortion in their transmission from
superiors to subordinates.

It is

not evident, however, that policy clarity
contributes

to more effective transmission processes.

Clear policies are just as

vulnerable to distortion as unclear ones, particularly if
they are
controversial as was the case with Miranda

.

Press reports of the

^"irdnda rules greatly oversimplified the policy and
often failed to

report how it affected the interrogation process (Wasby, 1973).

More-

over, how Miranda was understood by police depended primarily
upon the

source interpreting it.
in

Milner (1971a) reported significant variations

police understanding of Miranda in terms of source.

he discovered that departmental

Significantly,

sources were more likely to involve

greater distortion than those outside the department.
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Differential

support by elites

State court justices are potentially
important Intermediaries
1n determining the way
Supreme Court decisions are
implemented at the
state and local level.
Most state courts now have
authority to

supervise trial court behavior
through adoption of rules and
through
enunciation of guidelines resulting
from review of trial court cases.
Therefore, state court review of
trial court decisions provides
two
important vehicles by which state
courts may influence state and
local

Implementation of Supreme Court decisions.

State court opinions may

be used to express support or
opposition to policies

decisions and such decisions may help
commence
additional

state court policies emerge.

courts have undertaken

a

implied by Court

process by which

a

While it is clear that state

more activist posture over the last two

decades (Porter and Tarr, 1982). few studies
are available which carefully document precisely how much Influence
state court rulings

interpreting Supreme Court policy have in
determining lower level
responses and ultimate policy outcomes.

The few studies that do focus

on this issue, although unable so far to
establish

a

direct causal

relationship between state court decisions and
directions of local
response, do provide evidence of the importance of
state and trial
courts'

support for

a

Supreme Court policy.

As noted before, Mapp , and later Miranda

,

provoked widespread

controversy among national, state and local elected officials.
courts were no exception.

State

Canon (1974b) discovered that "organiza-

tional contumacy" was widespread.

Canon defined Instances of contumacy

to consist of attempts to express defiance, disobedience or resistance

to court policy through
tactics which include adoption
of strained

interpretations, expressions of
confusion and other means of
delaying
implementation.

Significantly, the most frequently
expressed criticism of both
decisions pertained to their adverse
implications for effective law
enforcement.
State courts showed considerable
sympathy for police
and strongly sided with law
enforcement values. As Canon observes:
Those taking this approach seem
to identify less with
va ues ascribed to the courts
in determining
co

s^U

tional

''''' ''''''' the Judiciary

0974b: 61).'

Thus, state court contumacy may
provide an important source

of political

symbolism injected into the arena of
state politics.

Given the widespread negative public
reaction to Ma££ and Miranda,

perhaps state courts found it necessary
to shield themselves from the

inevitable political repercussions likely
to ensue from the necessity
of complying with decisions of judicial
superiors.

Such cues create

expectations among prosecutors and police that
Supreme Court policy

is

being implemented under protest and that
actual enforcement may be
unl

i

kely.

We also know a great deal about prosecutor attitudes toward
the Mapp and Miranda rulings and they are overwhelmingly negative.

In

his survey in one state Katz (1966) found the following prosecutor

attitudes toward Mapp

.

For example, most prosecutors are more likely

then other criminal justice officials to hold that reliable
evidence

should be admitted in court regardless of the legality of seizure,
that

state courts should not apply the same standards as federal courts.
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that

pdce

should not be subjected to
civil or criminal

prosecution
for violations of the
exclusionary rule and that the
Ma££ rule should
be relaxed.
Yet once the federal

standards had been adopted by
state courts

it appears to have been
difficult to persuade them to
relax or withdraw

the standard in face of Supreme
Court invitations to do so.
by Wilkes

(1974;

Studies

1976) and Gruhl and Spohn (1981)
show that efforts

by the Burger Court since
1971

to relax the Miranda standards
have

neither resulted in similar decisions
by state courts nor produced
increased attempts by local prosecutors
to evade the ruling.
Interestingly, however, prosecutors continue
to be critical of the policy

yet uphold the doctrine in their day
to day decisions.
In addition,

there is some evidence that police
also look

primarily for direction from local trial
courts.

While local trial

courts sometimes demonstrate little familiarity
with state court

decisions, where local courts do comply with
instructions from state
courts, police practices are likely to be more
consistent with state

court policy (LaFave, 1968).
What this analysis suggests is that where police
and prosecutors

attitudes and styles are similar; where hostility by trial
judges to
the policies is widespread; where judicial willingness
to supervize

police investigative activity is minimal and where prosecutorial
case

screening is unsystematic, then police non-compliance
flourish.

is

likely to

Where such conditions prevail, the unintended consequence

of the civil

liberties decisions may have been, as Horowitz (1977)

contends, to reinforce rather than weaken an informal and, at times,

arbitrary structure of practices.
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The underenforcement of
Supreme Court dec1s1on<;
If most state courts have
complied with the Supreme Court

civil

liberties decisions in Ma££ and
Miranda

,

in

spite of initial

criticisms (see Baum, 1979 and Tarr,
1977) and trial courts and local
prosecutors are generally willing to
comply with state policies, then
it would be reasonable to
expect increased police observance
of

defendants' due process rights and
substantial reform of police in-

vestigative practices.
these expectations.

Yet the available evidence fails
to support

Instead they suggest that police conduct
continues

to be governed primarily by local

custom and practice.

Moreover,

there appear to be extensive variations
between police departments

within states governed by clear and consistent
policies expressing
unequivocal

protection of defendant's due process rights
(Canon, 1973;

Manwaring, 1972; Porter and Tarr, 1982).
There are two lines of argument to explain the gap
between
federal and state policy and local

performance:

(1)

state courts are

incapable of direct intervention in police conduct and
therefore are
unable to enforce decisions; (2) there are important political,

intergovernmental and organizational constraints which limit the

aggressiveness with which enforcement of Supreme Court mandates

is

pursued.
First, while it is true that there are important institutional

constraints to state court intervention and supervision of police
behavior, state courts do have the power to supervise lower court

behavior and, thus, may impose sanctions on both trial courts and police
for non-compliance.

Yet studies of state court implementation of Mapp

,
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for example,

indicate that while state courts
have been more willing

to overturn police methods
conflicting with the exclusionary
rule,

they have also been unwilling
to impose actual sanctions
on offending
departments and individual officers.
What evidence of this kind

suggests is that trial court judges
frequently fail to supervise
police investigations when there is

a

need to do so.

Second, while enforcement is
possible, political and organizational considerations make enforcement
unlikely.

State court

organizational relations to lower courts
and police were put under

pressure by Supreme Court rulings
involving increased state enforcement
efforts.

Briefly put, state courts adopting their
own exclusionary

rule before Ma££ were less likely to
comply with that decision because

adoption of the federal rule preempted
state-based mechanisms for
enforcement.

Clearly, criticism of federal preemption
of state court

supervisory, policy making and enforcement
power was widespread.

One

important recurring complaint, as Canon's review of
state court

contumacy indicates (1974b), was that Ma££ and
Miranda put state and
lower courts in an awkward and unwanted position of
supervising police
behavior.

Therefore, adoption of

Supreme Court policy would not

a

only preempt state policy making and thus,

decisions, but give federal courts
federal

law.

a

a

body of ancillary

larger role in enforcement of

Therefore, potential federal preemption of state enforce-

ment mechanisms constitutes

a

threat to the decentralized power and

discretion which typifies the administration of criminal justice.

local

State court judges are unlikely to treat Supreme Court policy
with

a

sense of urgency unless organizational

interests are either

threatened or advanced by compliance.

The Supreme Court civil

liberties
decisions created new opportunities
for state courts to increase
their
organizational strength and policy making
authority through administrative reforms.
Efforts to increase the power of
state courts to

supervise trial courts through policy
making may also further administrative centralization and vice versa.

evidence to be found which suggests

a

However, there is little

significant relationship between

policy and administrative control and
the ability of state courts to

influence lower court compliance to
policies and decisions through

administrative reforms.

It is evident that progress towards
state

court unification has been slow; where
substantial administrative
reforms had been adopted, it is not evident
that their implementation
has been successful

nor increased lower court compliance to state
court

and Supreme Court policy (Baar, 1980; Glick,
1982; Click and Vines,

1973).

Conceptual Frameworks for Understanding State
and Local Implementation of Federal Policy

Studies of the policy implementation process have progressed
through several stages involving closely related focal points of
inquiry.

The traditional disciplines of administrative theory and

organizational behavior supplied the initial

impetus to systematically

investigate why policies fail to get translated into neutral rules of
program execution (Hargrove, 1975; Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976).
Studies of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, demonstrating
a

gap between intent and actual

performance invited closer inspection

of how a legislative policy gets translated into behavior (Dolbeare
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and Hammond,

1971; Wasby, 1970).

As the field of policy
implementation

developed, the focus has broadened
from

preoccupation with organiza-

a

tional dynamics of policy execution
to recent attempts to advance

integrated explanatory frameworks
capable of specifying common factors
affecting outcomes.
The second stage of policy
implementation analysis has been

characterized by

a

plethora of case studies identifying

factors hindering program implementation
processes.
and Mosher (1968), Derthick
(1975), Lowi

a

number of

Studies by Bailey

(1969), Murphy (1972), and

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) document how
statutory ambiguity, guideline development processes and organizational
complexity, including

variations of state and local official support
may contribute to the
failure to achieve intended goals.

With the exception of Lowi, studies

by these authors and others of a similar
kind have exercised caution in

developing broader implications of what their findings
imply about the
nature of the political system.
This restraint has been justified in part because we lack
the

explanatory theories necessary to identify causal relationships
between
significant factors shaping outcomes.

In

addition, there has been no

common agreement on what should constitute the outputs of public policy.
Some studies have been content to measure procedural compliance while

others seek to trace the relationship between output, impact and

ultimate change processes (Dolbeare, 1974).
Recently, efforts to model the implementation process have been

launched to fill

developed cover

in this
a

important stage of theory building.

The models

wide range of policy areas and arenas and draw upon
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several areas of knowledge
such as organizational
behavior, public law,
community power studies, and
technology innovation and
diffusion.
These
efforts hav3 resulted in identifying
several factors likely to
influence
policy effectiveness.
There are however, variations
in the rigor and

specificity with which the models
are constructed.

Some schemes constitute interesting conceptual
frameworks (e.g., Bardach, 1977a;
Berman,
'

1980; Edwards,

1980) while others specify causal

relationships between

factors, elaborate the significance
of key variables and in some

instances, prescribe ways to achieve
effective policy implementation

(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Ripley
and Franklin, 1982; Van Meter and
Van Horn, 1975).

There have also been attempts to examine
the utility of more

rigorous models in applied settings, most
notably by Van Horn (1979)

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), and
Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein

(.1976).

But, little effort has been directed at
testing the strength of these
and other models in accounting for the
variation in the effects of public

policies.

Studies which apply conceptual frameworks and
specific policy

contexts do suggest, however, that the relative
significance of particular
factors likely to affect policy implementation
processes may vary between
policy systems.

For example, given the strength of dispositional

ele-

ments and controversy likely to confront criminal
justice policies, the

extent of change and clarity of policy goals may be
more important to
policy success than elite support or availability of
enforcement mechanisms (Morash, 1982; Wasby, 1970).

Although theory testing

is

only in

a

rudimentary stage at this

point, efforts have been made nonetheless to develop conceptual or
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explanatory frameworks capable
of integrating our knowledge
across
policy settings and institutions.
Such efforts seek to identify
common factors influencing the
implementation of policies originated
by courts as well as
legislatures.
Although the attempt to develop
an
integrated explanatory framework
presupposes further progress in
applied studies, it is not precluded
by these developments.
Moreover, conceptual frameworks
construed in the broadest
institutional terms are

a

necessary corrective to study
conclusions

dictated largely by policy areas
applied.

in

which particular frameworks are

Examples of limited attempts in this
regard include works by

Baum (1977; 1981); Mazmanian and
Sabatier (1983); Nakamura and Smallwood
(1980); Shapiro (1968) and Shapiro and Hobbs
(1974).

urges caution in generalizing about
judicial

Baum,

in particular,

implementation processes from

legislative policy studies because of
important differences in institutional characteristics and the secondary
importance of environmental

influences such as interest group and public
support.

He also suggests,

along with Brown and Stover (1977), that the
literature in organizational

behavior provides the best source of guidance in
understanding

court systems in which policy implementation processes
are determined

principally by the preferences and utility structure of
subordinates.
In the

remainder of this chapter,

I

discuss some of the issues

and terms used by the authors of different conceptual models
to describe

policy outcomes.

Then,

I

review and contrast in more detail the con-

tours of three models which advance contrasting explanations
of state
and local

implementation of federal policy.

The models have been

selected for their perported general applicability to the implementation
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of federal grant-in-aid programs
involving intergovernmental
regulation.
Since the models selected also
generate conclusions about the
nature of the American political
system and institutions from
applied
settings, these themes will be
carefully drawn out in the ensuing

discussion.
Following the analysis of the state
implementation of the
federal criminal

records privacy mandate presented in
the next few

chapters, alternative explanations are
developed in Chapter VII which

draw upon the frameworks sketched here.

Subsequently,

I

assess the

relative significance of factors contributing
to compliance to public
policy, suggest connections to the findings
of studies of state

implementation of Supreme Court due process policies
and sketch
conceptual

a

framework with which to understand common factors
influencing

the state implementation of federal mandates.

Measuring response and
pol icy outcomes
An important concern of conceptual models regarding
policy

implementation processes

is

how to define the outputs of public policy.

There is little agreement or consistency in the literature on policy

implementation regarding ways to best characterize outcomes of public
policy.

The terms compliance, response and impact for example, are

used in inconsistent and often overlapping ways, each suggesting

different implications regarding scope and measurement.
is a

need to employ

a

Thus, there

common terminology in order to compare the

implementation of policies originated by two different institutions
involving different capacities and approaches to implementation and

enforcement.
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As Wasby (1970)

focus than impact.

has argued, compliance involves
a narrower

Assessments of compliance turn upon
judgments about

the policy originators'

intentions as well as the implementers

ness, and understanding of what is
expected.

'

aware-

Importantly, the term

compliance differentiates between correct
and incorrect behavioral
responses, thus strongly weighting
interpretations by policy superiors.

However, the consequences of policy may
not be intended and often involve second or third order consequences
(Dolbeare, 1974) which

complicate judgments about causal relationships
between policy, behavior
and attitude.

tions about

with

a

a

For example, the implementers'

perceptions or expecta-

policy's effects may influence their willingness
to comply

policy directive.
In

addition, the usage of the term compliance involves
normative

assumptions regarding hierarchy, obedience and acceptable
and unacceptable response to policy.

Policy is often implemented in contexts where

lines of authority are uncertain, where intergovernmental
and inter-

organizational relations are better characterized in non-hierarchical
terms.
formal

Although the implementation of judicial policy may involve
hierarchical relations between the Supreme Court and state courts,

states and localities do not always bear

a

subordinate relation to

Congress with respect to policy development.

In

addition, implementers

may exercise substantial discretion in the way they choose to respond to

policy requirements.
in

Consequentially, they may satisfy policy objectives

varying degrees through behavior neither required nor intended by the

pol icy originator.
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Four terms may be employed
to characterize policy
results, which
help bypass some of the more
vexing problems associated
with the measurement Of compliance.
These terms are response,
effects, performance and
change.
Each term may be distinguished
in several ways.
First, the term response
appears to capture two dimensions
of
behavior: the consistency of
direction of behavior with intended
goals
and the intensity of the impl
ementers attitudes toward the
policy.

Both the direction and intensity
of response may be influenced
in turn
by how the policy is interpreted
and by perceptions of expected
effects
of that policy.
Direction of response pertains to
the avenues the

implementer chooses to "satisfy" policy
demands.

Thus, response to the

policy demands is not necessarily
the same thing as compliance.

Policy effects or impacts, on the other
hand, refer to the

direct consequences of the policy including
organizational structure
and patterns of intergovernmental and
interorganizational

characteristic of

a

particular policy system.

intended and unintended effects.

relations

Policies may produce both

When intended results are achieved,

this usually implies that at least some of
the policy goals or objec-

tives have been achieved.

However, unintended consequences do not

necessarily imply policy failure for such effects
may sometimes contribute to the realization of policy goals.
A third term to distinguish from the other terms
characterizing

implementation processes is that of performance.
may not result in changes in performance.

only in knowing what happened as

a

Compliant behavior

Thus, we are interested not

result of the adoption of public

policy but whether there has been some improvement in the nature or
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conduct Of decision processes
and outcomes,

issues of efficiency as

well as effectiveness, including
fairness and due process, must
figure
into the appraisal of performance.
In addition to these notions,
attempts to alter performance

involve the idea of change.

Policy induced changes are, for
reasons

we have already noted, difficult
to measure, for change can
occur on

many different levels.

Change or the lack of it may be
manifested in

beliefs, behavior, attitudes, procedure
and organizational structure.
It is unlikely that policies will

produce simultaneous changes in all

these dimensions; rather, such changes
that do occur as
the implementation of policy will

a

result of

be limited to one or two dimensions.

The local consequences
of federal aid
Van Meter and Van Horn

implementation.
a

(1975) advance a systems model of policy

Their model proposes that where implementation
involves

federal, intergovernmental policy, it embodies

a

unidirectional

relationship between the policy, intervening variables
and performance.

Performance

is

defined narrowly to consist of the "degree to which

anticipated services are actually delivered" (144).

As such,

the

definition neglects an important feature of policy implementation
processes--it's impact and whether ultimate outcomes were achieved.
It is conceivable,

therefore, by this measure, that policies could be

effectively implemented but not result

in any change.

Key variables posited by this model
and resources,

a

include:

policy standards

set of intervening variables which include federal

communication and enforcement mechanisms, characteristics of implementing
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agencies, and economic, social,
political and other environmental

conditions.

In

addition to these factors the
authors suggest that

within the local policy environment,
the disposition of local implementers is an important variable
standing between federal control

mechanisms and ultimate performance.

The importance and utility of

their work lies in its stress on
local elites and the political

environment.
Van Horn (1979)

has applied an amended version of
their

original construct to explain the outcomes
of the implementation of
several

recent revenue sharing programs.

In

this analysis. Van Horn

reviews the legislative history and
implementation of General Revenue

Sharing, the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (ETA) and the

Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG)
in order to determine
what the resulting performance of these programs
implies about how the
funds were used, who benefits and who governs.
The findings about the latter two issues provide an
interesting

explanation of implementation processes and politics.

In

essence,

although federal revenue sharing policies deviated only marginally
from intended goals, they also exerted little impact on decisions
made
by local

impl ementers

First, Van Horn contends that the "worst fears" of liberal

opponents to decentralization of redistributive policies in employment
and training (CETA) and housing (CDBG) were not realized.

Decentral-

izing power to state and local governments did not produce benefit

patterns which substantially departed from targeted disadvantaged
groups.

One important reason for this outcome is due to the relative

strength of national and local

interest groups (whose political
clout

was increased by war on poverty
programs)

in

protecting the interests

of the poor and disadvantaged.

Secondly, however. Van Horn contends
that unclear national
policies and vague goals, combined
with the autonomy of local
officials
minimized the impact of federal agency
control over intergovernmental

implementation processes.

There were two sources for these
variable

results.
The inability or incapacity, as
Van Horn suggests, of Congress
to specify clear national

intended outcomes.

policies helped account for variations
from

Given multiple and ambiguous objectives,
local

implementers unsurprisingly developed
to how best to allocate funds.

a

variety of interpretations as

When Congress grew disappointed with

limited initial progress, they responded during
reauthorization by

imposing heavier regulatory burdens on local
government.
federal

Yet increased

regulation had counter-productive effects which
withdrew

flexibility, thereby inviting increased variations in
response.
Van Horn's reading of several

revenue sharing programs leads

him to reason that effective policy implementation is
most likely to

occur when the ends of policy are clear but means are left
unspecified
or flexible,
Federal

incentives are targeted and enforcement

is

selective.

enforcement has been the subject of particular abuse. Van Horn

observes, because

a

heavy handed approach is used regardless of the

vast differences with respect to faithfulness to statutory intent and

performance records among state and local governments.

Thus, enforce-

ment tactics must be geared towards actual performance and be stronger
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where local

interest groups representing
target groups are relatively
weak in their influence in local
politics.
Moreover. Van Horn disputes Lowi's
(1979) assertion that

ambiguous law results

in

delegated power and policy failure
because

of the very unambitious policy
agenda that ambiguous laws support.
Van Horn argues that flexibility
and the lack of legislative
clarity

are essential

ingredients to intergovernmental
feasibility and local

innovation given the forces of rapid
social economic change.

Adjusting policy to the system
Rein and Rabinovitz (1977) offer a
contrasting conception of

the policy implementation process.

They argue that we conceive of

the politics of implementation as a
circular process which progresses

from policy enactment to guideline development,
resource distribution,

oversight and legislative revision.
tives of legal

At each stage contending impera-

intent, bureaucratic feasibility and external
consensus

must be resolved before policies can be fully
implemented and objectives achieved.
(more likely)

These three imperatives may operate in isolation or

in conjunction at each stage of the process.

Respect for legal

legislative objectives.

intent requires that implementers acknowledge
The requirement that policy be bureaucratical
ly

feasible necessitates that implementers make concessions to various
interest groups in order to minimize opposition from target groups.
Such concessions may be required in order to assure effective

implementation.
external

The consensual

imperative is operative when interests

to the implementing process dominate implementation through

control over priorities and definitions of standards constituting

effective performance.

This influence typically results
in control

over the allocation of resources
to beneficiaries.
Thus, the politics of implementation
of federal mandates is

portrayed as the process by which
conflicts among contending imperatives are resolved at each stage of
the implementation process.

Importantly, Rein and Rabinovitz
hypothesize that the way in which

conflicts are resolved

is

a

function of statutory purposes (i.e.,

clarity, salience, and consistency),
resources (i.e., kind, level and
timing), complexity and "settledness" of
the administrative arena in

which policies are implemented.

In previous

work (see Rabinovitz,

Pressman and Rein, 1976) the authors have
attempted to examine their

theory with respect to the guideline stage of
implementation.

These

studies have sought, in particular, to determine
how guideline

processes vary across policy arenas (e.g., health, social
services,
housing and internal revenue) and how guidelines
relate to the larger
political

system.

An arena in which policy is implemented is defined to consist

of a political and administrative context in which policy is
both

formulated and implemented.
institutional

It includes a

"web" of individual and

interrelationships which would develop over time among

congressman, administrators, interest groups and academic experts, and

other interested parties (1976: 405).
and complexity of the intergovernmental

Arenas vary in terms of level

hierarchy of working relation-

ships, centralization of decision making and settled patterns of

interaction.

The patterns of relationships between policy and arena

which unfold from these studies suggest that clear policies are likely
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to result in compliance
in settled arenas but
require accommodation

(i.e., bureaucratic imperative)
in open systems.
on the other hand,

Ambiguous policies,

require clarification in settled
systems and both

central control combined with
delegation over time, in open arenas.

Guideline development processes
involved in implementing Internal
Revenue Service tax regulations is
offered as an example of the first
cell

shown below in Figure

2.

Pol icy Arenas

Substantive Issues

Settled

Open

Clear
Compl iance

Accommodation

Clarification

Control/Delegation

Ambiguous

Figure
Development

2.

SOURCE:

Issues, Arenas and the Process of Guideline

Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976: 406.

While the social service guidelines documented by Derthick
(1976) depict
the polar extreme in cell 4, the Health Maintenance Organization guide-

line development processes are considered an example of

2

as documented

by Altman and Sapolsky (1976)

An example of an instance in which an ambiguous issue is

implemented in

a

settled arena would be Steiner's (1971) analysis of
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public relief policy.

This presents an interesting
case according to

the authors because it
suggests that an ambiguous
issue could work to
unsettle an arena thus implying
that structural changes may
occur

depending on the match between
policies and arenas.

The possibility
that ambiguous policies may
become more clear, and vice versa
over time,
may be due to changes in the
patterns of interactions in an
arena,
induced 1n part by reactions to
policy by institutional actors
in that
arena,

The fact that this last point
is left undeveloped by the
authors

suggests the need for additional
cases which fit these circumstances.
But what is not entirely clear are
the criteria for deciding how to

characterize

a

policy arena or system in order to
measure changes it

may undergo over time.

Moreover,

a

policy system may involve

a

mixture

of settled and unsettled elements
which include relatively unchanging

functional routines and transactions, yet
decentralized power and

conflictual policy making processes.

Such features could very well

complicate judgments about conditions conducive
to compliance and policy
effectiveness
There are several

implications of Rein and Rabinovitz's (1977)

examination of intergovernmental regulation and the
American political
system.
is

First,

if policy effectiveness,

more than simple compliance,

the major objective of implementing public policy then
the price

paid for the consensus that is required is reinterpretation
and minimal

change in institutional structures.
fronted with

a

paradox:

This is so because we are con-

clear policies have their best chance of

success in systems which have remained unaltered
over time.

When we
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fan away from

this optimal

situation there

less consistency with statutory
intent.

is

greater conflict and

By this reckoning, it would

seem that ambiguous policies
implemented in open systems must
closely
approximate pluralist political
processes, yet are least likely to

involve consistency with statutory
intent.
In

fact, the authors are moved to
conclude that since most

policy arenas fail to approximate
the characteristics of

a

settled

arena, federal and state guideline
development processes set in motion
the forces of dissipation and
disaggregation at each successive stage

of implementation.
is

Therefore, policy which ultimately gets
implemented

likely to be the product of complex bargaining,
negotiation and

interest group compromise.

Policy implementation processes thus

reflect the broad dispersion of power and
access to decision making

characteristic of

a

pluralist political system.

What makes this view contrast most sharply with
Van Horn's
analytical

framework

is

the evident absence of

a

meaningful role of

state and local elected officials in the implementation
of federal
policies.

Guideline development processes appear to occur in self

contained bureaucratic worlds answerable only to the most
powerful
external

interests.

Therefore, by this account, state and local

elected officials appear to have very little significance in the equation in which policies ultimately get executed.

A unified framework for explaining
judicial and legislative policies

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) have developed and applied

comprehensive conceptual framework by which to explain policy

a
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implementation processes involving
federal policies which include
either distributive and regulatory
purposes or both and are originated
by either courts or legislatures.

Thus, they have developed an inte-

grative framework by which to explain
implementation processes of
courts as well as legislatures.
societal

They construe policy to include broad

agendas involving complementary statutes
and court decisions

over time.
Moreover, the authors contend that their
framework includes

other strengths as well compared to those
frameworks already described,
and greatly enlarge upon the conditions
identified in the literature
as conducive towards compliance.

They also acknowledge the importance

of tractability of the problem and validity
of theory as important

variables affecting performance.

In

addition, the diversity of target

group behavior is also considered an important determinant
of exten-

siveness of change.
Finally, they are careful to draw distinctions in the stages

of policy outputs.

Policy outputs (e.g., adopting agency policies,

delivering services) constitute one of several types of dependent
variables in the implementation process which include compliance by
target groups, actual
revisions.

impacts, perceived impacts, and major statutory

This distinction is important, for as Dolbeare (1974) has

cogently argued, policies produce radiating second and third order

consequences which may confound assessments of causal relationships
among factors and influence assessments of the extent of change.

Compared to Van Horn, Rein and Rabinovitz and others, Mazmanian
and Sabatier are far more impressed with the extent to which

a

statute

can be structured to satisfy
the twin goals of policy
effectiveness
and democratic accountability;
neither goal has to be necessarily
sacrificed in the implementation
process.
The authors strongly
reject the findings of Rein and
Rabinovitz and Berman (1980) that
the

distinction between formulation and
implementation dissolves when
policies are implemented.
They offer three reasons why
the distinction must be maintained.
First, instances in which the
distinction dissolves are the

exception rather than the rule.

Second, if policies evolve continu-

ously over time (or involve circular
processes) the evaluation of goal
attainment becomes problematic, if not
impossible.
Last, viewing
policy processes as

a

"seemless web" obscures the division of
authority

between elected public officials and
administrative officials.
The application of the framework to
different policy fields

culminates in several findings.

The most salient finding is that the

processes by which federal mandates traverse
through state and local

implementation processes to become public policy do
not appear to
undergo any pattern of "routine or natural
progression" towards ultimate

outcomes.

Policy implementation processes may start slowly,
quickly

gain or lose momentum or pass through several
cycles.

The exact course

which the policy will take will primarily depend upon the
extent to
which the statute effectively structures the implementation
process,
and long term environmental conditions which include
support by

soverigns and interest groups.

Policies do not necessarily degenerate

over time nor permanently derail; policies may be rejuvenated with

renewed vigor after long periods of

a

semi-stalemate.

Brown vs. the Board of Fdnr.tinn
(1954) 33
an example of

a

policy fitting

a

in which change in the
political

cumulative incremental i sm
scenario
environment was

a

precipitating

factor in achieving substantial
gains in compliance.

The Brown
decision, although largely ignored
by an indifferent Eisenhower

administration, was given renewed
vigor by

a

combination of national

legislation (Civil Rights Act of
1964), bureaucratic enforcement by
HEW and supportive appellate
court decisions.
Interestingly, differences in the politics of discrimination
between the North and South
have also accounted for emergent
differences in efforts to end school

segregation.

Southern segregation, manifested largely
in de jure

terms, has been easy to rout out
compared to de facto forms in the
North.

Consequently, as

a

result of differences in environmental

contexts in which discrimination is
manifested, there are now two
policies instead of one.

However, some observers of the judicial

process, such as Baum, argue that "the balance
of political forces is
less important" to Court decisions, citing
Ma££ and Miranda as having
been "made in a seemingly unfavorable climate
of public opinion"
(1981: 42).

Mazmanian and Sabatier contend that if the statute or
decision

carefully structures the implementation process so that
sovereigns are
given continuous oversight and intervention responsibilities,
the

distinction between authority, power and accountability of elected
officials versus bureaucrats can be more carefully maintained.

Yet,

given the proclivities of Congress to produce ambiguous, unstructured

statutes and judicial reluctance to interfere with bureaucratic
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discretion, the authors' prescriptions
for policy success would
necessarily require changes in the
institutions of Congress and the
judiciary which are unlikely to
occur in the forseeable future.
In
addition, continuous interest group
support and periodic intervention
by sovereigns

is

no guarantee against either
statutory revisions

in-

consistent with initial purposes nor long
term preservation of the
status quo.

The identities and policy priorities
of interest groups

and sovereigns are themselves subject
to change over time, which in

tandem, may produce new consensual
underpinnings of a policy in

dramatic contrast to initial basis of
support.
Although intent on accentuating differences
between their
framework and others, Mazmanian and Sabatier
characterize successful
policies as undergoing cumulative incremental
ism in which enacted
policies develop gradual

support over time moving closer rather than

farther away from original purposes.
a

difference.

This may be a distinction without

For regardless of whether policies undergo
disaggrega-

tion and revision or cumulative support and progress
toward ultimate

objectives, the processes by which either result occurs
involves an

assumption of the politics of interest group bargaining, negotiation
and compromise.

Therefore, from opposing perspectives, the politics

of legislative formulation and implementation appear to involve

essentially the same processes.

CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL PRIVACY
MANDATE:

THE

NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE WASHINGTON
CASE

The 1973 amendment to the Crime
Control Act provided LEAA the

opportunity to impose

a

national

policy on the states for the protec-

tion of privacy and due process
rights of data subjects through

regulation of criminal justice information
systems.

LEAA officials

expected the regulations to result in
substantial change in state
record management practices, the integrity
and quality of criminal
records, and, importantly, uniform state
policies limiting the dissem-

ination of criminal history record information
(Marchand, 1980: 204205; Zenk, 1979).

However, as Chapter

II

suggests, the processes by which national

policies are converted into state policies and local
practice are

complex and the measurement of compliance is problematic.

The recent

history of revenue sharing programs advancing regulatory
agendas
suggests that consistency and uniformity is likely to give way to

variable approaches with differential results.
This chapter attempts to determine how the states have per-

formed with respect to the federal criminal records privacy mandate
and political

factors shaping responses.

There are several reasons

why it is important to examine the national context first and then to
turn to the Washington case and interpret its significance.
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First,
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the criminal

records privacy amendment simply
conferred on LEAA the

authority to adopt regulations
providing the states with more
detailed
guidelines and to set in motion
a state planning
process by which state
policies could emerge.
The guideline development
process was prolonged
primarily because of the access it
gave to contending political
interests to further influence the
shape of national

policy.
State plans
were initiated during this period
of unsettled policy and therefore

provide important bases by which to
understand the subsequent state

policy-making processes.
Washington was not unlike the majority
of states in undertaking
a

planning process which eventually led
to the adoption of state policy.

However, in some important respects,
Washington state's initial policy
was idiosyncratic and thus unrepresentative
of other states.

Yet, as

the ensuing analysis indicates, the novelty
of this state's policy

quickly dissipated, resulting in

a

rather desultory and unexceptional

performance record compared with other states, and
little evidence of
actual

change.

What this analysis provides, then,

is a

way to determine

just how the responses of officials in Washington
to the federal mandate
and the state's resulting performance contribute
to understanding
national

patterns.
Next, wide variations in the methods used by sponsors of studies

of state performance under the federal mandate dictate that caution
be

exercized in drawing inferences about policy induced change based
solely on evidence of behavioral compliance.
tell

us a great deal

While national surveys

about procedural compliance, they reveal little

about micro political forces
at work in

a

given state with which to

explain outcomes and assess
change processes.
Moreover, as Marchand's
comprehensive documentation
(1980) of
the conflict over a national
CCH indicates, the assessment
of the

results and efficacy of the
criminal records privacy mandate
vary
according to the interests sponsoring
the particular study,
this

m

regard, even the most recent
studies by the Office of Technology

Assessment have not been immune
from political forces intent
upon
interpreting the facts to suit
particular interests.
Therefore, a
case analysis drawn from one state's
experience provides
in

a useful way
which to put documentation of the
national context in perspective.

Finally, notwithstanding these
deficiencies in studies docu-

menting state performance,

a

national context for Congressional

regulatory policy provides

a

means by which to probe similarities with

and differences from state performance
under Supreme Court civil

liberties policies.

Since both policies constitute forms of inter-

governmental regulation of criminal justice,
albeit from different
institutional sources, an analysis of one state's
experience within
this dual context may uncover, in more depth,
common political

factors

which confront and shape outcomes of attempts to
regulate the administration of criminal justice.

Issues Involved in the Development
Federal Guidelines (1974-1976]"

~o"f

Although spare in detail, the addition of Section 524B, the

privacy amendment, to the Crime Control Act of 1973 provided not just

another condition of aid, but presented LEAA an opportunity to develop
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detailed guidelines to advance its
own interpretation of criminal
records privacy policy.
The amendment invited extensive
administrative
interpretation and contributed to a
prolonged guideline development
process.

Although LEAA wasted little time
proposing draft regulations

(Title 28) for public review and
comment in February 1974, substantial

controversy and criticism delayed their
final publication until May
1975.
a

Continued dissatisfaction with several
of the guidelines forced

subsequent substantial revision in 1976.

The regulations underwent

yet another modest revision in December
1977, in which, among other
things, LEAA suspended the deadline for final
compliance to some

sections of the regulations for up to another
eighteen months to two

years

Defining criminal history
record information
LEAA's 1974 draft regulations drew heaviest fire from
criminal

justice interests with respect to the definition of criminal
history
record information, internal dissemination controls, and applicability
to the courts.

In addition,

non-criminal justice interests, partic-

ularly the press and private employers, along with police, expressed
strong opposition to LEAA's restrictions on public dissemination of
criminal

history information.

In

fact, the dissemination provisions

were by far the most controversial of all of the proposed regulations.

While strong opposition to these and other provisions may be attributed
in part to LEAA's
in

failure to develop guidelines sufficiently grounded

prior legislative intent, criticism of LEAA's proposed regulations

also stemmed from more fundamental philosophical differences over the
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role that the exchange and
dissemination of criminal records
plays in
effective law enforcement.
In its 1974 draft regulations.

LEAA defined criminal offender

record information to include
that information collected
for the
purpose of identifying individual
criminal offenders and alleged
offenders.
The definition represented a
novel interpretation because
it was more irKluM^^ of data
considered to constitute criminal
history
information than either stated in
the Menard decision or intended
by
Congress.

Unlike the Menard ruling or
Congressional proposals, LEAA

drew no distinction between files
maintained on subjects with formal
contacts with criminal justice and those
without such documented contacts.

Thus, the inclusion of information
on alleged offenders

implied that dissemination of intelligence
and investigative information collected on suspects would be
subject to regulation.

The director

of the Michigan State Police expressed
incredulity at this prospect by

commenting:
You include within the definitions section
all types of
records that I would have in my department.
This rule
would provide controls on the access to current
departmental internal investigative memorandum, intelligence
files, modis operandi files and any other files I
would
have as they relate to current criminal investigations
within my agency.
I
cannot believe that you truly wish
to provide the criminal or organized crime individuals
with access to information regarding them that involves
ongoing investigation into their criminal activities
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a: 33).
In remarks submitted by a staff member of the New York
Department

of Justice, the LEAA staff is referred to

a

section of the Senate Draft

Legislation (the Criminal Justice Systems Act of 1974--the Hruska Bill)

where

a

more careful distinction is drawn between intelligence and other
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criminal

record data.

Part of the problem with
LEAA's overly broad

definition of criminal offender
record information was that
it wasn't
entirely clear whether it was
intended to occur or was a
definitional
oversight.
There is some evidence that LEAA
officials were concerned
about the fact that intelligence
and investigative information
was not
always carefully separated from
arrest and conviction information
and
thus had to include it in the
definition of criminal offender
informati on,
It is

possible that LEAA expected that
such

a

definition (anticipated

to be objectionable to law
enforcement) would enable the separation
of

intelligence materials from other files,
thus accomplishing the same
overall purpose of securing

criminal record data.
in

a

higher quality and verif iabil ity of

In any event,

as the Washington case illustrates

Chapter V, clarifying the types of material
covered by the regula-

tions has not dispelled problems of
interpretation.

Law enforcement agencies were particularly
concerned about the

effects that dissemination controls, such as
transaction logs, would
have on effective law enforcement.

One comment submitted by the

Phoenix Police Department is illustrative of these
widely shared

concerns
Our investigators work on a daily basis with other
criminal
justice agencies in our normal duties and are constantly
discussing criminal history information on suspects, prisoners, etc., and the logging of this dissemination would be
ludicrous and impossible to control.
The dissemination of
criminal history information is inherent within the criminal
justice system, it cannot be contained or curtailed without
a corresponding decline in effective law enforcement (U
S
Department of Justice, 1976a: 10).
In

local

addition to the press and law enforcement agencies, state and

governments also expressed criticism of restrictions on access to

criminal history information
by non-criminal justice
agencies.
Many
state and local governments
which permit access to
criminal records
through either custom or
through ordinance for a
variety of employment,
credit and other purposes
were pressed to continue
existing practice.

Court re cords and the separation of powers doctrine

addition to dissemination policy,
LEAA's attempts to make
its 1974 draft regulations
apply to the records of court
proceedings
proved equally unpopular. While
custom holds judicial proceedings
and
resulting records of disposition
to be accessible to the
public, LEAA's
initial broad definition of
criminal history records material
committed
it to the inclusion of
information which pertained to court
proceedings.
This was proposed not only for
policy reasons but because LEAA
recognized that court participation was
essential to achieving the goals of
In

completeness and accuracy.
The National

Center for State Courts submitted

a

strongly worded

challenge of provisions to include the
courts under the LEAA regulations.
These statements not only questioned LEAA's
authority to promulgate

regulations regarding state court activities,
but challenged the con-

stitutionality of executive regulation of the
judiciary.
Center contended that LEAA's actions "marked

a

The National

clear departure from its

often stated policy of not imposing federal regulation
on states, and,

more particularly state courts, that utilize LEAA funds"
(National Center
for State Courts, 1974: 4).

What was found particularly objectionable by

the courts was that LEAA had exceeded its administrative
authority.

The National

Center pointed out that all the original privacy amendment

required was that information
stored in criminal justice
information
systems be accurate and complete.
This did not imply some
additional
state regulatory authority.
The National Center argued
that in proposing this regulation, LEAA
was attempting to anticipate
Congressional
activities to regulate information
privacy.
In addition to these broad
concerns,

the Center found LEAA's

regulations unclear as to which state
agencies would prepare

a privacy
plan and unspecific as to whether
the state courts would participate

in

development of that plan.

Moreover, the regulations did not
make

clear which areas of the judiciary were
covered (e.g., whether it
included only state courts, appellate
courts and/or trial courts).

Clearly the National Center was troubled
by these ambiguities and the

lingering implication it left for further
encroachment of executive
control over the courts:
Thus, the regulations appear to give LEAA
wide discretion
determining the extent to which the judiciary
will be bound
by the regulations and what must be done
by a state judicial
system to comply with the regulations. Such
discretion in
a federal agency over actions of
a state judicial branch of
government poses serious problems from both the
standpoint
of the limits of federal authority and juridical
independence (National Center for State Courts, 1974:
4).
As a result of widespread dissatisfaction with
the attempt to

include the courts under Title 28, an intense lobbying
campaign was

mounted by state court judges and administrators to get the
courts
exempted from coverage.

That effort was ultimately successful for the

1976 version specifically exempted court records.
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Privacy and the press
The extensive conflict which
the 1974 draft version of
the

Title 28 regulations incurred
was indicative of the conflict
inherent
in attempts to translate
general statutes into detailed
regulations.

Significantly, conflict focused not
only upon issues internal to
criminal justice administration
but also upon public access to
the
information regarding the proceedings
involved in the criminal justice
process.
The right to privacy collided with
the public right to know.
Importantly, the press considered itself
to have

a

special

responsi-

bility and freedom to convey information
about the process without
restriction.

That right and responsibility was
asserted to be pre-

dicated on public attitudes toward crime
control and punishment.

For

example, comments submitted by the American
Newspaper Association best

expressed these concerns:
The American Newspaper Association's
position on the
proposed rules of law is one of outright
opposition
We applaud the intent of these rules to
afford greater
protection of privacy to individuals. However, insofar
as these proposed rules would infringe upon
the right
of the press to gather and disseminate information
relating to criminal justice we do seriously object
The danger it seems to us, is that LEAA's effort
to
protect one right, i.e., the right of privacy, it is
proposing to make that right supercede the public's right
to know (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a: 31).
The Allied Daily News Association (an association of the
Pacific

Northwest) argued that legal restrictions on dissemination of criminal
records material would also encourage suppression of information about
the working of the criminal justice process:

That the ordinary policeman, jailer, assistant prosecuting
attorney feels morally and legally free to reveal this
information is more important to our criminal -judicial
process than any statutory language mandating such openness--
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more important too. than
is generally appreciated
This
lack of compunction about
"passing the wSrd" renders
difficult, impossible, any long
term cover imnf fin
or^corruption in the system

(u's^'S^rrlL^nrofju'ulce!

With the publication of the
1975 regulations, the Allied
Daily
News Association took yet
another opportunity to elaborate
on what was
seen as a widespread philosophy
regarding legitimate access
to criminal
records

Finally

we would observe that

a lawful purpose of criminal
the
deterrence 0? c? me
!he
k
nw?2 ^"r°T^^°"
knowledge
that a person's criminal history
will probablv
adversely affect that person's
future has been

an ?mpon^
though unevauated deterrent to
the commission of Jrime
throug out history.
Granted the criminal record may
actually contribute to recidivism
among criminals, thev
deterrence ;es!;i^ing
from
fr'om"D:b[l"
i^irK^^^'^'"?"''^public availability
of criminal records works on all
tne rest of us--the great majority-who
have no criminal
''''
''''
^^p-t-"t

oVTshlZ

Moreover, the press contended that voluntary
guidelines governing news reporting had already
been established in numerous states.

By 1974 twenty-four states had adopted
such guidelines which recommended

restriction of the publication of some criminal
justice information

considered an evasion of individual privacy.

Limits on dissemination
As stated earlier,

LEAA's attempts to establish limits for the

dissemination of criminal history record information
were fraught with
substantial controversy.

Part of the difficulty stemmed from LEAA's

overly broad definition of criminal offender information.

LEAA found

itself in an awkward position of restricting dissemination of
criminal
record information which heretofore had been freely disseminated between
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criminal justice agencies and
widely shared with a variety
of noncriminal justice users.

Revisions made in the 1975 version
of the privacy regulations
Showed both a softening of LEAA's
position with respect to dissemination
and greater clarity about which
records would fall under
dissemination
restrictions.
An extremely important
oversight by LEAA regulation
writers in both the 1974 and 1975
version of the rules was a failure
to define the term "dissemination."

why

a

Perhaps this explains, in part,

survey conducted by MITRE of Title
28 compliance activities

turned up as many definitions of
dissemination of criminal history
records as agencies involved in the
survey (1977a: 7).

In

its 1976

planning instructions. LEAA acknowledged
this omission and attempted
to correct the mistake with the
following definition:

Although dissemination is a key concept in
the regulations,
regulations do not define the term.
However, it can be
interpreted to apply to the release or transmission
of
criminal history records information by an
agency to
another agency or other individual (U.S.
Department of
Justice, 1976c: 14).
Clearly, the term "dissemination" included
exchange of information from one criminal justice agency to another.

transfer of information constituted

a

However, not every

dissemination.

For example,

exchange of information for the purposes of reporting
data to the
central

state repository and information exchanged between police,

prosecutors and courts with respect to cases currently in
process were
excluded.

Thus, LEAA made it clear that factual

information regarding

criminal justice processes (e.g., status of investigations, apprehension, arrest, release, prosecution, correctional

status)

"which is

reasonably contemporaneous with the events to which the information
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relates" could be disseminated
without restriction (U.S.
Department of
Justice, 1975b: Sec. 20.33(c)).

While this definition provided

a

bit more clarity as to when

criminal

records information could be
legally disseminated, it was
not
sufficient to satisfy representatives
of the press.
For example, the
Dallas Chapter of the Society
of Professional Journalists
argued that
numerous departments were unwilling
to risk faulty interpretations
of
what information was "contemporaneous"
and thus refused to answer any
and all requests for information.
Similarly, the Allied Daily

Newspaper Association observed that
most law enforcement officers
would be reluctant to advance their
interpretation of when release of
criminal records information was
contemporaneous with criminal justice

processes (U.S. Department of Justice,
1974a: 35).
LEAA responded to these criticisms by
loosening the dissemination requirements in the 1975 regulations.

Criminal justice agencies

were now permitted to release criminal
records information if state
statute or executive order made the absence
of

a

criminal records

a

pre-condition for employment or licensing.
Evidently this revision did not concede sufficient
ground
to private sector employers who, by
1975, through their contacts with

police departments, had become sufficiently apprised
of the effect of
the regulations limiting access to criminal

history records.

For

example, while responses to the 1974 regulations largely
consisted of

comments submitted by criminal justice (fifteen) or other public
agencies (nine), only two comments were received from private firms.
By comparison, when the 1975 regulations were published, thirty-three
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Of the seventy-four
comments submitted to LEAA
came from private sector
firms and associations.
Most of these comments
expressed strong opposition to provisions for
limitation on dissemination
to non-criminal

justice agencies (U.S. Department
of Justice, 1974a; 1976a).

been

a

First,

Consequently, under pressure to
further relax what had initially
very restrictive policy,
LEAA made two important
concessions.
it

defined

a

new category of criminal

consist of "non-conviction data."

history information to

Non-conviction data is defined to

consist of information pertaining
to an arrest which has not
resulted
in a

disposition either favorable or
unfavorable to the data subject
at least one year after the
arrest.
In turn, the limitations on

dissemination apply only to non-conviction
data.

Thus,

LEAA made

a

substantial departure from its initial
policy which prevented access
to nearly all

criminal

history record data.

LEAA made two more revisions in dissemination
requirements which
all

but capitulated to the pressure of state and
local

interests in 1976 and 1977.

public and private

The 1976 revisions permitted state and local

officials discretion in the interpretation of statistics
permitting
access to non-conviction data while the 1977 revisions
no longer required
express statutory authority for access to such data (U.S.
Department of
Justice, 1976d; 1977: Sec. 20.21(b)

The states'

(2)).

role in record

management processes
LEAA's draft regulations also proposed guidelines to secure

completeness, accuracy and currency of criminal history records.

Completeness was defined to mean that criminal offender records should
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contain the

''fact,

date and result of every
transaction which occurred

ln processing a case fro.
arrest to fina,

Of Justice. 1974b..
Sec. 20.21 ,a)(
be Obtained by requiring
that all

1

))

.

disposition" (y.s. Oepart.ent

Completeness and accuracy
would

transactions appear In the
state record

file within thirty days
of the date of the end
of the transaction.
This
section was not entirely
clear for It alluded to a
central state repository for the storage of
complete records but did not
specify what role
the central repository
would perform in the management
of criminal
history records.
Presumably, the central state
repository would constitute the only point of
dissemination of criminal history
records to
non-criminal justice agencies.
With the publication of the 1975
regulations, LEAA finally

clarified this point.

Prior to the dissemination of arrest and

conviction information, each criminal justice
agency would be required
to contact the central

state repository to insure that the most
complete

and current information was disseminated.

Recognizing that many states

could not satisfy this requirement because of
the absence of

a

central

state repository, LEAA made exceptions to the
predi ssemination query
rule.

Inquiries would not have to be made if, for example,
time was

of the essence and the state repository was technically
incapable of

responding to the request.

As noted in Chapter I,

by 1975, only seven-

teen states had automated files of complete criminal

history records

and virtually none of these states provided on-line inquiry
capabilities
to the localities they serviced.

query by local

Thus, in many states

a

predissemination

law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies still

has to be conducted largely
through .ore cumbersome and
time consuming
manual processes.
In

its planning instructions,

LEAA intended these exceptions

to be only temporary:

permitted

in recognition of the
?pj??if
real ty that present manual
repositories cannot resoond

"UfSld

''^'^ exce
oe understood
SrSn'
^rS't^aoor^
to apply only until central
state reDo<;i
tones wil employ sufficient automated
data process q
inforLJior eds
'° '''''
ot criminal justice
i. ^tf
agencies throughout the state fU S
^
Department of Justice, 1976c: 27).

oTcSal

Given the optimistic expectation
that most states would solve

these technical
1977,

issues, LEAA established

for compliance to the central

query requirement.

a

deadline of December 31,

state repository predissemination

Many of the comments received by LEAA
criticized

this time frame as unreasonable.

Nevertheless, LEAA acknowledged that

"although the regulations do not strictly
mandate this approach," the
states were urged to do so in very solemn
tones:

"The states should

adopt this approach in their plans unless
there are compelling reasons
not to do so" (U.S.

Department of Justice, 1975: 26).

states were urged to seek legislation to vest

a

central

Moreover, the

repository

with legal authority to collect and maintain
criminal history record
information.

LEAA's final

regulations (1976) were thus the product of con-

flicting pressures in which criminal justice agencies pressed
for more

specificity and detail as to what was expected while non-criminal

justice interests pressed for greater flexibility and state discretion.
Moreover, given conflict over executive regulation of the courts and
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subsequent exemption of the. fro.
the Title 28 regulations,
an important
element in a mandate predicated
on effective coordination
between
criminal justice agencies was
withdrawn.
Clearly, the interests formative in the development of
dissemination guidelines had
succeeded in
preserving state discretion on a
central issue.
It also gave the press
and others the opportunity to
influence state policy processes
consistent with their preferences.

Pa tterns of State Policy and
Performanr P-

The Politics of Measuring
Compliance
The Title 28 security and privacy
regulations divided state

implementation processes into three
successive stages.
stage consisted of the submission of

a

The first

state plan by the State Planning

Agency (SPA) which identified steps
the state would take to adopt state
policy and implement procedures to comply
with the federal mandate.
The second stage consisted of the adoption
of state policy (e.g., by

executive order, legislation, court order or
rule) and selection of
an agency or commission to administer the
regulations.

included the actual

procedures.

The third stage

implementation and utilization of state and local

The results of each of these stages have been
documented

by LEAA-sponsored studies

in

varying levels of detail and methodological

rigor.

LEAA did not require the states to provide evidence of the

extent to which procedures were followed or to document changes
record quality.
the central

in

The states were, however, expected to certify that

state repository had been audited, including

a

random

sample of state and local agencies, within eighteen months following
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the 1977 state legislative
session.

State plans were reviewed
and

assessed through an in-house
evaluation process.

In

its

S«r^

State_Plans (1976) LEAA staff
presented the findings of that
review
process, including a description
of similarities and difference,
?s in
proposed policies and procedures,
examples of typical problems
states
faced or expected to encounter
in implementation and
recurrent difficulties in interpreting the federal
regulations.
Since the Summary
was partly intended to be a
technical assistance document
it made only
selective references to specific
state problems and approaches,
and
thus does not constitute a
comprehensive state survey (U.S.
of Justice,

Department

1976b).

There are other problems with the
Summary of State

should also be noted.

P lans

that

As with any survey relying upon
self-reporting

and assessment, accuracy and objectivity
are problematic.

Interpreta-

tions vary among respondents as to
precisely which information is

sought and/or what documentation
to tell

is

appropriate, and there is

a

LEAA, as the grantor, exactly what it wants
to hear.

tendency

For

example, some state plans failed to provide
important information

regarding dissemination and audit approaches while
others (for example,

California in 1976) provided elaborate and detailed
plans covering
federal requirements and state variations.
In addition,

while LEAA required that state plans reflect the

views of diverse groups in the state through

a

deliberate, phased

process of review and comment, states varied in the rigor with which
the public was engaged.

For example, the state of Washington provided

full-time staffing to an Attorney General's Advisory Committee,
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representative of diverse interests,
which met for over
careful deliberations to
formulate

draft legislation.

In

year in

consensus ultimately embodied
in

contrast, many other states
appear to have

relied upon SPA staff to draft

review and approval

a

a

a

policy, subsequently given
pro forma

for forwarding to LEAA (U.S.
Department of Justice.

1976b).

Finally, the significance of
the state plans, in most cases,
lies largely in what they
promise in terms of policy responses,
not

what was actually delivered.

With few exceptions, state SPA's
in-

dicated that they expected to adopt
comprehensive state policies by
the December 1977 deadline.
Yet, as of 1981, eighteen states
had yet
to enact state policies while
six states had elected to simply
amend
public disclosure laws to reflect
the need to observe criminal records

privacy considerations.
LEAA contracted with SEARCH Group, beginning
in 1974, to conduct
a

series of surveys to document policy
approaches and progress which

states have made to implement procedures
which bring them into com-

pliance with federal and/or state guidelines.

The SEARCH Group

methodology involves the compilation and analysis of
state statutes,
regulations, executive orders, or other formal policies
in terms of
Title 28 and other policy categories addressed by the
states but not

required by federal

regulations.

The resulting Compendium of State

Legislation Supplement (U.S. Department of Justice, 1978b; 1979) and

subsequent update published by OTA in 1981 provide an overview of state
progress and
states.

Such

policies in

useful

a

a

a

source for more detailed comparisons between the

comparison has been drawn between state dissemination

subsequent section of this chapter.

There are, however, three
important limitations to the
SEARCH
material.
First, ambiguity and lack
of specificity of state
policies
may support different
interpretations and judgements
as to the extent
Of compliance.
Second, the compendium and
thus, the survey data
upon
which it is based, only
describes how states have
adopted policy and
procedures required by LEAA; it
does not indicate the extent
to which
they have been implemented
(operational ized) and what that
implies
about state performance.
Finally, the SEARCH Group-having
initiated the LEAA supported

effort to demonstrate the feasibility
of

a

national

CCH, long-time

proponent of state-originated
standards, and eager to justify
it's
continued consultative and technical
assistance role with the stateshas been hardly in a position
to objectively document state
compliance.

The analysis of state compliance
to Title 28 regulations does
not appear
to be based on a close reading
of state statutes nor a careful

distinc-

tion of the actual administrative
functions state agencies performed

with respect to security and privacy.

For example, the number of

"independent" commissions classified as having
administrative authority
for criminal

records privacy regulations

is

greatly exaggerated because

state criminal justice commissions with policy
advisory roles (formerly
SPA'S) are included even though they have no
operational

function in

privacy regulation.
A study LEAA commissioned in 1977 by the MITRE
corporation was

intended to provide

a

more intensive examination of state implementation

activities which included both

a

quantitative survey (from an eighteen

state sample) of the extent to which procedures were
implemented by

no
state and local criminal
justice agencies and

qualitative assessment
(based on interviews) of
common factors which facilitated
or limited
progress toward substantial
compliance (MITRE, 1977a;
1977b).
a

Although site selection criteria
were not entirely clear, MITRE
appears to have selected a
cross-section of states representing
varying
levels of technological capacity,
policy development and
implementation
stages.
The state of Washington was
included in the survey.
The survey
involved on-site administration
of lengthy questionnaires to
state and
local

officials most closely involved in
criminal justice information
systems with responsibility for
compliance to Title 28 and state laws.
An important limitation of this
format was reliance upon
self-assessment

and crude estimates of record
quality which could not be verified.

The

survey questions, geared as they were
towards probing technical or legal
barriers to implementation, tell us
little about political factors while,

unsurprisingly, uncovering

whole raft of technical constraints.

a

Moreover, no clear criteria or standards
are provided by the

study authors with which to justify classifying
states in terms of
minimum, medium, and substantial compliance.

These classifications

are particularly problematic because they
fail

state and local

policy adoption and actual

utilization of procedures.

In

to distinguish between

implementation and/or

addition, given the absence of base

line data, there is no way of determining whether
any meaningful change
in

state and local practice has occurred as

a

result of procedural

responses to the regulations.
These criticisms take on added relevance when examining the

Washington experience.

Although MITRE classified the state as in

Ill

medium compliance, at the
ti.e the survey was
conducted (September 1977)
had been only three months
since passage of state
legislation and
the implementation process
had barely begun.
Interestingly, all states
Classified as in either substantial
(two states) or medium
(nine states)
compliance had state legislation,
while all states falling in
the
minimum category did not have
such legislation.
Therefore, the primary
standard of assessment of state
and local progress toward
compliance
appears to turn upon the presence
or absence of state legislation.
The

n

primary utility of the MITRE
survey for this study is that
it provides
one interpretation of state
performance with which others may
be
compared.

Perhaps the most comprehensive
source of quantitative data which

documents both state utilization of
federally-mandated procedures and

attributes of state performance with
respect to record quality and

management practice

is

a

study conducted by OTA (1982a).

The purpose

of the OTA report was to identify
the current status of criminal

record systems in the United States;
define alternatives for

computerized system; identify potential

impacts of such

a

a

history

national

system; and

specify relevant policy issues needing
Congressional attention.
The publication of the OTA report initiated
in 1978 was delayed
several

times by lack of funding and unexpected
political

pressure

emanating principally from Federal and state law
enforcement officials.
With each successive draft (one in 1979 and
two in 1981)
of the body of the report was trimmed because
of

a

a

great deal

variety of objections

Including challenges to the adequacy of methodologies used
to determine
record quality in federal and state repositories.

Interestingly, law
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enforcement interests attempted
to downplay divisiveness
over governance, management and other
issues pertinent to federalism,
which
emerged early in the study,
preferring to present a united
front for
publ ic consumption.

One element of the analysis
begun by OTA in 1978 and 1979

consisted of 130 intensive interviews
with

a

wide variety of state

and local criminal justice
officials and staff in over twenty
states.
The interviews, excerpts of
which are found throughout early
draft

reports, probed beliefs and attitudes
about the use of criminal justice
information in depth and elicited candid
observations about problems
of federal-state relations in
criminal justice as they relate to

inter-agency, informational relations.
Two primary messages revealed by the
interview responses are

that the utility of a national

CCH is questionable (compared to the

magnitude of cost) and that Title 28 regulations
have had limited
efficacy in improving the quality of criminal

information used in

routine decision-making.
In

addition, an effort was also made to conduct sample
record

quality audits of both the NCIC/Ident, CCH and
several central state
repositories.

The FBI, extremely critical of the results
of the NCIC

audits, demanded that the work be repeated in two additional
surveys

using their own definitions of data quality (regarding
accuracy,

completeness, etc.).

Ironically, their own 1979 audit showed considerably

poorer record quality (39 percent incomplete) than that documented by
OTA (27 percent) (OTA, 1982a: 91).

113

Finally, following a preliminary
report published by OTA
(1978)
Which included statements by
state officials sharply
critical of FBI

domination of CCH proposals, the
FBI and Department of
Justice insisted
that additional surveys be
conducted to determine potential
consensus
on alternative designs for
a CCH.

These surveys (OTA, 1982a;
U.S.

Attorney General's Task Force
on Violent Crime, 1981)
generally indicated that a consensus had been
reached on the technical
configuration
of the CCH system.
These survey results were subsequently
included in
the OTA final report.
Although the study was not specifically
undertaken to determine
the results of Title 28 regulations,
the OTA report also systematically

documents (through surveys completed
in 1979 and 1981) state policy
responses as well as the extent of actual

requirements.

Thus, the OTA provides

a

implementation of Title 28

far more detailed profile than

studies by SEARCH Group and MITRE.
The next sections begin with a discussion
of the early state
plans and then turn to the OTA reports to
provide an overview of state

and local

performance.

Following this, the other survey data is pre-

sented in order to identify factors which
account for the record

quality and management patterns which occurred.

Performance in

Washington will be presented in the context of national
patterns and
summarized in

a

concluding section.

State plans

Adverse responses to the 1974 draft regulations which mandated

compliance to all provisions within

a

thirty day period persuaded LEAA

to provide a more reasonable time period within which the
states could
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take steps to achieve
compliance.

Consequently, final
regulations

published in May 1975 gave the
states until December
31, 1977, to
certify that "all procedures.
[were1 tully
Lwerej
fullv nno
operational. and imple.

"(U.S.

.

Department Of Justice,
1975: sec. 20.23).

time, each state was
required to submit

a

Prior to that

written plan which involved

significant criminal and
non-criminal justice interests
and specify
steps to be taken to comply
with procedures set forth
in the
tions.

regulaThus, each plan would certify
that "to the maximum
extent

feasible" action had been initiated
to implement the plan.
LEAA utilized
the planning document to
evaluate whether the procedures
adopted would
accomplish the required objectives.

Maximum extent feasible, in this
subsection means actions
^° ^°^P^y.^^th the procedures set forth
thp'n?.n
H
in the
plan that do
not require additional lP nic;i.fiwo
^^^^o^^ty or involve unreasonable cost or
do not exceed

w

bee.

(Department of Justice, 1976d:

pn^^f'u'^L^uP'^''^^'^^
^U.
22(a)).
[Emphasis added.]

Thus, with the exception of provisions
pertaining to individual

rights to access and review (already
mandated by the Menard ruling, to

which immediate compliance was expected, LEAA
provided considerable
leverage to the states to justify additional time
to overcome any
obstacles.

State plans would be required to enumerate legislative,

technical or fiscal constraints and describe steps
taken to overcome

these barriers.

States unable to satisfactorily implement all pro-

cedures could, upon

a

showing of good cause, request recerti f ication

of compliance each year until

officials anticipated that

a

full

compliance was achieved.

LEAA

two year planning process would promote

development of comprehensive state legislation designed to address

various technical
constraints and provide
thp instrument
.
through which
.
iPA.
•

^^^^^^

^--^^

;r7'

u

they faced 'n achieving
complete comp, iance.

Significant,,, approximately
75 percent of the
state plans
were developed and
submitted 5y the State
Planning Agencies,
„.iie
Of the rest were
prepared .y agencies
responsible for maintenance
Of the central state
repository,
this regard,
Washington was one
Of only a handful of
states to conduct an
exhaustive commUtae and
Publ,c review process as
recommended by LEAA. By
1982, i„ thirty-seven
states, state police,
departments of public safety
or highway patrols
exercised administrative
authority over criminal
records privacy

-t

m

guide! ines.
in addition,

method for conduct of

diversity

in

state plans did not in
most instances describe
the
a

statewide annual audit.

Plans exhibited great

the sample size, frequency,
and selection of criminal

Justice agencies to be audited.

Although many state plans
provided for

an

independent audit of the
central state repository, the
states
generally assigned responsibility
for local audits to the
central state
repository.
In this respect.
Washington again differed
substantially
from the norm by insisting
that the audit function be
conducted by a
non-criminal justice entity such
as the State Auditor.
In other areas state plans
acknowledged few difficulties.

Some

reluctance, however, was expressed
with respect to satisfying the
intent
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Of p.ov,s,ons for i„,i.,,,„
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
that states be permitted
to st.^ctu.e
guidelines on individual
access
in ways that ™ini.i.ed
the potential burdens
involved if inundated
by
such requests.
State plans also displayed
several variations in
proposed dissemination policy.
Tbese variations were
largely the
product Of constant changes
in LEAA dissemination
policy until a final
version in 1976.
Finally, state plans indicated
that

a

combination of legal

and technical

problems limited tbeir capacity
to respond to the federal
privacy mandate.
Both types of problems
appeared to center upon the
role of the Central State
Repository (CSR).
Lacking sufficient regulatory authority, the CSR was
unable, in many instances,
to achieve a
level of arrest and disposition
reporting sufficient to satisfy

completeness requirements.
local

In

addition, their inability to
handle

inquiries in a timely fashion
limited CSR's usefulness and

effectiveness.
LEAA concluded from the plan review
process that prior technical

capacity and the existence of
comprehensive state legislation were the
two most important factors contributing
to the successful implementation
of a state plan.

The Summary clearly indicates that
most states planed

to introduce state legislation
although specifically not required to

do so:
It should be noted that while the
regulations did not require
the enactment of state legislation, the
plan review indicated
that nearly all states had enacted or were
planning to enact
implementing legislation (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1976b:

3)

The only data
available regarding
NCIC/rrH
'"'^''^
to the 1979 OTA st„H
data furnished
5. the Presidents
on
,„.orce.ent and
.d.inistrat.n
.stice, The

P''^"'-

-ss^on

-

f^T^^^^^^^^^^--^^^
in

report

dis~red

co.plete co.rt
dispositions

addU,on, although no
n^erica, values were
provided, the report

''"'^

.am.

record

™-

in both federal

systems

'

-te.atlo e.ort

to

.easj

and state criminal
Justice indorsation

A record gualit.
audit involves the
atte.pt to trace a
record
n^amtalned i„ one s.ste.
to its origin in
another in order to
determine
Whether the record
contains the sa.e
information.
While methodologies
are available which
involve surveys of end
users or decision
.a.ers
the OTA undertook a
sample of active cases
recently disseminated by'
the NCIC.
This method offers
clear advantages in terms
of accuracy
compared to other methods
in which
representativeness may be compro-sed by a low survey return
and variations in
quality of computational
processes utilized by
respondents to a survey.
Two different federal
data bases were involved
in the OTA surveys:
the FBI Identification
Division's manual criminal
history file and the NCIC/CCH
file.
The results of the
NCIC/Identiflcation and CCH record
quality

survey are presented in
Table

5.

IhO»most.vianif1ca^^

ajA]laL^roblems_for both files Involved t..

-^^-r-ttimi
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"^""""tion

1979'slpfe™'

and CCH File

Ident

Arrests in sample
Local agency responses
Arrests not verifiable
because
Pending or sealed
No record locatable
No prosecution of arrest
Fugitive
No arrest data
Total arrest cases
verified
Results

CCH

400

400

231
63

19
37

257
92
3

55

6

9

1
1

24

168

165

:

Actual disposition not
recorded on
record

Disposition occurred more than
120 days prior to sample
Oisposition occurred less
than
120 days prior to sample
Disposition occurred after
sample
Disposition data unknown
Record otherwise incomplete
when
compared to local record
Shows sentence but no
conviction
information
Shows conviction but not
correctional information
Record inaccurate when compared
to local record
Disposition information does not
agree
Charging information does not
agree
Sentencing information does not
agree
Record ambiguous when compared
to local record
Shows more dispositions than
charges or vice versa
Other ambiguities
Complete, accurate, unambiguous
SOURCE:

OTA,

68

49
(29.6%)

48
45
(27.2%)

11
1

2

12

34
(20.2%)

32

(19.4%)

15

13

11

10

11

3

8
43

1982a: 92-93).

^^^^?^9h many records exhibited more than one
record
n^^Ki'
problem,
only one per record is counted above.
Earliest date
of sampling was 7/24/79 for Ident,
8/12/79 for CCH
n,.;,iitw
quality

74

Monnation, when cc.pa.ed
position ™eant that

a

with

^''for::;~7~Z;:;::X^^

ccu.t disposition was
shown in

^ut .issin, in the
fede.a,

.eco.d.

a

ioca, .eco..

,„accu.ate .eant that the
disposi-

tion, Charges o.
sentence appeaHn, in
the fede.a, .eco.d
did not a,.ee
wUh the disposition, charges
or sentence in the
local record.
Thus, of the 168 verifiable
Ident arrest events,
49 (or 29 6
percent) failed to contain
dispositions and 34 (or
20.2 percent) were

-accurate.

In addition, of the
165 verifiable NCIC/CCH
arrest events

45 (or 27.2 percent) contained no
disposition and 32 (or 19.4
percent)
were inaccurate.

other recent studies of
record quality underscore
problems of
record incompleteness: An
FBI sample in 1979
found that 39.4 percent
Of arrests in the NCIC/CCH
file did not contain
dispositions.
In
addition, a 1980 study by the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
found that
Ident receives dispositions
on only 45 percent of the
reported arrests
(OTA,

1982a.-

91).

The differences between
these sample findings and

OTA can be explained in part
by

a

difference in methodology.

As Table
indicates,
OTA removed from consideration
5
those cases which were

still

pending, sealed, if no prosecution
had occurred or if the record
was not locatable.
Had these records been included,
particularly

records not locatable, they would
have been included among "no dispositions reported."

Thus, as the OTA report acknowledges,
its analysis

tends to understate the true level
of arrests without dispositions.
To summarize,

the problem of record incompleteness
(no disposi-

tions) constitutes the most serious
record quality problem for federal

These findings about
record quality in
the NCIC/CCH
"^it/LLH fi,»
file are somewhat
surprising given the fact
that thP rai .1
™'
that submission
of record
,
ta
participating states (eig.t,
«
is regulated b.
strict standards

^i^i^iMitorles.

Problems with record
quality ta.e on an
added Significance when
considered in lig.t of
the fact that the
eig.t
states Who fully participate
account for 66.5 percent
of the total
criminal history records
submitted by all states
to the NCIC/CCH
Record quality also
appears to be the most
significant problem
Of central state
repositories where record
incompleteness may vary from
15 to as much as 42 percent or more
(OTA. 1982a: 93-94).
Compared to
other states record quality
in Washington is
rather poor. Significantly
although the Washington
state central repository
is fully automated
and
state law mandates state
court reporting of disposition
information,
central state repository
personnel indicated in 1981
that between 30
and 40 percent of state
criminal records are incomplete.
At the local
level

there is little quantitative
data available concerning the
quality
Of criminal records in most
states although some limited
was available
in Washington state.
(^Q-7-7.\
However zne
nuwever,
thp Ni
mttrf
KE (1977a)
survey respondents note
that record completeness was
"variable."
I

Wide variations among states
regarding the level of arrest and
court disposition information,
lack of monitoring procedures and
in-

frequency of audits directly contribute
to problems of state record
quality.

Most states now require state courts
to report case disposition

1

(see Table 6).

Table

6.

Institutional Basis for
Court

A formal

system mandated by statute

A formal

system by agreement with
courts

An

informal

Di

sposition Reporting.

1979 Number
..of States

1982 Number
of States

26

29

(

59.2%)

6

(

12.2%)

5

(

10.2%)

9

(

18.4%)

7

(

(

53.1%)
14.3%)

system
6

No system; depends on
jurisdiction

10

(

(

12.2%)

20.4%)

Total
49 (100.0%)

OTA,

49 (100.0%)

1982a: 101

There are substantial
differences between the
percentage of
arrests versus court dispositions
reported to the central state
repository.
Arrests are reported, on
average, at a much higher
rate than
court dispositions (82 versus
66 percent) (OTA, 1982a:
100).

This is
true in Washington state
where arrests are reported 95
percent of the
time while court dispositions
only 60 percent (MITRE, 1977a:
39).

This disparity is surprising
given

a

fully automated state court

information system which has the
capability of rapid retrieval of trial
court dispositions for transmission
to the central state repository.
There has been only marginal

improvement in court disposition

reporting since 1970 as shown in
Table

7.

Accounting Office study in 1973, OTA
found

Compared to
in a

a

General

follow up study in
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""-^^^^---'---ne.e..e.o.

states
...percent
or .ore dispositions
reported had doubled
(..o. seven to
thirteen
states), twenty-two or
48.8 percent of the
^•
statP. r.
states
continued to receive
less than 65 percent
of available case
dispositions.

''mion

and OTA Hnd^ngs.

Reporting:

1973
JO Study
,f

Comparison of GAO

1977
OTA Study

Dls£0^iyon_Rep^^

1982 OTA Study

~

~

Less than 65%:
Number of States

-31

Percent

,

19

17

22

46.3%

41.5%

46.8%

65 to 90%:

Number of States
Percent

n

„'

'

,

^2

More than 90%:
Number of States
Percent

7

^±^^'z

.

SOURCE:

OTA,

1982a:

10

11

12

24.4%

26.8%

25.5%

13

13
27 7%

J

2

29.3%

31.7%

102.

State record management
and enforcement
There are also wide variations
between the states with respect
to utilization of procedures
to monitor and update
delinquent court
dispositions.
For example, as Table 8
indicates, while about 60 percent
of central state repositories
periodically utilize procedures to
monitor
the availability of court
dispositions, the rest of the states do
so

only infrequently or not at all.

differences

in

There also appear to be substantial

the rigor of procedures used to
determine compliance.

Some states use onsite visits while
most others including Washington

rely on self-reporting
(OTA, 1981)
repository in WasMnoto

i„

tuu

y-Was.,ngton.uststil,

conduct a. anua,
review Of files
[for reasons
discusspd in
discussed
k
in esubsequent
chapters)
even th. . .
both the
CSR and ^f^^^
state court files
are fully automated.

state Agencies
to Monitor Court

Disposition']^

1979 Number
° I States

~~
'

Automated review of file
17

Manual

(

34.7%)

1982 Number
of ^iates__
Sf;itpc
19

review of file

oo

oo/^
'^^

^

8

(

16.3%)

Sometimes inquire of
courts before
dissemination
5

No review of
delinquent dispositions

is

Don-t know

(

(

10.2%)
36

n

(

22

"

4

(

8

"

i.

.

A<y^

2°/)

o

''''''^

^

^

1

(

2.0%)

Total

_______
SOURCE:

(

OTA,

1982a:

49

(

100.0%)

1

(

2.0%)

49 (100.0%)

104.

In addition, only
a few state agencies

(thirteen) have made any
effort to conduct an
audit of Information
stored in the central
state
repository.
Significantly, only eleven
states (as of 1979) have
con-

ducted systematic audits
of local user agency
files (see Table 9)
Again. Washington does
not differ in this regard
from the majority of
states.
Washington's only audit was
done when records were
converted
to automated files
during 1974 and
1975.

Conducted quality audit
Never conducted quality
audit

13

(

26.5%

35

(

73,

50^^

Total
49 (100.0%)

.

SOURCE:

OTA. 1982a:

105.

Significantly. LEAA's
.onUoring and enforcement
efforts have
focused almost entire,,
on procedural
compliance.
Not surprisingly
the profile which emerges
shows extensive
procedural adoption yet
1 ittl
evidence of substantial
change In record management
processes or
improvement In record quality.
Our review of the
available data
suggests that a great deal
of progress has been
made with respect to
getting the states to both
develop policy and adopt
procedures mandated
by TUle 28 and to
increasing the technical
capacity of state and local
criminal justice agencies to
implement these procedures.
Technical and
legal

constraints were cited by both
LEAA (U.S. Department of
Justice
1976b) and MITRE (1977b) as
constituting the most significant
barriers
to

effective Implementation and
compliance.

been significant changes In
both areas.

Since then there have

There has been substantial

improvement in the capacity of
central state repositories to
collect
and store criminal history
information and ability to service
state
and local agency needs.

Legal

5a.n-e.s to effective
state policy
control and
.egulatio
have also been largely
removed.
As the SEARCH r
,
indicates,
each state
.
st.t. has
H
chosen a process thm.mt,
.
"^''^ '^'^^ ^°^^'cies have
^
been
. .
adopted
to satisfy the
federal mandate
Yet "^o^t
most states
.
,
thirty-seven)
have lodged regulatory
control in a state
.t..
^
law enforcement
agency and
only .arely in
independent commissions
(eight).
Also, the powers
of
.

,

-PosUory

(CSR)

data have been greatly
expanded.

statute, authon-t.

to collect arrest
and disposition

Prior to 1974
rrior
t
1974, nonly

to collect ar.est
and disposition

a

.

few CSR's had

1nfo™t1on;

as

Of 1981. every CSR
.as the statutory
authority to collect
arrest In.ornation and ^st states
(thirty-five) have either
statutory or policy
authority to collect
disposition Information
fro. the courts {OTA
1982a: 101).

State dissemination pol
lev
and practice
This profile of uniform
procedural compliance disguises
many
differences in policy content
(e.g.. dissemination policy)
and the extent
to which states and
localities actually utilize
procedures and enforce
state and local agency compliance
with federal and/or state
guidelines.
Although nearly half of the
states have Imposed a uniform
dissemination policy on state and
local criminal justice agencies

through state statute, the rest
have adopted other methods which
Include
CSR legislation, open records
laws, executive orders, or
administrative
procedures.

While state statutes are applicable
to all criminal justice

agencies, eighteen other state
policies govern
procedures (see Table 10).

onij, CSR

dissemination
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Record Dlssemnatio^"po'ncy!°''"

''"'^

"^'^

Criniinal

History

Number of states
iIota]_49j___^

state repository
enabling legislation

24
8

Public or open records
law

5

State repository agency
policy

7

Executive order
State repository
administrative procedure

2
3

Employment practice
1

NOTE:

compiled fro™ U.S.
Department of Justice,
,978b; 1979.

LEAA's policy on
dissemination permitted the
states substantial
discretion to develop policy
for the dissemination
of conviction and
non-conviction information.
Not surprisingly, as
Table 11 reveals
from an analysis of
LEAA's

Cosendium^^stateU^^

1979)

„9;8 and
the states exercised
that discretion to
produce several different

policy variations.

While about half of the
states' dissemination

policies, including Washington's,
conform closely to one of
three policy
positions advanced by LEAA
at different times, and
thus do satisfy

statutory intent, the policies
exhibit wide variability in
legal
authority, applicability and
local implementation.
Group lA states (seven)
include states with dissemination

policies which restrict access
to both conviction and
non-conviction
information, and thus, are
closest to LEAA's 1974 draft
regulations.
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ment, by^?e]r o}'
Adopt']on^!°"'

Alaska^
Massachusetts^
Georgia^

ininois^
Maryland^
Colorado
Nebraska

II.

A.

—^^^^
Cal ifornia

Iowa

Alabama^
Oregon
Connecticut
Virginia
Washington
Maine

1973
1973
1975
1976
1977
1977
1977
1978

Iiyj_28in
Washington
Hawai i
Kansas^
Louisiana
Montana
Nevada
North Dakota
Oklahoma

Pennsylvania
States with Dissemination
Policy Which Applies
Only to the
Central State Repository
CSR Statute Only

Kentucky
Missouri
New Mexico
South Dakota
Vermont^
Arizona
Indiana
Idaho
III.

]972
1972
1975
1976
1975
1977
1973

Dissemination Policy
and Manage

1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1977
1978

Arkansas*^

Delaware
Mississippi
New Hampshire
North Carolina
South Carolina
Wisconsin

1975
1976
1976
1976
1976

States with Other Approaches

Texas
Utah
Ohio^
West Virginia
Wyoming
Florida^
NOTE:

1975
1975
1977
1977
1977
1978

Michigan
Rhode Island
Minnesota

1976
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978

1975
1976
1977

'

Tennessee
New Jersey

1975
1976

New York

1975

Compiled from U.S. Department of
Justice, 1978b; 1979,

^Regulatory authority

in

by state^ra:"rn?^rc°e:e:rrgenc;''

independent commission.

"

'''''''''' '^''^''''^ ^^"^^^^^"^

^Management by personal information system
board.
Management by state law enforcement agency
xa.i
all bidtes
states
j in
without superscripts.

—

O^-se
-ns.

h..h

states.

A,as. ana Hassacusetts

-i-.l»s^,„

-

Haa

p.,ncat,-on 0. t.e

A s,,„,-.cant
c.a.acteHstic o. states

pe.centa,e(„

create, separate

pass, state cH.na,

.

„M .an

3.o„p

u

.e,U.

to ct.e. po.-c.
,.o„ps, o. t.e states
.ave

co™Us,o„s

a«„,ste. state policy an.
.e,uUt1ons
Group IB states (eight,
have adopted po„c,-es
.ost s,-.na. to
LEAA.s ,975 .eguUtions.
Those .egolations
n.it dissemination o,
cn.1na, history record
information to „o„-cri.ina,
Justice use, if a
state statute or executive
order .akes criminal
conduct the basis for
exclusion fro. licensing
or employment.
The state of Washington
is
included in this group of
states because it also
ma.es access contingent
on whether criminal
conduct is the basis of
the exclusion.
In most
other respects, the Washington
statute is similar to those
characteristics of states typified
by Group
to

'

IC.

Group IC states (nine) have
adopted state laws or policies
most
Similar to LEAA's 1976 version
of the Title 28 regulations.
These states
demonstrate the most specificity
in distinguishing
conviction and non-

conviction information and permit
dissemination of non-conviction
information for an^ purpose (except
Washington), as provided by either
state statute, executive or
court order or local ordinance.
Across these three categories,
several states have added

innovations of their own which have
the effect of restricting the

exchange of non-conviction information
between criminal justice agencies.
The states of Alabama (Group
IB), Kansas and Louisiana (Group
IC) require
that criminal justice agencies
demonstrate that they have a "need to
know" such information for purposes
pertaining onl^ to the administration

of criminal justice.

Presumably this reauUti
'•^Qulation .
has been adopted
in
order to
tn ,i
discourage the practice
{discussed in Chapter
rh
.
VI) whereby
criminal i
^"""^ ^9---"
utilized as
intermediaries by
b
non-criminal
...
justice u<;er5
I
users.
,„ addition, Georgia (Group
lA) requires nn
-n-nminal
justice agencies which
gain access to
information to record
or log
loa all secondary
disseminations Of that
information
Sroup I, consists
of eighteen states
which have adopted
policies
Which apply only to
criminal history
information collected
and
by the centra, state
repository
Thus
the
'"^ di
"i^emination policy adopted
K
by
these states may be
classified as less
restrictive than
'^"'^'^ictive
th
any version
Of the UAA Title
28 regulations.
This group is
subdivided between
states regulating CSR
disseminations either
through state statute
formal policy or informal
administrative procedure,
ynlike states in
Group 1, these states
tend to be either less
restrictive with respect
to dissemination of
non-conviction information
or closely paralleling
the 1976 LEAA regulations.

~'

•

"

Group

I„A

includes six states which
have adopted comprehensive
open records laws which
specifically include the
regulation of criminal
history records.
What distinguishes these
states from other states
in
which open record laws
have preceeded the development
of criminal
records privacy policy is
that the open records law
specifies the
conditions under which criminal
record information may be
disseminated.
Texas and Utah, for example,
place no restrictions on
dissemination
of conviction or non-conviction
information while the other states
(Florida, Ohio, West Virginia
and Wyoming) closely approximate
the 1976
LEAA, Title 28 regulations.

Of the three
remaininq statpc

'''''' ^^^"^^^

^isse.1„ation of state
and

1

t^™u9h executive

o-eMa. .no„,.e -A
^e.ulates c.-.„a,
..to.,

t«

,..en„es,

.co.s t.o„,.

t.e state 0.
a

statute

vo.

pena..,

employment practices.
Finally,

U

to

is

evident fro. an OTA
fifty-state survey that
state use of procedures
to review local
dissemination activity
Is Infrequent and unsystematic.
Only twelve states
,.4.5 percent, used
sue.
procedures frequently.
„Mle most ot.er states
either reviewed local
logs only when a specific
abuse was Indicated
(twenty-nine states or
59.2 percent) or not at all
(six states nr
or 19
12.2c percent (OTA,
1982a: 105)
There is also a great
deal of unevenness
in local implementation
Of dissemination policy.
Some localities have
elected, through local
ordinance, to construe
eligible reasons for
access to non-conviction
information very broadly
to include licensing
and other employment
and
credit-related purposes, which
is often inconsistent
with state policy
Thus, local custom and
policy often prevail as
to the availability of
criminal record information
(OTA,
^

1982a).

State and local p erform/^nrp
LEAA-MITRE survey, 197/
As the December 31,

*

1977, deadline drew near for
states to

demonstrate full compliance with
the Title 28 privacy regulations,
LEAA commissioned a comprehensive
survey in September by the
MITRE
Corporation to assess the extent
of state compliance.

As a result of
the survey (published in
December 1977) which documented
substantial

deficiencies in overall compliance
efforts. LEAA permitted the states

to request an
extension of up to ei„ht»„

^

to demonstrate
satisfactory compliance.

-compliance

,

s

at

^O"-^

Significant,,

was tie. to t.e
conclusion o

-

-A

st

requirements!

t.

r."^"
'

create a stronger
„
^^"^ ^^"^^
°f urgency that
state

^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
cr,.e Control Act)
.ut insisted for
t.e first time
that

Of record quality
that had been
achieved as
or LEAA mandated
procedures.

a
^

result of iimplementation
,
'^"''It

The MITRE study
determined that states
were confronted with
two types Of difficulties
in attaining
satisfactory compliance:
factors
external to the regulations
indicative of the environment
of implementation and factors internal
to the regulations
themselves, such as
'ack Of specificity and
clarity of intent which
caused difficulties
in interpretation
and implementation
(1977b: vii).

Factors considered by MITRE
to be external to the
regulations
include the political
environment, financial
capabilities and interagency coordination mechanisms,
addition, several other factors
were enumerated which
included insufficient time
to achive compliance,
lack of precise state
mandates, lack of appropriate
legislation, lack
Of sufficient resources,
local practices which limit
change and
tendencies to link compliance
with automation of criminal
history
record systems.
Not surprisingly the study
authors conclude:

m

Because these factors are
exogenous to the regulations
^'^"^ ^bout the problems hey
generate which could be ameliorated
by changes in the
content ,n the regulations (MITRE,
1977b J?")

Although MITRE
devoted an enti.e
vol^e of

"

-

-e.a,

only Of secondary
significance
instead, the

H,4

the d-f
difficulties

tacto., these

Us

two

.a t

,

"""'^^^^

•

"""""^

'^^^'^ °^

s

"

•

encountered in state an.

were rooted either
in the f

^

/

'"""^^^^
i

that

,

-P'«entation efforts

'^-selves or occurred
ccurred
because of the absence
,
of st;>to
state ilegislation
and/or detailed
regulations.
MITRE ranked the eighteen
5t,t«,
'"'•^^^^<^ *nto three
categories
,
„f
-oMiance:
co™. iance (two states.

^

.

—tial

-"—).--1.al

.

compliance <se.en states,,

fourmaoor findings inferred
fro. the data
utilised

.diu. co.lLce
m.tre presented

to rank order the
Pirst, the study
concluded that "long
ter. prior involvement
the privacy and
security implementation
is a reliable
indicator of
successful compliance"
(MITRE, 1977b: viii).
The two states in
sub
stantial compliance had
comprehensive legislation
and long term

states.

-h

involvement in privacy and
security implementation
prior to the 1975
regulations.
States considered in
medium compliance, including
Washington, had passed
some kind of legislation
to conform with the
regulations, hut were still
in the process of
implementing procedures
States falling short of
medium compliance had not
yet passed enabling
legislation.
The second finding stressed
that passage of comprehensive
state
legislation tended to greatly
facilitate progress towards
compliance.
Legislation was considered
comprehensive if it addressed all
aspects
Of the regulations and
specified an agency to exercise
administrative
authority.

Third, the MITRE
survey concluded
that-

content lacked spe??f
citv

"naU„

the

MURE

'"'"^'^^^

c^r

to

ful

report ,Uted severa,
other .actors w.ic.

appear to contribute
to diffir.nt,-

•

^'^•^^^ving compliance.

These

Resources,

contusion as to
interpretation o.
practice and absence
o. automated
systems
Significant,,, in nearly
every instance in
which MITRE found
deficiencies in procedural
compliance, a connection
was established
to ambiguities
originating in the Title
^s regulations.
Supplementary
-terview data suggested
three overall sources
of confusion originating
the regulations.
First, many local
agencies were uncomfortable
wUh the Wide latitude of
discretion they had to
interpret local
dissemination policy and
implement the general
provisions
It is
evident from the MITRE
survey that state and
local officials sought
a
"nghf interpretation rather
than that which best fit
local conditions
and policy orientations
(1977b: 6).

r:;.'""""^
-9ulat,ons.
traditional

-

second, what seemed
particularly unclear was the
exact role
intended for the state
repository:
some viewed it only as a
passive
recipient of local criminal
history files; others
interpreted its role
to

include active regulation,
monitoring and enforcement of
data
quality requirements.
Confusion regarding the state
repository's role
was determined to have
caused delays in local implementation
activities.

Finally, the MITRE
study concluded th.t
^^^^ "^^ch. of the ambiguity
.
of thp
the
states,
.ole .Sides in
0^
the doctn-ne Of
fede.lis..

"^^"^

.

rut

within the states
'
;^p1emen?at?on
on
who IS to take the
the question of
init at
.'l
This has Often
resuUed ?n a nrnn'°"^P^^'"'^ activities,
states.
.^^^^^"^^te in many
In some states
molemp^tf '
responsibilities as beina ??m?f ^^^''^' ^'"^ perceived their
level activities,
onen^ ocal1/'^"'^'P'^^^ t° ^tate
little to achieve
comp an
^^^^^^ ^re doing
e
upon state level
implementer^ fni n w^^^^^ '"^^t wait
Frequently, when the
'"^ procedures,
state does rn^p
J'"''
°^t^^th
and procedures,
guidelines
localities h.tl n
inactive 0. ,oca,
n^^Jr.^rp^-S-r^Mf?^,^;,^?"^

^

„

™^ "'™^ -"^-onc,u.e.

t.at t.e pn„..
avenue to .eanzation
Of greater progress
1„ state and ,oca,
compliance included t.ree
Pnndpal elen^nts:
(,) Congressional amendments
which clarified the
TUle 28 regulations, particularly
on dissemination
policy, and specified a more precise
role for tne
the centr;,!
central ct.^
state repository;
(2) passage
of comprehensive state
leqislatinn;,nH
M^
legislation, and,
(3) increased federal
enforcement and technical
assistance to^ neip
help state and ln..i
local agencies interpret
and properly implement
required procedures (MITRE.
1977a: 24-25).
•

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
To summarize,

in most respects the
state of Washington exper-

ienced technological
development in criminal Justice
information systems
comparable to the more advanced
states.
As Table 12 indicates,
the
state profile of technological
capacity (i.e., central state
repository
computerization) is similar to or
better than that of the majority
of
states.
Although not a full participant
in the NCIC/CCH, the state
repository has been fully
computerized since 1974.
Not all jurisdictions

1

PerformaJ^e^Unde;

JwVll°'

35

Washington's Technology,
Regulation and

0
0
0
0

Cr?mi
1574.
l' eco'rdr
ff'^lf'^'^'^^^^
Off-line acces to
ciC
H-'liorf??Partial on-line servke
P^''*l;*P^"t i" NCIC/CCH
to fou° Jh I
program
linked through teletype
Jurisdictions; the rest
are

0

?SuTcS^pui^;:?Li^c\rp"??r"'

0

Two subject-in-p?o
ess ioi

0

^^"^^ repositories

'case':'"'^
State court information
f,r"^5enient systems.
?v,;»m

£artici£aMoij:eS^^

but trial court

Regulation

CSR also mandated by
court rule
0
0

mil

<^'5P°sition reporting to

™

a"d"?;?f/?::?^siLr:s^)?s"^-'^
r'^^^p uv^.w,,^.
regulations^.

Comprehensive

<;t;,to

n^-w

i

rest^iclJo^rordlLe^^J^^^o

^V;^*c1i:S^]°r
information; access to
non-conviction information determi„»rf
k
J
ordinance; dissemination
^"^
of non-convttlon t f ""^I"?^
1"^°™'^°" governed by
pre-dissemination guidelines ?? I
'=l«^rance through the CSR
'
maintenance of a log)
and

—

"

°
°

^^^"^^^

con'?en^?^^:rcrtini?\'ist?rn?e
vIou'ons^Tf^JIc^^rd^tS^:^:,-'^^'

"^"^"^

'°

LSlf,^^^

security
'

Performance

'

~

^

Arrest reporting estimated
at 95%
Disposition reporting estimated

TcZUZlZr--

0
0

'-"-mplete.

logging of disseminations95-100%
Local agency logging:
6-% compliance.

''j^^'^^^' have conducted sample audit of files
sample audit conducted in 1981
to pre-test '"'^'^
s. rvpv in
no syst^emati ^udits have
been condurtPH

S?a?e audit:
State
audiV'-'

_^trument;
in

at 60-65%
°' ^'^'^

aTs^^oi-ir ]?ss^:n':?!onr^

i>tate
0

challenge

^

1980.'^^' Washington State Patrol assumed administrative authority

re^orUnlr^^^^^^^^^

-"^^^^^ court disposition

have on-line access
to the CSR but
reqional
regional
p.

court information
syste.

,

;; ;;
^'"^

altho

renins .compute.
Washington .as

.
information
system<; ^-n

.

"

^"'^^

aUo

a.opte. comprehensive
legislation w.ic
Close,, contorts to
policies reco^ended
UAA guidelines
-Hion. an independent agenc.
(the State Planning

m

--,strat.e

.,enc,)„as given

and regulator,
authority.

Finally, the
legislation

P-v,des that the administrative
agency may contract
with the state
Chosen to maintain
audit authority within
the control of state
law
enforcement.
in

spite Of these
characteristics, the state's
actual perfor-

^anagement practices between
localities
ehforce^ent is negligible.

is

highly variable, and
state

Court disposition reporting
to the CSR

lags well behind arrest
infor^tion.

Thus. 30 to 40 percent
of state

files (in June 1980)
were incomplete or inaccurate.

Only about onehalf Of criminal justice
agencies conduct pre-dissemination
queries to
the CSR, as mandated by
federal and state law. and
only an estimated
60 percent of that number make any
effort to log disseminations.
In
addition, local audits are
rarely conducted and a
state-wide audit has
yet to be conducted.
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The

p.ofneo.

state

pCces,

rV"^'"^""^^^"^'°"'
-0.

-n,

co^P^.ance.

.ea..e..
T.e

T.e.e

ave .eacte. to t.e
.eae.,
"Ot explain

U.

^n.o^at.. p.sent.

tMn,

..ate a.

—

p.oce.u.es ana
pe..o™ance

.t t. o.e:t.es

3,,, ,,,,,,
sc

tens

.at

.

.s.~

_
t.e states

n

.appe.e. t.e wa. t.e.

... T.e.e a.e i.e
important recurrent feature^;
.
reatures nf
of fh.
the ^
data
regarding nationwide
performance which suggest
factors which "'dy
may explain the
thp gap between
intended
goals and act.al
performance.
Briefly, t.ese
performance features
-elude

(1) comprehensive state laws
„1t. variations

1„ dissemination
discontinuity
(2)
between procedural
compliance and the
frequency of actual
utilization of procedures
and the lac. of enforcement; (3) negligible
efforts to improve record
quality; (4) lack of
reporting of court dispositions;
and (5) the absence of
ev,dence of
Change in local practice.

policy;

The first important
feature of the data presented
here Is that
although states have adopted
several variations of federal
dissemination policy, marked by
differences in scope of
applicability, nearly
half the states have
adopted comprehensive legislation
imposing uniform

dissemination policies and other
procedures on state and local
criminal
justice agencies as recommended
by LEAA.
The utilization of state
legislative processes to respond
to and adopt a federal
mandate would
seem to constitute a particularly
significant measure of the importance
that state officials attach
to state adoption of a particular
federal

-

J—

^

--s .

cose,,

e...

.e ...e.e

.
'

the,.po.tanceoft.e.o,eofstateof.c1aUan.ot.e.,„te.ests
invoke,

in

development o.

a

,e,.,at,ve consensus,

^-atlon Of interests and
factors fo™at1ve

a.

t.e

.ent.

1„ subsequent
guideline

development processes.
Another feature of the
pattern of state
compliance which invites
further analysis is the
evident discontinuity
or disparity between
the
extent of procedural
compliance and the frequency
with which such
procedures are actually
utilized and/or enforced
hy state regulatory
agencies,
.here policy is endorsed by
a state legislative
process and
a state commission
or agency is given
sufficient authority and
jurisdiction to enforce compliance,
it would not be
unreasonable to expect more
evidence of actual use of
procedures (or evidence of
their use through
the consequent improvement
in record quality)
than has been the case.

What needs to be explained,
then. Is why the seeming
perfunctory
procedural compliance but absence
of performance Improvement
and change.
Is it, as the MITRE
report indicates, because of
ambiguity or uncertainty among state or local
criminal justice officials as
to their
respective roles and responsibilities
with respect to control over
records management practices?
Are state and local criminal
justice

officials simply Ignoring the
state mandate or are they refusing
comply with state guidelines?

to

Or, alternatively, do a combination
of

political factors which Include
organizational conflicts, the relative

—.en.es,

an.

.„e...,

e,Ue

the relative
importance of these
factors in ^^^^
th.t .two
different agencies
,
^
t.e State PUnn.n,
.,ency and t.e State
Pat.o,, and app.oac.es
.ave
.

-vo1.ed

processes

,„

,.ae,1ne .eve,op.ent,
..p,e.entat1on an. enforcement

Perhaps the most
conspicuous finding of
all surveys reviewed
^ere 1s the negligible.
1f not laC, of
change In the quality
of federal
-pcsltor. records since
1967.
As Chapter I indicates,
a co.hlnatlon
Of technical and
political factors have
limited the expansion
of the
NCIC/CCH program.
Political reasons have
included conflicts over
bureaucratic jurisdiction,
federalism, protection of
constitutional
nghts and privacy and others.
In addition, full
participation in the
NCIC/CCH has been negligible
because few states are able
to satisfy
standards established by the
FBI with respect to
technical capacity
(e.g., computerization of
state files and automated
linkages to local
record files), accuracy and
completeness, and timeliness.
It is

evident from the data on the
quality of records In the
federal repository that even those states
considered to have satisfied
technical
standards have not solved problems
of record quality.
of computerization alone

is

Thus, the extent

no guarantee that states are
able to

effectively control record quality
and Integrity.

Moreover, the

enlargement of state regulatory control
over state and local records

management practices, resulting from
the passage of

a

federal mandate.

has not appeared
to have had a
measureable effert
°"
the state and ,
oca, , eve,
Thus
h

"---^

"

case study of one
state's experience
is to identlfv
'oentify tactors
tart
which have
,
Hmit<.H i„
1-ned
,oca, compliance
to federa, and
state regulation.
Further, although
most state renn.it,
^eposttortes no« have
the authority
to Obtain „
.

17
"

-

- -

'n record qua,ity
at federal,

"""^

—

'^^^

state and

,

•

-position

-e

oca,
^"-'^

information, the

most Significant
de ect
,eve,s
'eveis.

Me
We hhave noted

-

-ers doctrine has contributed
to
the exemption of
the courts from
regulation under Tit,e
28.
Nonetheless, court cooperation
is essentia, to
attaining the objectives
of
accuracy and comp,eteness.
«hat is of particu,ar
interest to an
ana,ysis of one state's
experience, then, is what
has been the response
Of state and trial
court officials toward
the privacy mandate;
what
pomica, and organizational
factors limit cooperation
or coordination
'

wnh

other agencies; and what
effects these factors
have had on the
amenability of other criminal
justice officials to state
guidelines
and execution of
implementation responsibilities.
Fi-nally,

the available data tells
us a great deal about
state

responses to and performance
under Title 28, but little
about the
reactions of local criminal
justice officials and agency
personnel.
What have been the factors
which influence responses of
local law
enforcement officials, for example,
to state regulatory authority?
What have been their perceptions
of and attitudes toward the
privacy
mandate? What effects do local
law enforcement, prosecutors
and other
officials expect state regulation
of record management to have on

organizational functions
and effective
-rective law . .
enforcement? Therefore
,
>=reTore,
,
how do these beliefs
.
a)-tit„H„
expectations contribute
to our
,
„
,
understanding
of state anH
and local responses
and performance
and cone.uent nationwide
patterns Of coMiance.
The presentation
of the
Washington case in the
next three chapters
wi„ probe these issues
in more depth.

CHAPTER

IV

EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
DECISION MAKING
IN WASHINGTON,
1975-1977

As we begin an
examination of the
Washington experience
with

the federal

cH.na,

records privacy amendment,
„e note that i™p,e.ent.t,on passed through
three distinct phases.
This chapter treats
the
first phase, lasting
from 1975 to 1977
1977, wh.vt,
which involved the
development
of a state plan and
adoption of iLdte
state leai<;i;,tinn
legislation adespite numerous
political Obstacles.
Then, Chapter V is
concerned with how administrative guidelines were
developed in 1977 and 1978.
Finally, Chapter VI
deals with the abortive
attempts to improve record
quality and concurrent revisions in the
state policy and reassignment
of administrative
responsibility to the State
Patrol between 1979 and
1981.
•

State Elites:

In

The Consensus of Indiffprpnro

many respects, it

ever adopted criminal

is

surprising that the State of
Washington

records privacy legislation.

The Washington

State ACLU chapter had sponsored
criminal records privacy bills in
1974
and 1975, but neither made
it out of committee and
both were quickly
forgotten.
Like so many conditions which
LEAA had attached to receipt
of aid, Washington state
officials responded to the criminal
records

privacy mandate with

a

similar air of routine and resignation.

the completion and submission
of
142

a

Even

plan to LEAA in 1976, which promised

143

session,

was no guarantee
t.at a statute wou,,
actually 5e adopted

T.ere„e.e seve.aweatu.es
o.t.epo,U.a,

criminal

records privacy leoi.l,t,-„
=

.

a

e„.>o™ent

rather dim prospect.

and

Primarily

- - «es ... „uld .ve

to

converted into a state
plan; an Attorney
"ey General
general whn
who was ambivalent
about security and
privacy reaulation^- . a
^"^^
Of state department
,
,,,,
heads Who
preferred not to be given
responsibility for
administration
Of the regulations.
By 1977 Daniel Evans
was nearing the end
of this third term
as
a popular Republican
governor who had deeded
not to run again
Then
Dixy Lee Ray, former
head of the Atomic
Energy Co™ission and
political
neophyte running as a
Democrat, unexpectedly
defeated Republican Oohn
Spellman (King County
Executive) in the November
1977 election.
Prior to this, in 1975
Evans had requested that
Attorney General
Slade Gorton, Chairman of
the Governor's Committee
on Law and Justice
establish a special Advisory
Committee on Security and
Privacy to assist
in the drafting of
a state plan to
satisfy LEAA regulations.
The
Advisory Committee, under
the guidance of Assistant
Attorney General
James O'Connor, was able
after nearly a year of
deliberations and

compromise to fashion

a

forward looking plan which
commanded

a

solid

consensus among both criminal
and non-criminal justice
interests.
However. Attorney General Gorton
made it clear on two separate
occasions that he was ambivalent
if not unsupportive of the
LEAA

cnm,nal records privacy
regulations
PHvacy statute in general.
general

i„ particular

.

' comprehensive
Sort
Gorton
was invited to
testify before
Congress in October
1975
'^/b, when aa h,-ii
bill sponsored
by Senator Hruska
was
introduced to provide
statutory guidelines
guideline, for
f.
criminal records
privacy
at
•

i^egulations were
'^cre still
btiM

in
^
in a= comment
and revipw
^''^^^ ^f:>n^
^^^gS' 3nd^ ,,Hruska
asked

,
If p
Gorton
would comment on them

Here is

.
a

c

segment of that exchange-

^^^-^

Depart:enro?'5usti?: decent!

the

v' i'"T^^
taining to crimina
^^^^^^^^^ Perjusl ce r^o^ds
-^.-eral with thei^r
Issu^^cTa^nTthe^^H/-]

Mr.

Gorton.

'

Yes.

reguuJions'^have farreachino^no??
that they convert material ?hJ i '^ "mfications and
considered
public information ?o
?esJr,rted ?^f'
""^
encountered any reac?ion1n"Sa1

™f

relZT^"'

-"-'^t-" on nonlaw n orcelenf aoenc?:sTf"'S'''
"^^"^ ^"d
traditionalTy and'historirll?^^™'"'
to get at some of
s
fo l^t
n'

they"t™nrbi??^g^Tl^7{n?t^s

r^ovlr^t^^

^

tions'^n genera"!?"™'"' °" '''' ''''

°"

'"egula-

I
tip not wish to
testifv st
'^J^°"- '
^^"J^^*ha
ve
b
'?he"r''P'''
'
oeen asked
j s{
asked, the Governor has
iust asked mv nff^vl
^

thi.'^'''

Washington
9en^?a,

h;,vp

hnon"^^^

P?:-

:

Ka?

I

have just appointed an
advisory committee
^"
°'

se^ci^lty^n-d^^lJacTaV::^^

f^iT^'

''^^^'•^P ^

fn^^)^-^
en''

inaepenaent
Sendent

Tr^in'^s

'o^oo^^r

"

national

-

CCH discussed in Chapter I
-ord man
eit

.^^^"^^'^P^^ stan^da'rds'^or^reguL'i

n

^^^^'^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ed an

nationa
hn.^H to
f develop and enforce more ^^Qorous
national
board
riaorous and
restrictive controls (Marchand, 1980:
167-202).

^
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I

can say this.

I

have hppn th^

•

•

considerable amounts of
°^
oMeclions o/'''^'"^
the type of which you st^tn^
°^ J^^'^ exactly
n^ent agencies anS
non- a'f n oTce^^^r^o^
agencies about
the severity of these
r^^tlZ/^
fact that they do
^^e
?n ?art
other governmental
°^
en
es
'nV''.^ '^'^derstand that they are
:
beinn rnnc.-!^
of Justice, an^ o'ur
ow Ita'
Ss^^.^l^^^Pftment
comments known on that
subject
Rnti
in a position to be
'^'^^^
specif c on i?
t-e (U.S. senate
Jud?ciar"co:m;tt:e/?976'r"'

^

L
toZlT

^

When Senator Hruska
next asked Attorney
General Gorton to
comment on the LEAA
program to deal with
'"career criminals,"
he
suggested that the proposed
^•
posea Title
?r
^on.
i
ntle 28 regulations may
undermine these
efforts
Sen.

Hruska.

Now. the

dealing with the so-cal

e.cept

I

FAA ic cr.,.^

d ca"ee

p

4.-

I*'"?.^ f,\T""

hTtr;T?^.a^^ r?.- 1^^^^^^^

Do you feel there is
a need for efforts
in thi.
direction to try to deal
particularly ad specf 5a Iv
with the prosecution of
career criminals a such^
What comment would you have
on that?
Maybe you have a state plan
that gets into that
Mr. Gorton.
Senator, I do agree that Jhis
is a"

^

the'more
s?g Ifi :n?as""?hr"r'
ap£rwin2_Ui^^
of previous rri^p!
wnetner or not the defendant
had proper legal advice '^^t
the time he was convicted
for these prev ous cH^es
that IS to say, the proof that
he is, in ?act
Jhe
'''''' ''''''''^
^^^^
d??f cu t'n7^"'i

" V''

[Emphasis

Lded.f '

'''''''''

Not only was it difficult to
get state officials excited about

criminal

records privacy legislation but it
was evident that

a

consensus

was going to be difficult to
achieve on which agency should undertake

responsibility for administration and
enforcement of criminal records
privacy guidelines.

One problem was that there were no
agencies which

«ere either appropriate
or willing to
.
1-0 accept fu.
•J
the administrative
responsibility for
implementation of such
guidelines

-1ch

state agency Should
assume administra-

to a head at the

oece^er

the security and
Privacy Advisory
Committee.

i.e, .eeting

Phil Winberry
Administrator for the State
Courts and chairman
of the Advisor^
Co»ittee. conducted a
discussion regarding
administrative options
several agencies were
discussed which included:
a new

Department of
Justice, the State Auditor,
the Attorney General,
the Identification
section of the Washington
State Patrol
itaie
n ^
n
Patrol, th.
y
the Data
Processing Authority
the Department of
Corrections and a new security
securitv and
.nH n.s
privacy commission
an alternative
recommended by LEAA and
strongly favored by
O'Connor,
staff to the advisory
committee (O'Connor,
1975).

The Department of Justice
option was advanced
because many
expected passage of legislation
proposed in the House to
create such
a department.
Pending creation of this
department, it was recommended
that interim responsibility
be assigned to the Attorney
General.
Nonetheless, strong objections
were made to both alternatives.
First,
'

1t seemed inappropriate
and premature to assign
responsibility to an

agency not yet established, and
to vest a regulatory function
in the
Attorney General's office would
create a conflict of interest with
its
primary responsibility for
prosecution of violations of state
law.
Consequently, both of these alternatives
were rejected.
Eager to get this important matter
resolved as soon as possible,
the committee proposed three
alternatives and sought guidance from the

Governor as to his preference on the
matter.

State Court Administrator

Winberry drafted

a

letter tn
*° r„.*

^^^""ting that

Governor's guidance
on this matter

P-ferred alternatives

strong,.

he

soUcU

the

"

The

''"^^

•

Its first Choice:

^

w?th'*??;:=L^^r^ii ::tui??h'^^^^^
commission
°'

independent
to undertake con?
ulJS'"^
responsibilities within
the ta e^ Tf'uH.'"'' "''"''^
of the committee
consensus
that whatever .^1
takes the long term
""d^rresponsiblH?

.7::c\-^;ra^d%-jc\^i

L-^^^

5i

-^-•v1^:
tioL-w^Tc^-

-

"

"-desirable

L^Sfa^r^
"

and we would like
recommendation
to know ?f th.J'"'?^"''"
''i^t 15 the case
1976).
(Winberry,
The other two alternatives
presented in the letter
included
attaching the Security
and Privacy Advisory
Co^lttee to the Attorney
General's office or
assignment of administrative
responsibility to the
Office Of Community
Development. While the
Governor's subsequent
review of the co^ittee
proposals, as reported in a
letter from Gorton
to W,nberry did provide
some guidance, he questioned
whether Title 28
regulations actually required
the state to vest
administrative authority
in an existing state
agency:
.

The Governor asks whether
or not the State of

^^^^^-^

To^ZuT^Xln!^,

-

W;,ch-inn-Hn

ad;1sry11^^ttee

creaJ?o^=oTaT^ndet^^e^-"S:^s1L%^\Se^-u\1e^^^
5t^te already has too many
^° not w?sh ^ch
'
a
e oons?hi?T^'"'°"'*°
«t°''"^^ G^"^'"^'
°^
therefore
s Jh!'^"'?
preference of both the Governor and
mvse?f
rhJ!,myself, choosing among your three
alternatives, that the
'fi^

t"/

U

^

in effect,

7'"^

t.e

Oove™.. p.fe...
aUe.at.e

-

house.

--op™ent(OCO,.
to

a«n1ste.

T--1„g

Act.

a,!

^-he.^.e.

„UM„

aff1..ed the stat.s

the Off,-ce Of

Co^U.

the OCO „as c.eate.
h. the

3ove™.

fe.e.a, p.o,.a« ,e.,,
Co.p.ehensWe E.p,o..ent an.

Co.™„Uy

Development Bloc. G.ants
and LEAA) and .eet
various planning requirements.
Thus the LEAA pn'vacy
regulations
seemed to logically fit
into this mold.
The Attorney General
also indicated that
the Governor had

some reservations about
the appropriateness of
the Office of Community
Development, since it was
a planning rather
than an operational
agency
thus leaving open the
possibility that if the
committee were to determine a more appropriate
agency, such as the
Department of Social and
Health Services, he may
reconsider his reco-endation.
Consequently,
with the co™,ittee's consent,
Winberry contacted several
agencies to

determine their interest in
undertaking administrative
responsibility
for security and privacy.
It is obvious from a review
some of the responses from
agencies

contacted about their interest in
administering security and privacy
regulations that they were not eager
to undertake such an odious
task.
For example, the Deputy Director
of the Corrections Division
of the

Department of Social and Health
Services

Governor Evans) made

a

(a

super agency created by

blunt, unambiguous reply:

...

it

apparent that the department is
""^"^
complex agency
^nH IT^.
and
think! planning responsibility for
security and privacy
matters within our agency would be seen
as adding
^ insult
to injury (Burdman, 1976).

^lrpL!''cooI\

is

^^^'^^y ^^^9^
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pe.ce.e..,e.t.ec

a,

J.s.ce

co-.u.

t^e.Identlfication
Iect?o„"'J^S.,*?^aS?rSLl
agencies at present and tn i^^
Justice
an audit whi?h could
""'^P'^OP'^ conducting
pos ?b v ?n,n'?
would destroy our
e'ffe^'^i^^^ss^^Ic'^ofn^r^^k^r'""'
T.e State Patrol,
position on

t.s

pol ic.

.tter did.t soften durin.
the 1977 legislative
session, even though
the Sheriffs and
Chiefs
Association and other law
enforcement lobbies urged
that the Patrol
assume administrative
control.
Having exhausted the
possibility of engaging
other state
agencies in the administration
of privacy regulations,
and acknowledging the need to separate
the privacy regulatory
authority from
agencies covered by the
regulations, the committee
gravitated toward
acceptance of the Governor's
stated preferences, as
O'Connor's notes
of the February 13 committee
meeting indicate:
^^'^ ^^''^^
operating agency
'''''' '''''''' '''''
be'd
a
r^'nd'th!^
^ a commission which would be
reDrLpn?.t?:p of non-criminal
representative
justice as well as
criminal justice views should
be establ ished wi?h
specific authority.
In light of the views
Lpressed
by the Governor to the
Attorney Genera
atLchl q
such a commission to the Office
of Community Dee?opstrati ve purposes might be the
best
f'fV"^
fT.lilZ solution (O'Connor,
feasible
1976).

ITanuTJ ^^IT^""^

It was evident as the time
drew nearer to submit a final

plan

to LEAA that the Director
of OCD did not concur with the
committee's

endorsement of the Governor's
recommendation.

The OCD director was

invited to express his views at the
last formal meeting of the committee
(on June 25,

1976) and proceeded to douse their proposal
with cold

water,

in what was

taff, the OCD

-e^nt
-r"™"^"
r
^ous,n,

a

sutpIu

.

C.ctc,

Ric.a.d He.pstad.
contended that it
was

-

^

.eca.se

—

^n

Us ..t.ns „e. Cea..
^

e.c..e la l

.

(P-^aps inconsistently,
that

.eguuto.. co™iss1on
within the OCO would
constitute

a

"

cent™, ove. the
aUocation of LEAA funds
(Washington Attorney
ney General',
beneral s Advisory
A.
Coranittee
on Security and
Privacy, 1976).
•

Recognizing that the OCO
director',s views,
o'l-ector
constituted a clear
veto Of the committee's
plan, the recommendation
was withdrawn to
attach a security and
privacy co^ission to
OCD.
Instead, the committee

commission and carefully
explained why the committee
had been unable
to select an
appropriate agency.

The State Planning Agency

Not only was there little
sense of urgency on the
part of
state government and criminal
justice officials as to the
need to

comply with this latest of
LEAA guidelines, but the
State Planning
Agency (SPA) was hardly in
a strategic position
to mount support from
the criminal justice
community necessary to gain
passage of state

criminal records privacy
legislation.

Almost from its Inception in
1970 as the Law and Justice
Division of OCD, the SPA was
beset with an absence of
Tiission and policy purpose,

a

sense of

inconsistency in leadership, staff
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- .tin, a«..3.ato..

s.cess.e

.„.,..o.

tronted with differenf
tferent crcu.stances
nVr~,,mc-4.
and demands, and
aspirations, management
styles and policy
interests.
organizational structure
*•
and grant
ana
arant allocation
process
numerous changes with
each successive
administrator.

L

was con-

had varying

The SPA

underwent
Srant award and

™nagement processes particularly
exhibited distinctive
changes.

When
the SPA first initiated
its grant award
activities under its
first
administrator, dames O'Connor
(1970 through ,973),
that process was
organized in «hat resembled
a combination
of what Feeley and
Sarat
(1980) term the "agency advocacy"
and "cafeteria menu"
approaches.
During the initial years
of the LEAA program,
there were intense pressures for SPA
to spend money quicUy
in order to achieve
some Visible results.
Under these conditions
each criminal justice
agency had to insure it
could get a satisfactory
share of the resources

consequently, grant recipients
carefully cultivated an SPA
staff person
Who would in essence be
an "advocate" for its
particular project. What
evolved from this practice
was an agency structured
in separate divisions, each serving a
separate component of the criminal
Justice
system.
Thus, the annual state plan
was the product of a logrolling
process in which support for one
project was provided in exchange
for
a

reciprocal support for another.

However, this approach was neither
successful in promoting

innovation nor coordinated approaches
to the problem of crime.

The

fact that numerous other states
adopted similar planning allocation

processes perhaps
prompted LEAA to
promote
a
^
^
campaign of crimespecific planning to
get
spa'cs back
k.
the SPA
y
on track toward
the intended
goal Of the Crime
Control Act ^^eeley
(Feelev and
.nH Sarat,
.
i

specfic Planning

te^s 0.

-

1980: 83).

.e>,uired that the SPA's

the needs o.

te™s Of

nove,

pan.cuU.

strategies

I^P^c-ng the a«ntst.tion
of

c.na,

Crime

Identif, projects
not in

,.t1ce components .t
.the.

„h1ch agencies .1ght
conaho.ate 1„
c

a,

,.st1ce and .eduction
of

„1.e

The "cafeteria ™enu"
approach was an adaptation
to crl.especflc Planning employed
5y Washington and other
SPA^s.
According
to th,s strategy,
projects would be funded
which deal with specific
cn.es, such as burglary or
larceny.
Order and purpose was
now introduced into the state
planning process.
Instead of listing
projects
according to components in
which they were funded,
projects were now

categorized according to
crime-specific problems.

As an expression of

its unequivocal

commitment to the strategy,
the LEAA launched a
$20
Million demonstration project
in eight cities called
the Crime Impact
Project to test the extent
to which crime could be
reduced by concentrating resources in programs
targeted toward particular
crimes.

Subsequent negative evaluations
cast serious doubt on the
crime reduction potential of such
approaches.
Moreover, the National Conference
of State Planning Agency
Administrators grew more critical
of being
held to crime reduction
performance objectives they were
unable to
satisfy, much less measure.
Saul

Arrington, the second administrator
of the Washington SPA

(1973 through June 1977) was among those
SPA administrators who actively
lobbied LEAA to relax crime reduction
performance measures and provide

153

t

-,es.

ion

,..enu„

,

Con.e.e„ce o. SPA
.,..,3t.to.s

^^^^^^^^^

^^^^

...
^^^^

" -^--e

.a.-to-aa. lea.e.s.lp

Planning a.enc. staff.

-Pons1.nit,es

.a

.a„a,«e„t of

h1s neglect of
leaae.ship an.

.a. two pnncipal

Ms

own state

a^Mst.ative

effects:

,„ staff .est.eness ana
derealization precipitated
1„te.-aiv1s1on conflicts
and Interna,
-.ganlzatlon. and

(.)

su.se.uent

Cose sc.ut,n.

t.e Ra. ad.i„ls-

tration lead to his
replacement 1n 1977.
Given both the unpopularity
and ineffectiveness
of crimespedflc Planning. LEAA placed
Increased emphasis from
1975 through
1977 on the standards and
goals strategy.
A National Advisory
commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals
was appointed in
1971 to generate recommendations
to LEAA regarding ways
In which the

administration of criminal justice
might be Improved by providing
benchmarks by which progress
towards goals may be judged.

Seven large
volumes were published by the
commission in January 1973.
In the
following two years, the LEAA
funded grant applications
submitted by
the states In which a
standards and goals project would
be established
within the State Planning
Agency.
O'Connor, the first SPA administrator was coaxed back to the
SPA In order to initiate the
standards and
goals project In early 1975.
A few new staff were hired
to conduct
research and produce standards for
the various criminal justice com-

ponents, including Information
systems.

standards have been produced.

After a year of work no

Instead, the staff had been utilized

by state and local

"PacUy
agencies

In ..n
"""^

--te.

instances, their
efforts were

toward .rant preparation
assistance for local
project
appl icants.
The standards staff
underwent

a

complete turnover
,y earl.

When the project finall.
expired.

Civen the absence
of adoption
Of any standards or
goals ,y the Governor's
co„„ittee and continued

P-ssure on the SPA's.ythe
UAA

to produce concrete
results, .oth

the SPA administrator
and Governor's
Co™ittee .e*ers considered
a
new standards grant
application as a prudent
idea.
This initiative
was given added impetus
by Chris Bayley, a
young and ambitious
second
term King County Prosecutor
(and newly appointed
Standards and Goals
Subcommittee chairman), who
saw a renewed standards
effort as a way to
influence state criminal
justice policy. He was
particularly interested
in improving prosecutorial
effectiveness and producing
a tough new
determinant sentencing law which
would abolish the Parole
Board and
greatly reduce reliance upon
a strategy of
rehabilitation.
To

insure that his policy
interest would be pursued,
Bayley

recommended that

a

young and able attorney, who
had served briefly as

one of his deputy prosecutors,
be selected as the director
of the
standards and goals project.
Acting on the assumption that
attorneys
are a good source of expertise
on criminal justice policies, two
more
attorneys (with excellent credentials
but extremely limited experience)
were hired over the next two
months.
One was appointed as an assistant
director and another was assigned
to produce standards for courts
and
prosecutors.

S300.000 g.ant

corrections and

«Mch caUed

fo. an info™atio„

syst™ specialist

U„

enforcement specialists
and an individual
with
socal science research
s.ills and expertise.
The standards director
was not particular,,
eager to .apidly expand
the staff to its
full
complement.
Por one thing it
would stretch h,s limited
management
capabilities and for another
limited accomplishments
of the prior
standards efforts dictated
that results should be
forthcoming as soon
as possible.
Only one other staff
hired was considered
timely and
necessary.
Thus, the author was hired
in mid-April to
coordinate the
development of standards for
state and local criminal
justice information systems.
The standards staff quickly
discovered that the rest of
the
SPA staff members, particularly
the planning division,
were not

particularly eager to reorganize
in

a

planning and grant award process

order to accommodate the latest
LEAA measures of successful
perfor-

mance.

For months, the standards
director was unable to make any

headway with the planning director
to reach agreement on how
standards
and goals would be integrated
with the planning and grant award
process.
Finally, in July 1976,

a

two-pronged strategy was adopted.

First the

Governor's Committee would identify
policy priorities for which meaningful

standards could be developed.

Second, when standards were

forthcoming they would be attached as
conditions of aid to state grant
awards (Brandt, 1976).

TU

T.e activity
„, t.e

.ant.

Z8

ana

Pn.c.

Ocve™..s Co^utee
ant.ipato. as t.e

- -^-e
Re,.,at1ons was l™,nent
was

confluence o. seve.a,

cH.na,

an

article published in
the Univer^itv nf w
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

a

to

t.
t.e

p.pcsaU w.c.

c.Hs Ba.,e.

Of t.e new sentencing
,aw. p.ecee.ed

J,

.ut o.sc.e.

,„st1ce ,e,s,at,ve

preoccupies t.e Sove^no..
Co™ittee.
a

an. SPA sta.f

.a. now p.epa.e.

t.ou,.tfu, an.

ti„e„

u-

In

addition, the new chai^an
of the House
Institutions Co..ittee,
Ron
Hanna, was submitting
a Juvenile Oustice
Refo™ Act (drafted with
the
assistance of the standards
project staff,.
Pi„ali,,
sPA ad.inist-to. had the standards
staff collaborate on
a draft bill which
would
convert the Governor's
Co^ittee on Law and Justice
into a statutory

required that the state
legislature or Governor
(through executive
order) provide a mechanism
by which comprehensive
criminal justice

Planning could be conducted
on an annual basis.
The SPA enabling legislation
would require consensus among

criminal justice officials
as well as approval by
the Governor's office
Therefore, the SPA administrator
scheduled a meeting for the
chairman
and sub-committee chairs
in mid-December 1977 in
order to produce a
consensus bill and discuss
other legislative proposals.
Attorney
General Gorton and King County
Prosecutor Bayley were generally

supportive (with some
.i„or changes) of
^1 a bill
DIM to convert the
"
SPA
^ra
nto a state cH.ina,
Justice planning
co-ission. However
the Kino
count. Sheri„ and
other iaw enforcement
officials in att ^
''''
9eneran, suspicious and
opposed to
such
^° '""-'^ a
permanent commission.
^ oe
The
King ,County Sheriff
complained that such an .
'^^•^ 3" agency
would constitute
a
prelude to the creation
creatinn of a ^
department of justice
tho csuper
jubLice--the
aqencv
considered to be a threat to fh.
.
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ci

.

^

.

'

'°

''''''"^y

local law enforcement,
addition, the Governor's
representativp
at the meeting,
^ esentative .t
Hempstad (the
O-ector Of OCD) indicated
that Governor ,vans
was not particuiar,,
favor in creating »re
commissions and expressed
his reluctance to
Preempt the views of the
incoming Governor Ra,
on this issue.
Consequently, further
discussion was tabled
until the new governor
could
be approached about
how she proposed to
respond to the issue.

m

-

The meeting had nearly
drawn to

a

close (with Attorney
General

Gorton leaving early with
other pressing business)
when O'Connor waUed
wuh a Sheaf of paper. O'Connor
was there to present his
draft of
security and privacy
legislation for review, comment
and approval by
the meeting participants.
Needless to say, the few
remaining officials
and staff were not eager
to undertake yet another
laborious discussion
on an issue few understood
or cared about.
One member of the Governor's
committee in attendance
recommended that a copy of the
draft be sent to

-

an appropriate subco^ittee
for subsequent review.

Somewhat disheart-

ened by the indifferent
reception to over a year and

a half of Advisory
committee work, O'Connor
reminded the officials that he was
now off

contract.

He would insure that the
bill was handed over to the
Senate

Judiciary Committee, but that
others would have to take responsibility
for what happened to the bill
after
that.

once She assumed
office. Gove.no. Ray
aid not waste an.
.s

-

0. state

t^e Office of

,o.e™„t.
co^unuy

.dena.e

to

Development as

a

,ene.a,

ti,„e

.o.anUa-

ca.pai.n. she had
sin,,ed out
a

„aH,„

example of how the

proHferation of fede.a,
p™g.a.s had g.eat,. enlarged
the state

^"-ucac,

Mo.eove., she had
contended that fede.a,
p,ann1n,
-nts had spawned a new cUss
of civil servants
who threatened to
.su.p
state policy making
functions wUh a .ind
of "socialistic"
planning
alien to incremental
political processes.
in

late January 1977 Governor
Ray appointed Blair
Butterworth
her campaign manager,
as Acting Director
of OCD with the mandate
to

'

commence a reorganization
of the office in which
many of its functional
act,vuies would be reassigned
to other agencies.
There

was some irony
to the selection of
Butterworth to execute this
mandate, for he had

been strongly identified
and intimately associated
with the administration of the federal "War
on Poverty" programs a
decade earlier.
For
example, as western Regional
Administrator of the Economic
Development

Administration, he had helped
administer the $28 million
demonstration
jobs and public works
program in Oakland, California,
that was subse-

quently documented in a now
classic study by Pressman and
Wildavsky
(1973).
The OCD division of most
concern to both Governor Ray and

Butterworth was the Law and Justice
Planning Office, that
Local

is

the SPA.

law enforcement had repeatedly
criticized the SPA for over

regulation and inconsistencies in
grant award processes.

As a special

Deputy Assistant
assigned to conduct

review
'i^view of
Of the Law and
Justice
,

Planning Office Indicated
1n

-

a

„

Di

a

l<iRn

°

was

<
'"terview.
the new OCD
admlnlstraf

pa.t,cu,a..t.ou.ed....Hngton.sad.1n1.t.at1,e
style.

Su"?c7s?:1-"^:^•^;a^r.:^L^^?t^°'"^

r

^rocT^^eT ^a1
operated autonomously^rrom
Jhe o
""J *'-'-'"9ton
Hemstad [the previouf
OCD D??ec?o?l had'n' """"t"''
rein.
^''^^
When pressed about
the SeJIiic
his staff were doing
^ach
of
he dtdn'J.
V^,
about what they lere'doino
"'"^
""^ally a Machiavellian
environment.

a"i-a?

?™^r -l-{Led

n
"1

As the fact-finding
process progressed, the
new OCD leadership

became .ore convinced
that Arrington would
have to be replaced
A
vacancy in the position
of Standards and Goals
director provided the
opportunity to Infuse new
blood into the state
planning agency
Butterworth's Deputy Assistant
recommended that Arrington
offer the
Job to Donna Schram.
Schram. who holds a Ph.D.
in clinical psychology
was a personal friend
and former colleague of
the Assistant while
at
the Battelle Research
Institute, and had established
a strong reputation in criminal justice
research and policy development.
Ultimately
she became Arrlngton's
replacement in early June 1977.

Schram persuaded Arrington
that the SPA should adopt
an aggresive posture and stay on
top of legislation of most
concern to the
Governor's Committee. Schram
was particularly interested
in addressing
the serious Issue of prison
over crowding, Including juvenile
justice
and sentencing reform.
Consequently, the criminal records
privacy
legislation would nestle in the
safety of near obscurity.
In fact,
for the first three months of
the 1977 legislative session no
one knew

(nor probably cared)
what had happened
to th.

S^^^J^U^^^^Jiea^^

-

s„b.tt

t:o
to

se
benate
ate Judiciary
Committee.

2608-

March, the crl™,-„a,
records

--senate

-

en,

^^"^^

,SB, aaos, the

....ton

bn, surfaced.

State C

a,

The

.cord:

d,sc.sed.

standards Director
Schr. assigned her
.„.or.at.on
systems specialist to
attend this and other
hearings held on the
bill
unlike Its unsuccessful
predecessors In 1974 and
1975 this
latest privacy legislation
had .uch better
prospects of .ettl^,
serious
attention.
An attorney and
trial lawyer, the
chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Co™ittee had
strongly supported due
process rights for
criminal records data
subjects.
In addition, the bill
reflected an
-presslve consensus building
process through the Attorney
General's
Security and Privacy Advisory
Co^Utee. Most relevant Interests
had
had an opportunity to
be Involved In the
planning process and .ost
had
seen and commented upon
the draft legislation.

What the Senate Judiciary
Committee considered most
important
about the bill was that
some form of policy response
was required in
order to continue to get
LEAA funds and the SPA had
persuaded the
committee that legislation
was the best method.
,n addition, since
the publication of the
Title 28 regulations the
uncertainty regarding
the conditions under which
criminal records information
could be released under the federal
mandate had produced wide variations
in

interpretation by st^jtp
state and iloca

™.

-..

...

.

aaenripc

....

esDpri;»iiv/ ^r.
especially
for news media
whose lifp

^Ldie or affairs
hi

'^'^
eager to aet
get

"

a

c

uniform policy.

Both the senate
an. Ho.se

^

.

therefore, the
press was

...ar. Co^Utees

sought

test,.ony and guidance
on what to do
with SB 2608.
Committee members were
oartimi;,^!
particularly opposed to
the creation of
a new commission
(perhaps recognizing
the ^•'^^'^t-^
futility of .suchh a
^
recommenda,
t.on^ ^to Governor
Ra.) and suggested
instead that the State
Judicial
Counc, .est approximated
the commission
concept,
.hile State Court
Administrator .i„,erry was
not eager to undertake
added responsi.i,.

.

--^^
that the audicia,

--ci,

Counci

would .e one of several
possiM,

i ties.
With
tentative, nonco^itta,
concession extracted fro.
the State Court
,

tMs

Which he statted. he
reluctant,, conceded

privacy commission concept
in both Senate and
House versions of the
b'H. This provision
remained unchallenged until
increased

interest
by the SPA in the
status of the criminal
records pr,vacy bill
provided
Wmberry with an opportunity
to divest the Judicial
Council of an
unwanted role.

'^fte. the senate
Oudlcia.,

- -lew

t.e substance
of the

,ean-ngs on WCRPA

'

staff..

M„

staff .
detailed analysis
which identified
laentified hhow the
proposed staf»
satisfied LEAA
guidelines anrf h- .
a

-"-nt

--ecommended some
changes
was subsequently
approved hy the OCO
director an

to the legislature

on^P^Mapro

ed

-'--

—

Th.

-

h

.

i=

That
:
.
submitted

•

~^

:;s:^^^^^^"'^^"°"^^^"^^^'----

Stale ;:;n

---^^

With new leadership
at OCD. there was
the pcssihil ity
of greater
,ce

.Vision assu.e
administrative authority
for security

co^itteewas eager

to hear from a
state agency which
could spea.

authoritatively ahout the
federal privacy mandate
and appropriateness
Of a state response.
Numerous questions were
raised at the hearing
-Hh respect to extensiveness
of coverage, fiscal
impact
and the

capability of local agency
compliance.

The SPA was as.ed
to present
testimony and announced
that OCD was now willing
to assume administrative ownership of a
state privacy law and
offered multiple reasons
why
OCD was the best
available agency:

1'^^"^'°^'^

CoJnc'Ir^o'weve?
The JudiciaTcouncil
own admi ssion, does

Deve'lo ^en

'
»

uii

™

tfie
he

-

the Judicial
inappropriate,

bv th^sL'r"?''''
'h a e
fix p'^rt^se't?'"'?^

'

°' '"^"''^
otner
ot"Se*;°hand''th°"'"
hand, the proper agency
to
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administer the sprii^i + . ^
through its Law and
regulations.
OCD
ju^t?rp oV"^^
LEAA funds which'?'
^^--n^st'ers
llTr'[V''l'''
justice system.
^"^^''^ criminal
Further OCD
5
justice operating
'P'"^'"* °^ '''^^r^a^
agencies anVth^
disinterested and fair
^ ^^^^
mplementa^ "^J^^-'
Furt er,
>,

the Law and Ju
tice pfann nn nl-^' requirements,
regulatory function by
Perform a
virtue o? ?;.^
interpret federal
'^^^Po^sibil ity to
\?
guide! npf.nn
^u'delines
and allocate
(Dalton, 1977a).
federal funds

.est,-...
t

at OCD
0. so.e ct.e. executive
.ep..t™ent

.

assi.ne. a.^on.,
to
administer the law instead
of the judicial
Judicial council.
-i
In addition, he
noted that the recent
withdrawal of the
Lne juaiciary
Judiciarv from
f
coverage by the
federal regulations
obviated tne
the direct
dirert i„„„i
involvement of the
judiciary in
security and privacy
regulation and administration.
It was difficult to
gauge the extent of
support by the

legislature and Governor
for OCD administration
of security and
privacy.
Governor Ray had made it
clear that she was

critical of the
cost and other burdens
that unnecessary federal
regulation imposed on
the states and localities.
She was inclined in her
administration to
-verse the state's role in
perpetuating this situation.
In addition
the House Judiciary
Co^ittee had several pieces
of legislation to
consider including a
controversial Juvenile Justice
Act, which was
amended sixty-seven times.

Moreover, the strong move
by the Office of Co^unity
Development to assert control
over administration of criminal
records privacy
regulation was alarming to law
enforcement interests.
The Sheriffs
and Chiefs Association was
particularly unhappy by the prospect
of the
SPA acquiring additional
regulatory authority on top of its
already

awards guidelines.

,„ o.de. to
this possibility,
the AssccMM
Assoc,at,on prodded
the State Patrol
to take a
""-•e aggressive
posture and offer tn .
.
administrative respons1b1I'
Itles
es for th.
,
the regulation.
their consternation,
the Chief of the
onl. l„.ewar.to
the Idea and his
chief of the ,dent1f
c,f "

-

^--was

™s

positively opposed to
such an Idea
the Sheriffs and
Chefs Association
failed

—

hinder the SPA's efforts.

The Patrol had 1 . .
introduced

a

toreal.ewas

bill

early on in
confer the power to
Investigate and
prosecute
persons suspected of
state felony offenses,
essence, such a law
would .ake the patro,
equivalent to a state
police.
The impetus for
the proposed legislation
originated in the Organised
Crime Intelligence
Unu (a unit begun by an
LEAA grant, because
Its investigative
activities were continually
dissipated for want of
prosecution.
This provided
the bas,s for a guid
pro guo between the
SPA and Patrol:
In exchange
for SPA support for
this legislation, the
State Patrol would support
the SPA^s attempt to
secure privacy regulatory
authority.
Arrington
did in fact attempt
to swing the Governor's
Co™ittee in favor of the
Patrol's legislative agenda.
However, the patrol surely
got the worst
end Of the bargain for
support fro™ the Governor's
Committee was not
forthcoming (Schram, 1980).
'

-'^

m

As a deadline
neared for the

^Ho„« Jud'cary
Committee
i

reoort It.
report
us remaining bills out
for floor vote
^

-

----ac.

.1,

..d not.

it

to

,

0

^^^^--°-"^"---"--^eando::er;;;d:of:z^
"'^^

----'-^

"ot an
i^^^^^^^^^

The information
systems specialist
was somewhat
surprised to
b,aphc„e call toward t.e
end of Ma. from
William Hagens. chief
Of the House
Institutions Committee
that the hill had
heen
-1ved
helng transferred
to the Institutions
Committee chaired
«on Nanna. a young,
ambitious representative
of a small P„get
Sound
-sort area whose career had
catapulted as a result
of rounding up the
votes necessary to elect
the new speaker of
the House, John
Bagnariol
SPA Administrator
Schram was perplexed
why Hanna was so
Interested in
seeing the bill passed.
As Hagens indicated
In a subsequent
interview
1980, Hanna had been strongly
supportive of creating a
Department
Of Justice and was
thus disappointed when
the OCD leadership failed
to back the SPA'S attempt
to submit enabling
legislation to create a
permanent criminal Justice
planning co^ission.
Thus passage of an
SPA administered security
and privacy regulation
provided a foundation
upon which other regulatory
and planning functions
could be added.
Hagens invited SPA representatives
over to his office to
propose language In which
the bill could be amended
to give the SPA

Wn

~,

-

statutory authority to administer
the law.

A committee hearing was

pass the bill out
for

a

floor votP

^
.

taken to

k

Subsequently, the
next Monday
a rather
rstho- „ ^
perfunctory meeting
and the proposed
legislation glided through
without uissent.
dissent
Hnw»
However, a difficulty
immediately arose thee
dau
u=
next day.
Hagens
notified the SPA
that upon a
closer reading of the bill ,,n=
bill, one Of »u
the committee
members discovered
an Objectionable
provision in the bill-a
provision supported by
the
Allied Daily News
Association which defined
the 1 imits of
privacy
invasion for the purposes
of limiting the
1 iabil ity
of the press in
publishing information
otherwise restricted by
the criminal records
Pn-vacybill. This oversight
nearly cost the bill
the support
necessary for passage.
the committee held

.

Throughout most of the
session the ACLU, the
Allied Daily News
Association and the originator
of the state's public
disclosure law
Jolene Unsoeld, had been
locked in conflict over
a bill proposed by'
the news association
to limit the extent
of liability for invasions
of
As insurance against
the possibility that
the attempt might

Pnvacy.

not be successful, the
Allied Daily News Association
attached a brief
section to the criminal
records privacy bill which
amended the public
disclosure law specifying the
conditions which constituted
an invasion
Of privacy.
The section was brief and
concluded with the following
language:
^'^^^ ^° Privacy has been violated
where
'''' unreasonab y i
vadeS
rtf'^^"?]
^^^^^ations of facts about an identifiable
individual
individual,
thVn
the publicizing of which
would be highly offen'''''''''
' Circumstance
in wnich
wh ch thT?a."?.'''
the facts or allegations are
of no leaitimatP
(Wash^'ngton SubstituL Senate Bil
1
26S8r7977:'se'c''6)^"'
f^L

'

^

'Tr^

The ACLU was upset

the .ef1„uicn
of

pHvacy because U «s
---^^-can..a.e. . a..ess .p...
.sues
~,o„s.s..s.
...o.c,os.eco™.s.„.saj:

-

™—

„.„3e

ana

o.c.e

cc.U.e.

,ence Of .0. s.es
..eatene.

cnminal records orivarv
threatened to prevent
the

hm
biU

to

^

a

,.e
t.
tne
y
^

"°t°--^ty than expected
and
fro. reaching

a floor vote
The SPA atte.pted
hut faHed to get
the parties to find
another
foru. h. Which the.
could settle their
dispute.
Instead, the Allied
Oail. News Association
representative, Paul Conrad,
continued to hold
the bill hostage.
The News Association,
however, did not
anticipate

suaded a former majority
leader to propose a
motion to eliminate the
questionable
It passed and the
Washington Cri.,nal Records
Pn-vacy Act (RCW ,0.97)
received unanimous support
for passage
Although the bill was now
on its way to the Senate
floor for a vote,
the senate version still
contained the controversial
a.end.ent.
Even
if the bill did pass
with the amendment, a
conference committee would
have to work out the
differences and the likelihood
of a compromise
appeared si im.

a«nt.

It was evident to the
OCD leadership that stronger
measures

of influence would have to
be employed to get the
Senate to pass the

WCRPA unencumbered by the News
Association's controversial definition
of privacy.

The mechanism seized upon
was the Juvenile Justice Act.

It too had passed the House
floor vote and awaited approval

in

the

Senate where ,t was
expected to pass by
a fain,
Deputy Assistant to
Butterworth decided to
caoH.n
capitalize
on the popularity
Of th»
h-n Kby suggesting
the bill
that if the News
Association's privacy
a.end.ent was not withdrawn,
Governor Ray (no real
fan of the Ouvenile
Justice law because of
the political conflict
with its proponents,
would be as.ed to consider
vetoing it if it
reached her des.
The
gesture struc. a responsive
chord and by a two
vote .argin the Senate
struck the a.end.ent and
thus passed the WCRPA
intact on June 10 1977
Senate passage of the
WCRPA did not guarantee
that it would
become state law.
"ixie Lee Ray still had
to sign the bill
within a
ten day period which
was ample ti.e for law
enforcement and other
opponents to make their case
for selective or complete
veto.
Surprisingly, evidently resigned
to the inevitable
prospects of SPA privacy
regulations and assuming that
the Governor would sign
it since OCD
supported it. no objections
were forthcoming from law
enforcement or
the rest of the criminal
Justice community.
Rather, opposition came
unexpectantly from the Office of
Policy Planning and Financial

Management (OPPFM).

The cost of compliance:
the
Governor's veto deterred

Before any bill passed by the
Washington State Legislature
reaches the Governor's desk, it must
be reviewed by the OPPFM to

assess the fiscal

impact on state and local government.

OPPFM review had rarely been confined
to budget matters.

However,
For, as the

title of the agency implies, it could
advise the Governor as to its

Pe-Pt1ons o.t.epo.c.

<^P' ^cations
p.p„3e. ,e,-sU.-o„
Normally, the state
budget staff „ni
assist in the
t.
preparation Of
*
fUr.i
fiscal notes
,f required
H
by leaislati>,.
Dy
legislative committees.
In turn, fiscal
,
iscai
impact estimates are
used to
to c„»i
"sed
evaluate appropriation
requests which
may accompany the
legislation.
Approximately si. days
after the
-«PA had been passed by
the legislature and
only four days
before
the deadline for
Governor Ray. signature,
an OPPPM budget
analyst
.

•

<.

until one was
forthcoming the bill
would not be forwarded
to the

Governor. Office.

I-dditio„.

not content with the
consensus
reached in the legislative
process, the budget
analyst indicated that
he questioned the
appropriateness of placing
administrative authority

Department of Licenses or
the State Patrol
This came as quite a
surprise to SPA staff In
that as early as
March 25 they had discussed
with OPPFM the need to
broaden coverage
Of a fiscal note which
at that time Involved
only one state agency
the Department of Social
and Health Services.
Further, the SPA urged
that a state appropriation
be considered to Implement
the bill i„ the
absence of LEAA funding.
Evldentlv neither of
tviueniiy
a
„f these
tho
recommendations
were heeded.
The OPPFM analyst's challenge
of the appropriateness of
the

SPA administrative authority
reflected an ignorance of the
political
consensus underlying the decision.
If the Governor were apprised
of
these views, it might threaten
to undermine the credibility
of the
SPA.

In the

little time that remained, the
SPA staff drafted

a
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memorandum to Butterworth
for forwarding to th«
^''^ Governor which attempted
to „^
persuasively address both
fiscal and administrative
issues
Una.,e to draw from
any precise budget
data for

^

.

r-

the State of
Washington. SPA staff
,uic.,y gathered cost
information from several
la-

tion.

The annua, cost of
privacy administration
ranged from $60 ,000
in lowa to
$350,000 in Massachusetts.
State implementing agency'
budgets did not exceed
$100,000 in any of the
states surveyed.
This
information was presented sinnn .wt-k
along with an estimate
of the state agency
and local government
cost.
In addition, the
memorandum indicated the
SPA could absorb initial
first year administrative
costs of implementation until a special
appropriation request was
considered in the next
legislative session.

Along with this information

a

work plan was developed
which

carefully itemized implementation
activities to be executed by
the
SPA.
This was done to anticipate
concerns that an unfavorable
OPPFM
recommendation might create about
the SPA's capability to
execute
administrative responsibil ities
Before the SPA staff had
completed the memorandum to Ray
the
OPPFM staff telephoned to indicate
that he would recommend that
the

Governor veto the section of
the bill which empowered the SPA
to
administer the law.
It was evident from this
response that no additional data from the SPA would
be persuasive enough to overturn
the

OPPFM analyst's predisposition toward the
dissolution of the SPA role
the state privacy regulation.

Consequently, the SPA staff recommended

that Butterworth take some action
immediately.

Perhaps there was

a

in

e

n,

^^^^^

him to send the
OPPFM director

^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^
a

letter which

emanat?^rf^:ry^:r'°sT:?f\'o"thTr^"'^'^'°-

»^

be

Section 9 of SSB 2608
to veto
whlcl^
^"PO^^^'^i'ity for
implementation of the
SecS^i?
State Planning Agency
'"e
(cSrrl^H^ ?h
Planning Office, OCD) ^""""^"^^^ ^^e Law and Justice
has

loiiiT:d:2]ii7.

7oiZ''rLT:

'"'^

^-^-"^

'^^^^ ^"der the
impression that there w;,c- ^^^7
that the Law and
Legislature
JusticrP a
n^^^^^^
Priate place to house
"pleme Ja^ion o^'tr'
least for the time being
Program-at
I
understand that Tvour '<if^ff ^.i
that responsibility
P^P"^^
for SecuJuv .nH^p'"'^"'"''
Privacy rest with
the State Patrol or th«
Testimony and analysis to S^'^f^Sf r"""" Vehicles,
that putting Securf
;\nd
va
'^^''"Ol is
equivalent to having a starvIrf ^J^v Tn'ttV^V"''''^'"
!
fryers.
"^^hington
The DM? s^n the ^ranl?ti?^"'''
"^P™"'^ between
data systemscerta nlv ,„
I
burden would be cos? J to tha?^''°"'^ administrative
tl^^s time
(Butterworth, 1977)
'

nf^n^

^

The Butterworth memo
had the desired effect,
for the OPPFM

recommendations were never
forwarded the Governor's
office
The
Governor's staff did receive
the memo drafted by the
SPA staff,

and
phone inquiry from the
Governor's office to Butterworth
to
clarify some obscure point,
the bill „as signed to bring
the State of
Washington into compliance with
the federal regulations.
The timing
of the arrival of the bill
at the Governor's desk was
extremely
favorable.
The 1977 legislative session
was nearing adjournment and
produced a deluge of bills for
the Governor's signature.
The Juvenile
Justice Act was among those
many pieces of legislation which
no doubt

after

a

state

iM»ent«1on

0. ,et anot.e. ,e.e.l

..ate.

^^^^^^^i^i^EHSination^^
In

late September, with

f,,ii

a

ties now planned and
initial draft

,

'3""''^ °f implementation
activi-

<

°'

guidelines underway,
an OCO

,

was assigned to
assist in the
development of a cost
estimate .0. submission
to t.e 3ove.no.
and state legislature
in
December.
Subsequently, a schedule
for a series of m» .
meetings with state
and local criminal
justice officials citv
"^"^ ^""^ "'^"ty associations
and
others was developed
in order to identify
impacts and costs
•

state and local criminal
justice agencies were
presented to Eugene
Wiegman, who had replaced
Butterworth as OCD Director.
The memo which
accompanied these materials
stated in part:

by RCW in q?

fh^

P

anmng Office designated

t^at^™u;?i?^e^?

s*?:t:tn^LTbi
'° '''' i™Pl™?a"?on
Pliance
pr?:ncTe??orf'"-

d' e' oT*''
effort may proceed with
maximum effectiveness

and iu"s?i

e^^l^-nTof^?^:

lltl

-"^^^^

^^^'^^

ll

November or early December
(Dalton, 1977b)
The memo was submitted to
Schram along with the explanatory

materials for her review and
approval.

Surprisingly, she was furious

about the process by which
cost information would be solicited
from
state and local agencies.
Such a strategy, she felt, would
invite
criminal justice agencies to
submit exaggerated, unreasonable
and

absurd estimates of fUr^}

^mr^

^

^""^^^^-"tly it would put
the SPA
and OCD ,n the
awkward position Of
uerending an inordinately
defendina
i
h,
larae
budget request .etore
a legislature
which sought increased
fiscal
'

.

--ity.

'-su.se,uent

jected that She expected

interview conducted
in 1,80, schra.
re-

-

magnitude of the costs
tor compliance to
security and privacy
guidelines to .e so large
that it would have
robbed other priority
„
siirh ^s prison
^ areas '"'"^
overcrowding of sufficient
funds to solve
longstanding and festering
problems."

subsequent interviews with
criminal justice
officials revealed
that While Schram's
estimate of the fiscal
impact was incorrect
her
Objection to a strategy
to solicit cost
estimates from criminal
Justice
agencies reflected a
realistic assessment. A
records division manager
from an urban police
department in eastern
Washington stated it this
way
:

A state-wide appropriation
for compliance to securitv

^--"-s''
w e^":?e''at1he^^•L'r^"^^"
that a5d^ i?^afta^do.^s^L^TL^
iv\?^a".?r
forcement's criticism of the
enormous cos s involved
in compliance with
privacy regulations was
j sTl dodqe
to get more money to
support local informato
system'
^o enhance
e
i-sca
ecurit of
'T''
security
our own information systems
!
wo
ni
but
we planned
to do that long before
the state oHvacv lL
'"^'^^'^ departments
n this
tate
^rn^/'^fL
could get by with an expenditure
of less than $l!ooo.

'iz^

Other law enforcement officials
expressed similar views.
example, an assistant chief
of

indicated that

a

a

For

western Washington police department

file update project was initiated
to obtain complete

arrest and disposition records
by

evidence personnel.

a

temporary reassignment of field

He estimated that it took
approximately 500 hours

of time to accomplish the tasks.

Significantly, throughout an interview

"

with the head of
the record,

'^'^
»f the Seattl
e Police
Department, additional
costs were never
mentioned
'
-pact Of WCRPA.
mterestinol
interestingly,
„h,le the withdrawal
of a special
appropriations strategy
did
lu not really
reall„ hhave an
advprc;p o-f^^ ^
°"
implementation acnvities,
activities .arguments
about cost imn;,rfc .
' ^^^^ continued
to be trotted
trottpH nout. as
a way to cause
a retraction
reiraction of proposed
guidelines

"

.t

also .y a state law
with criminal and
civil penalties
for
"--Pliance. .hile the legislation
reflected a consensus
among
0^

r

"

---PO-c.

c

al Justice
were far from .eing
completely satisfied
with ever,
provision and were
apprehensive a.out how
the SPA

--es

during the implementation
stage,

would dea, with these

m

(and nature of the
opposition, over criminal

fact, the depth of
conflict

records privacy policy
did
not begin to surface,
as the ne.t chapter
indicates, until the
guideline

development process commenced

in late

September 1977.

CHAPTER

V

THE GUIDELINE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
IN WASHINGTON.
1977-1978

P-ac.

Fc„o„1„g the adoption
Of t.e WasMngtcn
CM.,„a, Rl5,ts
Act (WCRPA) ,n

..e

,977, the State

PUnnIn, A.ncy (SPA,

^egan to develop
guidelines fo.
Implementation of the new
law

°'

P-ess

in the

guideline development

focused upon two
P011C. issues.

1 Imitations
to dissemination
and rules fo. Individual
access and review.
Given the protected

conflict over the LEAA
draft guidelines on
dissemination policy and
recognizing the latitude
that LEAA provided to
the states to develop
their own policies,
difficulties could be
expected to surface In the
development of state and
local procedures.
Conflict was especially
Hkely since the Washington
law enunciated a
dissemination policy
Whose ambiguity encouraged
uncertainty and competing
interpretations.
As indicated in Chapter
I, LEAA gave the
states discretion to
determine the restrictiveness
of regulations for
dissemination of
conviction and non-conviction
Information.
Although the MCRPA adopted
a more restrictive
policy on the dissemination
of non-conviction data
than required by LEAA. the
policy for dissemination of
conviction
information was stated in somewhat
equivocal terms:
"Conviction Information may be disseminated
without restriction" (PCM. 1977:
10.97.50)
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It became evident

shortly after
^ .u
passage of
y drier Da<;.;,no
the WCRPA that
great deal of uncertainty
prevailed as to what

loci

1.,

thi. P^''''^
.
'

.

Because

-7---

7- PolK.ste^e.

so.ce 0.

......

on

..o.t.e use of the

the release of
conviction Info^atlon
could be restricted

cn.1nal Justice agencies

a

^'"^Pl^ed

for

t.t .cena.t.,

one

discretionary •'^r instead
of

a

......

,,,,,, ^^^^
The

mandator, "s.all" prompted
.an.

to for.ld disclosure
of any criminal

nistory
record Information until
the SPA guidelines
had clarified this
and
related statutory matters.

While difficulties with
regard to dissemination
policy were
expected, the extended
conflict over rules for
Individual

access and

review were not anticipated.

The LEAA guidelines for
Individual access

had attracted little
attention and almost no
controversy, with the
exception of some co^ents
by the FBI.
Perhaps this was because
of
very general language used
to characterize the
procedures states could

employ to Implement these
rights.

Also, as Chapter III
indicates, most

subsequent state laws exhibited
little variation

in how they construed
an effective and
non-burdensome process to enable
data subject review,
access and challenge of criminal
history record Information.
Therefore,

staff were surprised at the
intensity of concern by both
civil liberties
and law enforcement Interests
about this issue.

Developing and Implementing
guidelines for MCRPA Involved two
different committees.
First, dissemination policy provided
the only
on-going policy and decision making
role for the existing Governor's

Committee on Law anH inc^-;^
Justice.
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whKh

coordinate criminal
justice Dolirv

was the body
required by LEAA
to

. h
'"^""'""'""""O"

,
to
which the SPA reoortPd

^--ons
Co^Utee

Of grant funds
and

Th„

regarding dissemination
had to be made by

a

Governor.

With ,itt,ee.perience
in or desire to
requiatecrimina,
justice processes.
Second, the SPA cre.t.H .
^ "^^'^^^ ^ special Ad Hoc
Advisory
p
Co^nittee broadly
representative ot criminal
justice and ncn-c
al
justice interests to
increase con™unication
with affected agencies
and
to advise the SPA on
drafting implementation
guidelines.
This latter
co^iittee was the effective
wording group i„ which
controversy emerged
and had to be resolved
over such issues as
individual access and
review of files.
What follows in this
chapter

is a

close examination of
the
factors and interests
involved in development
of guidelines with
respect
to dissemination and
individual access in order
to deepen our understanding Of the political
Significance of state guidelines
in policy
implementation processes.

Gauging Responses of StafP ^nd
Local
Criminal Justice OffiTiTu
No sooner had the SPA
acquired administrative responsibility

for implementation of the
Washington Criminal
a

Records Privacy Act than

wholesale turnover of leadership
occurred both

in

the Office Community

Development. Law and Justice Planning
Office (SPA) and Governor's
Committee.

CCD Director Blair Butterworth was
replaced by Eugene Wiegman,
a

longtime friend of Governor Ray.

Like Ray, Wiegman had had previous

experience at fe.e.a,
positions; ,e was
also a

-™

- --t,e
r^ni

F

----e

OCO an.

..lop

Wco„e

t. .3
a ne«

1™.

L
o.

r
t

a

H

enc

u'^came a new
division of the StatP

Sec.n. Oepan.ent

a„a plans

™a.e to t.ans.e.
t.e

nanca, Hana^e^ent
,.o™eH. OPPFM,

-0

oanua.. „,s,
W1e,.an was
asslone. to .place
Atto.ne. Cene.al
Oo.ton as Caiman P.

Te.

o^-ecove.„o.sco™itteeonuwan0ust1ce.
-xpecte.

—

In .act, ..e to
t.e

resignation of t.e .ea.
o. E.p,o..ent
Securlt,. .le,.a„
OCO as wen as
E.p1o..e„t Sec.1t. .o.
Septe..e. t.ro,.

«ove.no..s Co^lttee to
ass^e

pe.anent appointment as
Co„™iss1one.
of the State Employment
Security Department.
a

Before leaving, Butterworth
persuaded Wiegman to
replace
Arrlngton with Oonna
Schram as acting administrator
of the Law and
Justice Planning Office
TTice.
Srhram'cs ;impeccable
a
Schram
criminal justice research
credentials and demonstration
of forceful policy
leadership with the
standards project had been
Impressive.
However, the law enforcement
community was wary because
she was an unknown
quantity to their ranks
and thus suspected
(correctly) that the grant
award process would be
tightened and brought within
the ambit of her special
policy Interests.
As noted earlier, the
policy areas of ™st Interest
to her were prison
overcrowding and sentencing
reform.

Schram recognized the special
administrative responsibilities
that WCRPA created for the SPA,
but preferred to be spared
involvement

IZsTuT

''''''''' '-'''-'"'^^^^^

-pons,.„u,es

--^

competing for he.
I.edlate attention.
Thus
the
was appo.nte. PH.c.
A...,st.to. an. ..„ct1onea
as : staf.
to a

spec,

P-ac.sohco»nteeo.theOove.„o.sCo™Htee

-^---^

1 :

he 3ove.no.

s

Co.Utee, Oeo.,e

-

Of the State Patrol

^
a

„e« appo.tee to

Mattson, a ..tn-ct
ccu.t ,..,e an.

head of the State
Maqistrate'c:
gistrate s ;,c^n.^.^association.

privacy subcommittee
included
nciuded

a

Other members of the

c^t^to c
state
supreme court justice,
the Chief

the chief of

small eastern Washington
police
department, an assistant
superintendent of public
instruction and
Pierce County prosecutor.
,

a

Because of the ti.ing of
the passage of the law,
neither the
old or ne«

meters of the subcommittee
were familiar with

the details
Of the new law when
that committee was
reconstituted in September
1977
Thus, it took several
meetings over the next few
™nths to come up to
speed.
Moreover, their intimate
involvement in policy matters
was
probably more crucial and
timely when draft regulations
had been
completed for their review,
comment and ultimate approval.

With the selection of

a

judge to oversee the security
and

privacy implementation effort,
appearances would suggest that the
judiciary was willing to exercise
a supervisory role in
the administration Of criminal records
privacy.

However, Judge Mattson had some

reservations about the appropriateness
of the Governor's Committee and
the SPA assuming such a
policy operational role.
Mattson, now a

superior court judge put it this
way:

records privacv l^w ^nT
Agency
"r

.LT/e

body.

The Governor's

?

^"^P^ement criminal

iltl^J^'"?"
^^^""^"9

Co^mp!
icn "

''^'^ ^^-ning
«nd monitoring

viding consistent
P^°po
?1on%o°i."P'^^^
staff.
The committee was
^''''^y
more
0?
. nnf>-^''?
which different points
P^^^^^^^ g^oup in
of 7i2 .L
^^'^ "'"^ ^^"^^ they
met to consider
security and n.f
Governor Ray didn'
^^^ition,
really pu? '?n^ 'Vl'''
or solicit its advice
^"''^ ^"^ ^he group
tn crimLi
^'"^ matters.
sides these concerns
Bea? TrnJl
Judiciary, I
didn't realir?eercom?or?ah?f
essentially ^n
ex^ecS^^v'rfSnJtio'rj^aJJL^illg^?)^^^^

the privacy guidelines
required of criminal
Justice officials nor
indicate what its impact
on the

courts would be.

Evidently skepticism about
the SPA role was shared
by the SPA
administrator Schram:

expertise in the administration
of criminal iustiro
tL
aw enforcement community
was frustrated by the
PA'qulde

L

The;'did*no'
nk
SpTst'a??' rT''%"^^
f :ctN ni a^^: ^jo\^fe::^
t:iuiroi^?h?3^!ih^rw:?err^^"*

--ply continu
tne same things they
"e":me1hi^arS:'"r^
always'''.LT''
did (Schram, 1980).
In

o do

the meantime, the new Privacy
Administrator established

series of informational meetings
with other state criminal
justice
agencies and associations.
The purpose of these meetings
was to

explain the law to top administrators
and determine the extent to
which the law would affect their
record handling and administrative
functions.

In addition,

the executive staff of various
criminal

a

.ust,ce assocUtlons
.ep.esentin, ,a„ enforcement,
p.osecuto.s an.
courts we. contacted
o.e. to

en.st tne.

avenues o. co™.n,cation
to

7'™"

"^"'^^--^

Of criminal justice
system.

.e*e.sMp

„on

,„
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cea.,

regarding ,ene.a,
statute.
'--llcat.ons .0. eac.
component

The results of th.c
these meetings
suggested

t«o tMngs:

most a.enc. ad.nUt.ato.s
.ad little .no«,ed,e
a.out w.at
WCRPA requirements entailed
but the. were very
anxious as to the extent
Of the impact Of the
law on their record
management practices
The

«Uh

specific answers did little
to relieve that anxiety.
But the
meetings also indicated
that the SPA would have
to contend with two
extremes of reactions:
hostility over disputed
territory and
indifference.
The State Patrol leadership
expressed their concern that
the

WCPRA overlaped with their own
powers established under
For example, that legislation
had established

a

a 1972 statute.

Policy Advisory

Committee whose function it was
to advise the Chief, among
other
-natters, on policies regarding
the dissemination of criminal

information.

In

history

addition, the head of the
Identification Division of

the State Patrol complained
that the Central State Repository
would not
be capable of meeting the
WCRPA's January 1,

dissemination inquiries.

1978, deadline for pre-

The implication was that unless
funding was

forthcoming from the SPA or state
legislature, the Patrol would disregard compliance to this aspect of
the law.

Several other criminal

justice agencies mentioned costs as a
constraint to compliance and thus
had to be

a

factor figured into the implementation
process.

In contrast to the
State Pai-.-ni
''^"-"l. n,
the executive
director of

the State Prosecutor's
Association indicate,
that his «..ership

considered compliance
to criminal record
privacy one of its
"least
important concerns...
According to him, ..local

prosectors had at

time or inclination to
observe privacy
requirements...
Further it
«as evident that criminal
history records infor^tion
was not considered a critical factor
in prosecution.
The receipt of timely
and
complete criminal record
information is not considered
essential to
effective prosecution; how
the police construct
the crime is more
Important.
It was also indicated
that prosecutors rarely
disseminate
information to other criminal
justice agencies or the
public and thus
would have little need to
maintain '.burdensome audit
trails...
I„ fact,
in a

1980 interview the executive
director of the Prosecutor.s
Association estimated that only
three jurisdictions in the
state had
made any attempt to develop
audit trails.

Strangely, the leadership in the
law enforcement community
did not openly express its
attitude toward the WCRPA until
after
several months of participation
in the rule making process.

Initial

meetings with the Executive Director
of the Washington Sheriffs and
Chiefs Association were cordial and
cooperative.
Plans were discussed
to address

regional meetings of law enforcement
personnel and to

organize

state wide training effort.

a

There were several reasons for this
reticence and seeming

cooperation among the leadership and ranks
of state and local law
enforcement.

Although

..law

enforcement had to dislike the law because

It was a mandate
by the Feds

were w,,l,„g
wniinc to

-.

c:da

K

nsk.

L.-..
e..ning

"

T":'

"

;,c:

.

c

,

•

jeopardizing continuation
of LEAA
^^^^ "^o^ey ,from the
open resistance.

^

^

^^^^'^'^--^

a.ition, prior
.pos.re

- ----

-Pan.ents

Those Who had
participated in preparation
of
"

I

a

for a st

state privacy'

--

T

to t.e

-

effects,

there was also wide
spread uncertainty,
particularly a^on, s.lier
departments, ahout what
was required hy the
iaw and this .ade
it

ta.ty

,ead .any departments
to impose a moratorium
on the dissemination
Of any information
until they got a firmer
grip on what was
legally
permissible.
Importantly, the law
enforcement leadership saw
participation in guideline
development as an opportunity
to get what they
wanted
terms of regulations.
For all of these reasons,
a consensus, at
least among the ran. and
file, emerged which
involved a presumption in
favor Of getting something
done through participation
in guideline
development and implementation
activities.

-

The Governor

's Committee in a Policy
RoleDissemination Policy
'

As noted before.

LEAA had initTally advanced

a

restrictive

policy regulating access to
non-conviction information.

That policy
limited dissemination of arrest
records for "the purposes expressly
and specifically required
by statute, federal statute
or federal

executive order" (U.S. Department
of Justice, 1975: Sec. 20.

2.

(b)(2))

LEAA subsequently amended this
policy, under considerable protest
from

-se.„a.e. .0.

an.

^^^^^^^^^
executive order, court
order or court mi.
appropriate
state or
.r 1local, offici^^U" (w c
State
n
°'ficials
(U.S. Department
of Justice,
1976d: Sec
20.21(b)(2)).
The WCRPA established
dissemination policy
comparable 1n
restrictiveness to LEAA's
initial ,974 regulations.
That policy
involved the following
language:

c^^n:ic?!on'^'dat^m:rbe^'d]sIra":3-b"^^'^^ '"'""'^^

conduct or other non'rSnv^^t? ""^/I'^aations of criminal
"'"^
that it
be available or acce^5?M I f
1977: 10 97 80).

'

P'"-P°^e (RCW,

There were two problematic
aspects of this policy which
required
additional regulations.
First, there are a wide
variety of public and
private agencies which
conduct investigative activities
but such

agencies may not necessarily
fit the definition of
criminal justice
agencies.
Secondly, in many instances,
the legal authority which
authorizes non-criminal justice
access is vague as to purpose
and fails
to make reference to
non-conviction
data.

The SPA adopted a way to deal
with the first issue which had
been suggested by LEAA in its
planning instructions.

agency was defined to include
agencies which allocated

A criminal
a

justice

substantial

portion of their annual budget to,
and had as its primary function,
the

administration of criminal justice.

But this definition was unhelpful,

SPA staff thought, because it failed
to distinguish subunits of larger
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agencies

dia execute

"""""

cH.„a,

justice functions.

e..p,e,

Boards p.ncip.
funct.n was „censin,.

the enforcement
division did have the
power to prosecute
violators
Because of these problems,
the SPA staff
proposed that a subunit
which
conducts functions associated
with the administration
of criminal
justice could gain access
to non-conviction
information. However,
when
an opinion was requested
from the Attorney
General he rejected
this
approach as improper since
it would leave
the legislatively
imposed
condition of the budget test
"superfluous."

Nevertheless, there were two
alternative paths an agency
coulo
propose to resolve the issue.
The agency subunit could
either establish
a contract of services
with a criminal justice
agency in order to secure
access {a potentially cumbersome
approach given the number of
criminal
Justice agencies Involved), or
the agency could apply for
certification
by showing that a statute,
ordinance or other legal
mechanisms specifically enabled access to
non-conviction information.
Most applications
for access to non-conviction
information were handled in the
latter way.
These problems posed difficult
matters of judgment which the
SPA staff did not feel secure
making on their own.
Further, the SPA
was being pressed by requests
from a whole variety of federal,
state
and local agencies to make
quick decisions about matters on which
there
was little in the way of formal
policy.
In addition, many local law

enforcement agencies experienced dramatic
increases in requests for
criminal

record Information.

for example,

a

The Seattle Police Department indicated,

200 percent Increase in requests.

Consequently the

Privacy Administrator decided to enlist
the Governor's Committee in the

development 0. a s.ste™at1c
P0,1c.

wMc.

decision making role.

woul. .„.o„e t.e.
,„

TWO regulations
were subsequently
drafted to establish

a

fra.ewor. within which
the Governor's
Co^ittee could .a.e
deci sions
as to access to
criminal histor, data
which included
non-convictiol'

.nfor.ation.

One regulation set
up

apply for certification
as

regulation established

a

a

process b. which an
agenc. could

criminal justice
in.f.v. agency.

The other

method b. which the SPA
could determine those
non-cri.i„al justice agencies
which had legitimate
access to nonconviction data. The agency
would be required to
identify the purpose
for Which the information
was sought, the legal
authority, and how the
need to know this
information related to
performance of official
duties.
Approved agencies would be
identified and a listing
published
by the State Planning
Agency.
a

Surprisingly, the Governor's
Committee members, particularly
the Chief Of the State
Patrol and other law
enforcement officials.
Showed a much stronger interest
in decisions regarding
certification
Of criminal justice agencies.
Such decisions were not taken
lightly
because acknowledgement of an
agency as a criminal justice
agency,
even if it was only for the
purpose of obtaining criminal
record

information, was considered tantamount
to recognition and acceptance
in the law

enforcement community.

formed investigative activity for

For example, entities which
pera

social

service agency such as

Child Protective Services or the
Welfare Fraud Division of the Depart-

ment of Social and Health Services
were rejected by law enforcement

committee members because of "do good"
philosophies alien to the law

the

A^ed

-sed

Forces were certified
wit. little
discussion

PoHcy decisions regarding
non-criminal Justice
agency access

controversial issues wit.
potentially volatile
political results
consequently, t.e Oovernor's
Co^ittee largely deferred
such issues to
the SPA staff.
3iven the restrictiveness
of the state law,
it was not
surprising that few
applicants for certification
tc receive arrest
information were approved.
One federal applicant
particularly ranged
by .ejection was the
y.s. civil Service
Co^ission. They argued
that

conviction information.

But a

dose

reading of the executive
order

Showed that arrest for
non-conviction information
was not listed as
"material for which they
were authorized access.
This was also the case
with many other federal
and state agencies.

LEAA policy makers had
expected that a tightening
of access
to non-conviction information
would prompt federal and
state agencies
to seek legislation to
revise outdated statutes in
order to secure

information now denied them.

These actions were expected to
subse-

quently render criminal records
privacy

a

more visible public issue

and generate increased public
scrutiny of the way criminal

records were

used.

However, in spite of these
expectations, there has been no great
sense of urgency (by non-criminal
Justice agencies) to secure adequate
statutory authority bhcause not only
are multiple avenues available to

circumvent the regulations, but policy
custom continues to dictate who
gains access of such records.

-nte.v1ews

wUH seve.,

.e
a

e-tle.

,ocal

c

.........
..... ...

to access to sue.
.„,o™at,on.

-oration

,an.s,

Justice .ecc.s
.ana.e.

,0,

.ccess to

.co.

.stance co.pan.s

an. a ...t. o,
e.p,o.e.
depen. upon t.e st.en.t.
o. .eUtlons
cuUlvate. wU. Uw
enforcement
agencies.

Moreover, after the State
Patrol undertook
administration of
the law in 1980,
certification guidelines
have 5een relaxed to
allow
substantial discretionary
departures from the rules.
One
local

law

enforcement official who
was interviewed in
1980 about how dissemination policy has been
handled by the Patrol
observed:

'''''
en^orcemenfat'tltuSl: V'.lllf''
"°"!J^^tent.
They aren't
cops so they can'^tell
us
o Hn
''''' ^""^^^^^^
how we use info?mat?on\"ou'?

t:nT^el''''

I^ie^Ooc_Myiso^^
of Policy Confjj£t

It was evident from initial

reactions of many criminal
justice

officials that implementation
of the WCRPA was not going
to be easy.
SPA staff suspected that
ignorance of the requirements of
the law

exaggerated its actual effects.

If some mechanism could be
employed

to enhance communication
processes between the SPA,

and affected agencies,

Governor's Committee

perhaps the pockets of opposition
and more wide-

spread grudging acceptance could be
gradually replaced by dutiful
compliance.

The mechanism chosen was the
appointment of an advisory

committee, broadly representative of
both criminal justice agencies

189

and non-criminal
justice interests

Advisory Committee was
to provide

Tho

•

^''"^''y

e Of the Ad

Hoc

forum for
lur review and
comment on
regulations drafted by
the SPA staff to
i™p,e„„t the WCRPA
The co^Uteewas
expected to provide
the SPA „Uh
.„u,-p,e
perspectives fro. which a
consensus Interpretation
of the Intent of
the law could emerge,
to anticipate the
Impacts of proposed
rules and
a

compliance could be more
carefully
calculated.
'y calculated

wUh

Which

a

,
Th« explicit
The
attention

special appropriation
request could be presented
to the

Governor for submission
to the upcoming
special legislative session
This would help remove
what many viewed as the
central obstacle to
compl iance-the lack of
sufficient resources.

In addition,

such an

effort would help the SPA
to acguire the resources
necessary to conduct
a state wide audit.
Only an audit would provide
the SPA with specific
baseline information necessary
to make judgements about
progress toward
compliance.
Moreover, the audit authority
would lend credibility to
the seriousness with which
the SPA took its enforcement
responsibility.

The absence of

a

formal

appointment process of committee
members

by the Director of OCD appears
to have contributed to ambiguity
in the

line of authority for administration
in guideline development.

persons designated for appointment
were recruited in
a

a

While

variety of ways,

letter authorizing appointment
originated neither from Wiegman nor

Schram but from the Privacy Administrator.

Evidently the Deputy

Director of OCD and Wiegman were reluctant
to give the Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee a status that would associate
them too closely with the

-pressmen that the. had
.o.e than J„st an
advisory .o,e

NevenheUss.

seve.a,

.e. Ad Hoc

Ad.sc,

Co,,.ittee

- -ttee ...
in a

1981

.o.d

.e*e.

to

interview:

We knew someone
upstair? was t=ni
^f"* t° <^evelop
the rules but we
"'^
Just didn't' It
exactly who was in
charge.
in fact, there
were multiple
"authorities."

Schram was one

authority as administrator
of the SPA.

The Governor's Committee
had
supervisory and final
decision making power
so they were another
authority.
,n fact, the WCRPA
only mentions the SPA
as the administrative authority for the
law; no mention is
made of either the
Governor's
committee nor the OCD
director but the fact that
the OCD director was
formal

both head Of the agency
and chairman pro

spared conflict on this
point.

tern

of the Governor's Co.ittee

Perhaps because of a careful
avoidance

Of an association with
something potentially
controversial as the WCRPA
guidelines. Wiegman ultimately
delegated the job to Deputy
Director
James Frits whose signature
appears on the final version
of the
regulations.
As

indicated in the list of
participants in Table 13, the

membership of the Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee consisted of representatives
from a wide spectrum of state
agencies, criminal justice organizations,
a variety of state
associations and an assortment of
non-criminal
justices interests including the
ACLU, Public Disclosure and Human
Rights commissions, city, county
and business associations.
Selection
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Washingto?J^-I?na/Recc?dfp;?;i^/S:""

'"P'ementatlon of the

Participant Name
Agency Represented
Bill

Absher

Institute of Public
Se^-vice

i>eattle University

Doug Alexander

Bob Blum

Jim Beaty

Washington Association
of Counties
KING Broadcasting

Janet Bridgman
Craig Cole

Larry Collar
Chuck Dalrymple
Cam Dightman
Bill

Gales

Liquor Control Board

Hagens

Steve Harrington
John Hayden

P.

Healy

Graham Johnson
June Lloyd

Loeb

J.

Dan Lynch

James

R.

House Institutions Committee
Washington Association of Cities

Washington State Patrol,
Organized Crime
Intelligence Unit

Ron Hendry

Dennis

Licensing Liquor Control
Board
DSHS, Research

Board of Prison Terms

Gary Gilbert

Judge James

State Human Rights
Commission
House Ways and Means
Committee

Senate

Walt Gearhart

Bill

Public Records, Liquor
Control Board
Parole Board

Superior Court, Pierce County
Prosecutors Association
Public Disclosure Commission

Snohomish County Criminal Justice
Agency and
State Association of Law and
Justice Planners
City of Seattle, Law and Justice
King County System Service

McMahon

Doug Marshall

Suzanne Matsen

Bothell

Police Department

Association of Washington Businesses
Seattle Department of Licenses and
Consumer Affairs

Art Mickey

Liquor Control Board

Allen Mitchell

DSHS, Budget Services

192

Table 13 (Continued)

Participant Name
Agency Represented
Michel e Pailthorpe

Mike Pepe
Bill

Senate Constitution
and Election
Committee
DSHS, Adult Correction

Peters

John M.

Reed

FBI, Special

Doug Russell

DSHS, Data Support

Kevin Ryan
Paul

M.

Schultz

Jim Shofner
Richard Six

Merle Steffenson
Jeff Sullivan
Lester Sydney
Sgt.

Walt Trefry

Jolene Unsoeld
Bill

Agent in charge

King County Sheriff

Ed Ryan

Capt.

ACLU

Webb

Rick Wickman

SOURCE:

Assistant Attorney General
for WSP
Washington State Patrol
(wsP)

Administrator for the Courts
State Gambling Commission
Department of Licensing
Prosecuting Attorney. Yakima

County

Job Therapy

Spokane County Sheriffs
Department
Independent Citizen - Public
records interest
Washington Association of
Sheriffs and
Pol ice Chiefs
OCD

Washington, Law and Justice
Planning Office, 1977a,

processes for committee
membership varied- ..n
^ representatives were
.
idPnt.-f-.IdentifiedA by the Priva^,,
«--n,st.ator; ot.e.s
„e.e .eco-ended
by
respecti
respective
agences or associations
while a few
iew requested
k
membershin
flu-t,^
u ^,
selection criteria,

---e-„o.™a,

-tor ..red

tHat

an

t. .i.c.

1

..I

.a,or co.pone„ts
0. cri.ina, ,„3tice were
represented and that the
selertinn „^"^""^
maintained a continuity

"

-™'ved

in the

legislative process and
included participants involved in the
development of the 1976
state privacy plan.
Several subcommittees
were rroat^j ,
^" "rder to address
each of
Shown in Table
14 as requiring further
clarification
through adoption of
administrative regulations.
,n addition to the
subcommittees, the Privacy
Administrator created five
wor. groups whose
assignment was to produce
a work plan which
would identify specific
steps agencies would
take to achieve compliance.
Needless to say
«h,le there wasn't much
enthusiasm for the development
of work plans
several agencies submitted
such plans with the
expectation that the
appropriation would be forthcoming
in the near future.
.

The Privacy Administrator
had not anticipated that
the Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee would
be as large or potentially
unwieldy as it had
gotten to be.
The WCRPA had become
more than a curiosity and
interest
spread far beyond law
enforcement to include many
other non-criminal

justice agencies and associations.
tions for participation:

Each interest had different
motiva-

the ACLU sought guidelines
which provided

extensive leverage to the data
subject to inspect and challenge
the
contents of his file; the Human
Rights Commission was concerned
that
the guidelines on dissemination
were consistent with "fair
preemployment
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Provisions
Time Frame

REVIEW AND THAI

I.

i

rj^

A,

This portion of
law
goes into effect
on
09/21/77; rules
needed by then.

for resolution of
disputes, and

inSi?S„^"^
B.

C.
D.

n.

DEFINITIONS:

'

^i"-inaticn^S? S^rected
Criminal justice agencv

See Section 8.
See Section 6, providing
for deletion of
nonconviction data after
two or three
years under certain
circumstances

SECURITY OF RFrnpnc;

securltvlfi''' P'^Qtection
''l'''''' from
fire,
fu^^r
theft, ^
loss,
^

B.

C.

ni.
A.

B.

destruction) and for protection from unauthorized
access.
SPA to establish standard
for personnel
employed by state and local
criminal
justice agencies, who are
responsible
tor maintenance and
dissemination of
criminal history record
information (e q
levels of security clearance).
See Section 9 (1) and
(2).

Goes into effect
09/21/77; development
of standards can
continue after that
date.

DISSEMINATION
Effective 01/01/78, no criminal
justice
agency to disseminate arrest
information
unless record also states
disposition;
agency must check with
identification
section of WSP if record
pertains to
felony or gross misdemeanor.
(Section 4)
Conviction records, and information
pertaining to matter currently in
process
may be disseminated without
restriction
(Section 5 (1) and (2))

Section 4 goes into
effect on 01/01/78;
but Section 5 goes
into effect on
09/21/77; rules for
dissemination thus
needed by 09/21/77.
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Table 14 (Continued)

K"BrcH^;na/f%^^^

disseminated:

records and authorizing
or directinn
that such records
^
be aJailab
vanaDie.
e
(Section 5 (4))
'

p.ttaTs:?:,.-:--

l

Records must be keot of P^rh ^-i.
^.
dissemination.
(Section 5 (7))
DEFINITIONS:
Criminal history record
in
formation; nonconviction
data; convict on
•

IV.

COMPLETENESS AND

Am ipy-^

A

2608 (see
are crucial to imole^
mentation of law.
Records are not
complete" without dispositions.
Need
IS to assess existing
problems in reporting
of dispositions and
desirability of changes
''^'''''^ suchVeporttng'
B
a.
SPA has Zf"'l''
bPA
duty to provide for audits
of
criminal history record
information systems (section 9
(3)); such audits wilT
^"^"^^cy 0^ information.
C
nFF?M?T?m,'
L.
DEFINITION:
disposition.
Ln.
C^h'^^rJl^RfU/r^'?'"'''^
4J 43 RCW), but

SOURCE:

Disposition reporting
part of existing law;
discussions can continue after 09/21/77
effective date.

Washington. Law and Justice
Planning Office, 1977b,

'''''

-

^^^^^^^^^

work of the open
records law.

™de

a

Needlp,.
Needless to say,
these and other
agendas
collision with law
enforcement Inevitable.

one Of the .ost
consistent complaints
expressed hy law enforcerepresentatives Interviewed
s..se,.ent to the
,1del1„e development
-ess was that law enforcement
agencies were
.nderrepresented on the
Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee.'

Regardless of whether the
concern was well founded
or not the
perception of being outnumbered
had two principal
effects:
it drove
law enforcement
participants into a highly
defensive posture favoring
a

"narrow interpretation and
substantially weakened law
enforcement

support for the final
version of the guidelines.

Co^ents by a sergeant
from an eastern county
sheriffs department best
captures the reasons
for law enforcement's
defensive posture:
Where [the Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee! ant out
was that it was taken ove^
by vested in?ere

L

Se

houfd^a^ri:? '""V

r

he

^--e 1n\"Jbit":?ion^

n^=r:::^:e^!:^^l^?.,^^:;^n^^

a

v.

n."?. h

r"'

t

''''
inter s 'of
interest
'V. the votes we had,profecting'lhe
of cops with
we would havp
never gotten what we wanted.

surprising criticism for law enforcement
had bv
groups.
?he.e
'''''
wer^
nine
e memoers
memSe
in
in'alV
an. ?wo'^
two from the state patrol, two
from the SP^ttip
Police Department (added later to
the list in TablVlsrthree others
from po ice departments around the
state, the eLcut ve d reclor
he
Washington Sheriffs and Chiefs Association
and an FBI age
counts
had two representatives, as did
prosecution.
'^^""^"^

f;.r

thP Ilci^

^

'.^'V'

t?he

adopted
5, t.e SPA „e.econsi.e.ed
the p.od.ct
„on-,aw
0.
e„.o.ce.e„t .nte.ests
and faned to
.enect t.e
realUles of law enforcement.
Host law enforcement
personnel feU t.at
the .,es„ents.stant1a,l.
.e.ond t.e .tent of
.ot.
and t.e
WCRPA.
As a consequence,
as a records manager
fro. a large western
Washington Police Department
observed"Wh™ t^'e
th^ fules
,
were published
we basically ignored
them."

TUWS

•

The Ad HOC Advisory
Committee met six times
from August 6, ,977
through January 20. 1978.
The interest level and
thus attendance was

underwent substantial revisions.

However, the November
through January

period was marked by a
substantial decline in
attendance, especially by
non-criminal justice interests.
Public hearings held in
Yakima and
Seattle drew attendance from
mostly law enforcement and
other criminal
justice personnel
The months of December and
January were spent
focusing on legal issues which
necessitated several opinions from
the
Assistant Attorney General.
In fact, advisory opinions
had to be
.

requested several times in order
to resolve disputes over
interpretations which threatened to postpone
final adoption of the regulations.

Defining Rules for Record Access and
Ins pertinn

The debate over the guidelines for
regulating individual access
and inspection of criminal history
records was symptomatic of the level
of conflict between different interests
which emerged in the Ad Hoc

Advisory Committee's deliberations.

This discussion consumed an in-

ordinate amount of meeting time, compared with
issues pertaining to
record quality which probably should have received
more attention.

'

a

resuU of

that

,-.p,en,entation.

Wl1ct

What distinguishes
the two processes

1s

ove. the te™s on
which assent is gi.en
o. withheld "
What
"is
crucial
to the implementation
process" (Bardach,
1977a- 43)
Fro. this perspective.
Bardach advances two
reasons „h, implementation
is best characterized
as defensive politics:

'

nTT

participants who favor ?hrpolicv
'-''^ PO'"cy goals
aoaU of the mandate
l^'^
use
the exi^tPnro nf i-tl

Bardach's notion of policy
implementation

indeed serviceable

is

to those who seek to
understand the forces that shape
the execution of

the policy.

But. it needs to be qualified
in two important respects:

agreement on what constitutes the
policy mandate

is

frequently prob-

lematic and expectations about
what will happen turn in part,
upon how
the mandate is understood in
relation to legislative intent.
Expectations about potential effects of
the law can have a reverse influence:

anticipated impacts may produce
interpretations of statutory requirements
and objectives which, although
consistent with predispositions of

implementors are inconsistent with legislative
intent.

Stated in

-other way,

the

conte.

"

a

«

eas.y support aUernatlve
Interpretations

t'
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the meaning of
words and thus
the stated

of

a

UgisUt.e

.ntent

--dera.

ns.

These contexts support
different and. frequent,.,
contested
interpretations of statutory
Intent.
Each contestant
advances Interpretations Which not only
originate fro. their
perceptions of the

effects Which determine
the extent to which
features of the context
„ay
be altered.
The fact that neither
adverse consequences
feared hy
opponents of an Interpretation
nor the desired effects
of an alternative

-terpretatlon actually occur
as

a result of

Implementation of guidehave relatively lUtle
influence over the duration
of support
by proponents of
favored positions.
lines

Just such

a

juxtaposition of belief,
attitude and policy consequence was involved in the
development of procedures
designed to
implement WCPRA provisions
for Individual access and
limitations and
dissemination of criminal record
Information.
Both policies were the
focus Of intense conflict
between criminal and non-criminal
justice
Interests to advance favored
Interpretations of statutory intent,
to

achieve expected performance and
to realize ultimate effects.

In

particular, regulations to implement
procedures to enable inspection
and challenge of criminal
history record information became
the

"•.-en1„,..o. connect
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between „on-c

,..ce

...ests
seeking to advance
liberal construction,
"structions ,nH
and ,law enforcement
organization,
tions seeking to
contain such attempts.

„ w

The efforts by
non-criminal

interests to secure
the „ost

Pe^lssive rules on access
were animated

b. the assumption
that these
procedures constituted
the .ost effective
way to alter the
that
criminal records were
managed and disseminated.
The threat of inunda-

cH.1nal and civil penalties
for refusal to follow
guidelines for
access and other due
process requirements
would constitute a
sufficient
deterrent to unlawful
police dissemination and
an incentive to
secure
other important statutory
objectives.
In contrast, law
enforcement
interests were equally
assertive that such permissive
procedures not
only substantially exceeded
the intent of the WCRPA
but would constitute
an intolerable administrative
burden and would adversely
affect investigative activities.

Although neither position has
been borne out by the
actual
events, a moderately permissive
policy of access, promulgated
by the
SPA in 1978. has now been
replaced by guidelines originated
by the
State Patrol which have
significantly modified the thrust
of these
earl ier rules

Interlocking laws with conflicting definitions
One area in which LEAA guidelines
reflected some confidence

from prior policy was that of
provisions for individual access, review
and challenge of the contents of
a data subject's file.
The Menard

decision was conspicuous
in enunciatino
^

z::r
to
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unambiguous doctrine
th.t

-

-

t.e.a.c.nen,e infc^a.on
cons.e.. ,.cc.ate

rights.

The language used
in the federal
requlation,
.
'
^
to balance the
concerns of ad
administrative efficiency
against due
process
•

'"^"'"'^
'
to either the crim?
a
„s?icT
any criminal justice
nformatLn^l"?^"' *^
"dividual and mai^ai'n
he
f^'Z
the purposes of
challenge or co"ert?on fn
of Justice, 1975: Sec.

T

\

''"'"den
t*^^

individual

T"'
n"'""^
Department

20.21(g)O))

The apparent
even-handedness of the LEAA
regulations provoked little
controversy in the criminal
justice co^unity. These
provisions created
little controversy because
they lacked the degree
of concreteness and

specificity necessary to
energize alternative
interpretations and
expectations.
Instead, the states were
delegated responsibility
to
develop detailed procedures
to implement individual
access

and dissem-

ination provisions.

Importantly, the way the
states have chosen to
develop these procedures
depends to some extent upon
how they define
key concepts associated
with criminal history record
information.
Instead of parroting back the
LEAA guidelines (as so many
states have chosen to do) the
WCRPA framed access policy with
the

following language:
^9encies shall permit an individual
wJo Jr^n""^
J'k^^'"
who
is
or who
believes that he may be, the subiect
of a
criminal record maintained by that
agency to ap eaJ ?n
person during normal business hours
of that criminal

justice agency and
request to

<;pp

th^

•

•

TWO divergent posUlons
e.e.,e. a.out .cw

tMs polic. s.c.,a .e
,.te.
Preted and translated
Into su.se.oent
...deHnes. Representatives
of
the law enforcement
argued that the provision
should be given as
lueral an interpretation
as possiMe.
A
1tera1 interpretation
held
that a cri.ina, Justice
agency was onl. obligated
to per.it inspection
Of records originated
,y tj« agency.
Any other cri.lna,
history
material pertaining to the
data subject which
originated fro. another
agency, including information
from central repository
files, the FBI
and other criminal
Justice agencies which may
be in agency's
possession
was exempted from access.
Therefore, for example, if
the individual
,

wanted to inspect

a

criminal history file
maintained by the central

state repository then he
would have to secure that
file in person at
the central office.
Significantly, this position was
not based upon

an

interpretation of statutory intent
but rather on predictions
of the
organizational consequences which
would ensue If the policy was
not
adopted.

As an assistant chief and
former Governor's Connlttee
member

acknowledged in

a

subsequent interview:
to be

inundated
liLl^"^
to rues lotT.
''T'''
an already
alrLdv H?ff?
'^f^ situation.
"f"
difficult

by requests from in'f^^t

^"'^

worsen

This approach troubled the ACLU
legislative coordinator for it

failed to treat disclosure of
tlon.

a

record to

a

data subject as

a

dissemina-

Under the law the dissemination of criminal
record information

required that

a

pre-dissemination query be made to the State Patrol
to

obtain the most current and complete
disposition information.

In

-e.c..„aU.s.cea.enc,es„..
--p,ete.

D,>ecto. 0. the Pu5l1c
Olsclosu.e

supported

.3

....tea.

Thus, a second
posUion. advanced

Co^Us.on

pHncipan.

(POC).

t.e

st.on,,,

the ACLU and others,
contended that

a .ch .oa.de.
interpretation was warranted
hy reading of the
state p.Mic disclosure
iaw
The efforts to convince
the SPA and others
of the superiority

of this'

-terpretation exhibited
cleverness and legal
shrewdness.
In essence the PDC
director contended that
the word "record

"

left undefined in the
WCRPA. had a technical
meaning already well
established by the public
disclosure law-a law which
preceeded the
WCRPA by several years.
Public records were defined
by that law to
include:

Any writing containing
information relating to the cnndurt

A definition of records
included in the proposed rules
was indeed consistent with this definition.
Criminal records were defined
to include
that information "collected"
and "raintained" by a criminal
justice

agency to include:
information directly generated or
colperformance of its official
lunctfont.
functions; and
.nH (2) records or
information properly
obtained from another agency but
retained by a criminal
justice agency in the normal course
of its business and
'''''^
'''''
er
'^'^'^ fro^whe
obt inPd ?/t:'''
obtained
If they are in the possession
of the agency
(Washington, OCD, 1977).

IPrtpf h!;^'h°r

^

The SPA staff had framed the
definition of records in this way in

recognition of the fact that interagency
exchange of records enabled
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multiple agency ownership
of criminal
'""'"'^
,
particular
data subject.

^hich pertained to

,

Accordingly

a

^

the thinki
thinking was that
^
if a data
subject was given
access to all record.
.
"laintained
by an agency
which
.
pertained t hi.self,
would be provided
a better
opportunity
•

-

to

from other criminal
justice agencies.
31ven these ccndUions
the Integrity of
the information re-

organization and conscientiousness
of records personnel
The SPA
guideline writers considered
it important not
only to carefully
enumerate material approved
for dissemination
under the law
.

.ut wanted
to insure that the
infonnation the agency
disseminated was the same

-formation about

a

particular data subject
each time that information

was released.
The SPA initial approach
to this issue was to
propose a rule
Which listed the types
of files searched for the
purpose of identifying
cr,m,nal history record
material.
Law enforcement
representatives were
opposed to this approach
because it appeared to make
other criminal
history information available
to data subjects for
inspection.
The SPA
consequently gave up this strategy
and fashioned an approach
which both
acceded to the concerns of law
enforcement and showed greater
promise
Of increasing the accuracy
and completeness of criminal
history records.
This approach permitted the
agency to separate criminal history
record
Information from other files when
responding to a request to review
the

files or for other disseminations.

Anop..on.s so.cU.
SPA.

.......

O.s.os.e Cc.ss.n

The op.n.on presented
the following
findings-

w|r:jp^i^rs "i^rt^i^r^^^^
t^^^

t^e

definition includes
^^""^^ ^he
wrUinqs used
well as those which
^^ency,
as
are prepa?lf^
/^^^^ned by that
agency, criminal
history rPrnrHc
by the Washington
sLt7pa?rnl TH"^?';'^^°" maintained
a public record
^^^^^^^^^^^^ion Section is
of any cHmnll
such information.
^^^'^^ ^^^^
Te PuM c ii r nc" 'P"'^
^^"^ requires
agencies, upon request
for dPnJ?f '''^^
to make them
P'^^^^ ^^^o^ds,
promptly avail
also requires agenc
^he law
es ^o ldoit
^""^
^'^les consistent with the rh^ntJ-c
access to the pub
' eco ds''Shl'h°'
'''T'' '''' Public
assistance to inqu ?ers
^^^^^^t
?hp p^m''^^
states that its proves
^ J^^^^^^e Law
ons are tn\J'^^l''
^^^^^^^^^^y construed
and that in the eveni
of con^i.? between
the provision of
this act or any otheJ

f

^Mfr
'

L

°^
govern.
^hall
Ce^Linly
^^l''""
'''' ^^^^ '''''
State Patrol-Off ce
^
oart of'Eh''''
maintaining
the criminal histo";
Record must Inlr^t"''
°^ ^^^^^'^^
8 accept and process
l^''"cess requests
reaue.t. to
tn see such
records (Tuttle,
1977).
.

.

The Attorney General's
opinion had two principal
effects; it
robbed law enforcement of
the support necessary to
defend a more'
restrictive position and
greatly enlarged considerations
involved in
proposing rules which adequately
facilitated the exercise of the
right
to inspect and challenge
the accuracy and completeness
of criminal

history information.

For example, the ACLU
representative proposed

that since police precincts
and branch offices of the
state patrol were
criminal justice agencies,
such offices could handle or
facilitate
request for records inspections.

.aUnce in.via.l n'^.ts
an. convenience
a.a.st a..-nUt.t,-ve
t^at an. expansion o.
.sponsion

tive burden.

persuaded,

-U1cns,

.0. p.„..,o„.

Neverthpl
pqc
no«
.
vertneless,
non-cnminal

,„^^^^^,.„„

•

it was evident
evidprn- that
th^-i-

justice interests were
not

.

.

computeruation had created
the con-

in at least so.e
jurisdictions in the state,

in which c
a,
history records stored
in a regional
repository could be readily
Obtained through a remote
terminal.
Under these conditions,
it was not
considered burdensome to
utilize these capabilities
to facilitate such
a request.
The resulting regulations
strove for a middle
ground:

2ac165-m42o'(5) (ITtL'tl
branch offices of tilKl t

'

set forth In
'""^""^ <•egiom^ or

agency ^n'c'iSdlnftJe^w:

Z^^l'

'^^^

n^SSn^^^^le^^i^^Sr
"^'""^^ °' bran*ch''o???c -do'

criminal justice agency havj g'
uch

ac

r"Ju:sr(«;s;ig?s-"^^s:5^?^;ir"^

'

0

°
i

'caoa'"'

'^^^'^

In addition, another
administrative rule specified a
procedure by which

the agency responding to
the request would obtain and
furnish the

requestor with "a copy of an^
criminal history information

in the files
of the Identification Section
of the Washington State Patrol
relating

to the requestor" (MAC,
1978:

365.50.070).

An Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
spokesman for the law enforcement

position, Jim McMahon (a small town
police chief and

dominant voice

in the state law

a

respected and

enforcement leadership), clearly unhappy

«nh

the ruling,

rule.
1e

.

Tn
:„ .

207

increased the intensity
of his .tt.n
"P""
^^^^^^^^

association

--)-

t*"^

,

'^'•aft

^^^^^^^^

(--.uentl,

-ahonur,e.

attendance 0. association
.e..ers and others
at
P-'C hearings on the proposed
rules scheduled
.or late Nove.her
or
early December.
The letter exhibited
a tone of
urgency:
Jhoro"5ghi;

L

fa™i:?lHzr?h»s^,'"

''''''
"''^

^^^""s

prepared
be
"^^^
atiend Jhe oumI
The impact of th s
^'"P"^*aw
Jo?nS ?o"Kf
l""'"tremendous
°
L.E. aqencv in tho ctr^^
on everv
?
^
'° '•'^ "^^y smallest
(McMahon? l97?)
Among the issues
specified in tho
the i^tt„„
letter as critical
was that pertaining
to inspection guidelines:
.

lee'

desires to

h?f"recoM't?'n''^"''"

^o"rs^ltS^cZKil^e"co'rdT^

organiz ed effort tn

ri^p^+i-

/

?r

^^^^^

'"''"^
^

an

This characterization had
clearly misinterpreted the
thrust of
the procedure proposed.
The agency which responded
to the request for
inspection was onl^ required
to reveal criminal record
info™tion

(other than those records
maintained by the Central State
Repository)
which originated from another
criminal justice agency if it
was

currently in the possession of
such records.

Whether intended or not,
this misinterpretation helped
reinforce perceptions of greatly
exaggerated impacts.
When

a

public hearing was held in Seattle
by the SPA staff,

great deal of time was spent dispelling
the rumors created about the

a

extent

- -H.naU.s.ce

vKtc.
;;::r;.0.

a^enc.. .espo.i.,n.

to assist

.eco.s

acM..a,.n:

u

ca.sed postponement
of tne adoption o.
t.e ,.,e„-nes
ana t.us p™v1.ed
anot.e. opponunUy
fo.
enforcement ,„te.ests
to
for
P-^
revisions.
Howe... t.e conten.in,
s.es of t.e iss.e wo.,
not budge in either
direction.
Consequently, t.e SPA
staff offered
to Obtain an opinion
from the Attorney
General's office about
this
issue.
Both sides agreed
greea to "^u,^"
.
live .^-^t,
with the decision
and let the
adoption procedures go
forward.
The resulting opinion
appeared to vindicate the
non-law
enforcement point of view
by reinforcing an
earlier Attorney SeneraVs
opinion provided to the
Public Disclosure
Commission.
The opinion
included the following
observations and guidance-

St Eu

e^lrfi^

^jszt

ru^L:;%^nM:^^
indeed we questioned whether
they su t n a y a"^ended

'

re.]!^s'int c
It
^eJdia'i
oi.'f k"' ''l'''''^'
which provides that it be
JT^'"^^^^' legislation
iTkI
liberally construed.
As a general principal
then in
records specif]
ly'
de
ified
n'wJRpW
°f the Public Disclosure Law
continup'tn h ^T''''^'
consequently disclosure should
.

a?:a;s"be'?av'ored"'^'

"conviction record" and
the statutes or rules be inter'^'^^^^^on Of records
the
Pub
Public
lur^n":''T
Disclosure
Law.^'''r
To the extent that any such
record
maintained by a criminal justice
aqencv i?
L^^^k"^^^
''''''''^ regardless oTthe
origa n of
0? the information actually
contained therein
disclosure policy and objectives
of t^e Pub?ir^ni.7?nc''
'f^'
°^^^^°^^'^^Law
relating to records generally,
?hP
WfRPA provision
n n
the WCRPA
for individual inspection can only
be
interpreted to mean that any individual
is entitled to
appear at any office of a particular
criminal justice agency

VecL''whpl'!;f
record_ wherever used

I

ZT/

in
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to request information
on himself

Th.-c
i
burden of discovery
actual
and producinnthi
entity upon which
°" the
L?ion 8 p^ace^
obligation for
disclosure (Carr, 1978)

T.e opinion represented

a

substantia, defeat fo.
,a„ enforcement

-terests.

T.e

interview..

..Nine-nine percent of
,a. enforcement in this
state did not

enforcement leadership
considered t.e SPA administrative rules to have
overreached the ,aw.
especial,, as they pertain
to the ru,es on individua,
inspection.
A sheriff fro. an
urban eastern
Washington department
characterized the response
this way in a ,980

consider the SPA administrative
regulations ,eg1timate.
thought they went far beyond
,egis,at1ve Intent."

Most of us

The impac t of InsDection
provisions
In

interviews conducted in ,980
and ,98,,

I
sought to determine
What effects the SPA inspection
provisions had upon po,1ce
departments.
Respondents Interviewed InCuded
off1c1a,s from both sma„ and

,arge

urban departments.

of inquiries.

Sraa,,

Contrary to expectations, none
reported

a

deluge

departments have processed ten to
fifteen requests

year while requests to large
urban departments have numbered
between
I'ifty and three hundred
a year.
a

The most frequent source of
requests was from inmates in prison,

particularly persons convicted of
serious offenses who sought
appellate
review of their cases.
Another probable reason for this source
of
request would be that the criminal
history record is utilized in

decisions pertaining to parole.

It

is

obviously in the interests of

inmates to insure that their records
portray an accurate and complete

profile of arrest, charges and dispositions.

Another common but
sinnifir;,nt

""""

tions for ^nspect,on
inspection of records
were frequently
submitted under t.e
Pubnc Disclosure Law
instead Of t.e WCRPA.
„ot onW did
exhibit confusion
but records center
"'''"""'^ "'""^
t° ^0"
to handle record
.
requests filed under
a different
statute.
Such
confusion contributed
to delays in
receipt of requested
information

"

; understanding
and

*°

-'^

-ere

.as been

1 ittle
awareness
about data subjects
rights under the
WCRPA
contrast to these
Observations, which
suggest negligible
-s^-bilit.and utilization
of the law b. individual
data subjects
defense attorneys and
public defenders (at
least in two of the
largest
court jurisdictions in
the state of Washington)
have demonstrated an
increased willingness to
use the procedures
available in the WCRPA as
a tool in Plea
negotiations, trial defense
and as a ™eans to
influence
sentencing decisions.

In light Of the turmoil

tion provisions,

surrounding the development
of inspec-

it would not have
been surprizing to find
a great

deal

Of non-compliance.

»re

acceptance than anticipated.

Mam

and Miranda, was to
structure the discretion Involved
in the

To the contrary however,

there has been far

What the WCRPA did. similarly
to

administration of criminal
justice.

Structuring discretion does
not
necessarily entail adverse
consequences for existing
practices and
routines.
This fact was not entirely
lost upon those with
responsi-

bility for compliance.

manager put it this way:

For example, an eastern
Washington records

f

we didn't want it
therefore
Me hidn"? 4.1?^'
about our records
"""'^"h
hand! ng proce
.^''^''^
had to address it
""f'?'-t""^tely we
by mandate ?a?her
than desire.
the TOst beneficial
"
However,
Dart r.f til
us reorganize ou"
'''"'^
ec
ds pro Lses
'r„""
made^records more

^

i^Ponanr^^lL^entf^rc^-^^JIi

•j:s\ice

A records chief fro.
a large, urhan
Puget Sound police
department
marked that:

re-

One of the most
important effert-; nf fhn ^ i
^^^^ ^^^^^^9 process
was it suggested to urthJ ,!
^^^f^^^n^^ne what we we?e doing
with our ?Icords
It m.Sf

were managinr'nd using"
r^re
streamlining our procedures.

o

'^^'^

ds^ ultimately
u'?[ima?el'
we ended up

Some interviews with law
enforcement personnel suggest
that
expected negative consequences
have been overdrawn.
In this regard
two respondents interviewed
for this study provide
some interesting
insights as to how experience
with implementation increases
the

willingness to acknowledge
distinctions between expected
and actual
results.
A western Washington
records manager for example,
welcomed
the WCRPA in these terms:

Law enforcement agencies
should be eager to adopt
these
guidelines since they provide
structure and ce?taintv as
to the circumstances
under which discretion ma/be
used
in the release of
criminal records.
The law gives usin
answer to queries.
In fact, the WCRPA provide
gideles
which could serve as
department-wide procedure for the use
Of any information pertaining
to law enforcement matters
An eastern Washington
records manager chose to draw
interesting par-

alels to Miranda when asked to
evaluate his experience with the WCRPA
in

light of original expectations:

f

"^^"^
h.r.nf/li-'"''^'^ "^l^

^i>anda decision
9°^
impact us to-th^int where
damn thing.
And this was the attitude
we were taking on the WCRPA.
I
was the first one to say

wf
f/^!'."^'
we couldn
t do a

9

to

and to some degree it
was acce^ied

*

'"P'-""*'

up til Tooslf?p^:r:^tituie'?hat"^
^^---9
T'^'"'' criminal
Justice which was that by
saJfnn
w^^'V^''''"
no one can tell me w
^"^
a
to do'w h
]\t''l
"J""
needed some discipline in
tMs regard!

When asked to state more
specifically how the two
policies compared
in terms of effects on
law enforcement practice,
the respondent
provided this elaboration:
It [the WCRPA] compares
only to the extent th^t if w;>c
expected to impact us so we
couldn't do our job
Siranda
required us to warn a person of
his right
be?o;e
him in for questioning.
Similarly, we could have been^
mpacted by the WCRPA to the

poinVthat we were suppo

ed

What Miranda made us do was clean
up to make^IiTi^e
had the right guy and we had to
go through these procedures
"'^'^
'''''' 90in any ?ur
P?i"c^ and
Privacy
n 'J°''-r'
security gave us the same type of
obligation
We had to make sure the record
was clear and make sure ?he
record was available.
Prior to the WCRPA, crimna
justice

"

kelpin'g'

function.""'

'

^^^^^^ ''''''''

^

--^^

^^"^ preceded the Miranda decision,
we
n.nK^Ji^^^
probably
wouldn't have had that de^Ti^ Miranda
came
about in part because an officer acted
on the basis of prior
knowledge that the suspect was a known
criminal in the
community.
Because of that knowledge, the arresting
officer
acted in a totally disrespectful manner,
failing to acknowledge his rights.
If there had been an environment
conducive
to accuracy and completeness,
abuses of this kind may have
been less likely to occur.

Communicating the Rules
Law Enforcement Training
:

In a

review of studies of the effects of the Miranda decision,

Wasby (1974-1975 and 1978) found that in-house training can
be an effective source of communication and thus likely to increase the level
of

understanding of Supreme
Court decisions
ecisions.
In .turn, increased
,
understanding may have a
positive effert r,n
*
°" acceptance and thereby

Increase

theme,ihoodofco.pI1ance.
efforts Of

For example. Mil

ner. study of

Uw

the

enforcement Jurisdictions
in Wisconsin to
transmit the
iliranda decision indicated
that an four police
departments surveyed
rated conference and
training as the best
source of information

('971a:324).

"^^e

the professional i.ation
of the department did
not
increase police contact
with ncn-ia„ enforcement
sources of information
't did increase
utilisation of intradepartmental
lines of communications
However, while Hilner's
study also determined
that professional uation
can have positive effects
on the way court
decisions are communicated
and received, he
acknowledges, "there was no
real hierarchy through

which binding directives
regarding the implementation
of the Miranda
decision could flow" (1971a:
52).
The upshot of this Important
fact,
Milner concludes later, is:
"that Miranda did not basically
change
the decentralized and often
unsystematic communication
processes used
to Inform police departments
about innovations" (1971a:
226).
In this regard, what makes
the communication process
noteworthy

in the case of criminal

records privacy regulations is
that extensive

and well coordinated training
sessions were conducted by
law enforce-

ment leadership immediately after
the SPA rules were adopted.

Nearly

one thousand law enforcement and
other criminal justice personnel
attended sessions conducted in four
different locations in the state.
It was

indeed surprising and salutory to
see such a strong interest

taken by law enforcement to increase
awareness of

a

law and somewhat

unusual that the staff and resources
of the Washington State Criminal

th>s process because
it

tetn^

a^.ded

an

oppcn.nU.

to advance t.ei.
Of «.at t.e
.emulations .e.ui.ed ana
.o„

tHe^,,

implemented.
Each Of the principal

.e

instructors for the sessions
had been

act,ve participants in
the ru,e .aking
process.
The. included the
Chairman of the Sheriffs
and Chiefs Association,
the chief of the

Division Of the Seattle
Police Department, and
her deputy assistant
It was Obvious that
they had ta.en the tas.
seriously for the sessions
reflected organization and
effective use of training
aids and graphics
In addition, a short
test was included at the
end of each session to
certify that the trainees had
received credit for professional
development.
The chairman of the Sheriffs
and Chiefs Association
(perhaps
the most outspoken opponent
of the SPA ruling making
process) began
each session with a brief
overview of the law and explanation
of key

definitions.

He also used this as an
opportunity to editorialize

about the law, injecting his
opinions about sections of the law
and
regulations he considered questionable
if not illegitimate.
One
issue he chose to dwell on at
some length was the necessity to
log

dissemination between criminal justice
agencies.

He promised that

the law enforcement community
would be only temporarily limited by
this and possibly other provisions.

He promised that the Sheriffs

and Chiefs Association would introduce
several amendments to the WCRPA

during the 1979
legislative session.
ance of this and other
Provisions
.

^7""^

°'

;
leadership.

While ne
he didn't
didn t urge open
defi-

—

the i.pl ication was
.n.ista.ahle
ed

the law enforcement

The other instructors
relied less .pon overt
criticis™ and
mvective and .ore on emphasis
to advance their
interpretation of the
'aw.
For example, dissemination
requirements were considered
to apply

only to written exchanges
of criminal record
material, thus exempting
the frequent oral exchanges
of such data between
detectives or the
routine phone exchanges
which often involve
reference to records of
criminal conduct.
In another instance,
provisions pertaining to
data
subject access and review
were construed to mean
that the right to
access applied only to
conviction information.

Access to non-conviction
information would be permitted
only if the data subject
would demonstrate that his record was in
some way inaccurate or
incomplete.

addition to these examples, the
State Identification Division
director encouraged the utilization
of exceptions in the law which
pertained to dissemination of
criminal records.
He indicated that the
In

central

state repository did not have
the capability to provide timely

responses to a flood of inquiries.

Moreover, he suggested that it

would be erroneous to assume that
the central state repository
files

were current and accurate.
To be sure, the training sessions
were an effective device to

greatly enlarge awareness of the
operational aspects of the regulations.

Systematic exposure to the law made it far
more difficult for

isolated records clerks to invoke ignorance
as

a

defense of

a
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tnbuted

to a

.p,, ,,,„3.1ss1on of

t.e ,aw .e,ui.ed.

-t.e.

to

ceate

,-nfo™at,-o„ a.cut
„.at

n.st, co.plemy an.
a.MguUy .einfo.ced one
a sense of

.ncena.t.

-co..ect" interpretations
of t.e

,a„.

an. caution a.out
a.^anCn,
The typical

records c1er.,
unlike the seasoned
detective or the
tne self
...m.oh cop, often
self-assured
lack the
se1f-conf1dence necessary to
exercise discretion.
Host records Cer.s
work best in an operational
environment structured by
clear guidelines
and procedures.
This te.npera.ent was
demonstrated in training and
frequently was exhibited In
the efforts by a wide
variety of criminal
justice personnel to determine
what the "SPA" Interpretation
was prior
to the implementation
of procedures.

Second, unlike court-originated
decisions regulating administrative procedure, in which
the remoteness of the policy
source
insulates police personnel from
receiving information about
the decision
outside the law enforcement
community, the SPA had close and
continuous
linkages with the recipients of
the policy.
Whether they liked it or
not, the law enforcement
community had grown accustomed to
having to

respond and comply to the numerous
LEAA-originated and SPA-interpreted

conditions of aid.

The SPA rule-making process simply
brought law

enforcement personnel

into yet a closer interaction
with the SPA and

thus dependence for guidance.

This fact may explain why the law

enforcement leadership made such persistent
efforts to gain "ownership"
and control

over training and other avenues of
transmission (e.g.,

association meetings, panel discussions)
because of the effect
have of legitimizing the source of the
regulations.

it might

Respondents in

subsequent Interviews
Indicated that t.e SPA
c.e.1M1
.ad .een
9^eat„ enhanced as a
.esuU of assu.m,
.eg.Uto., authon'ty
Po.
demonstrated an unexpected
.nowledgeabn Uy of U„
enforcement
practice and a co™it.ent
to get something
done regardless of the
magnitude of resistance.

U

CHAPTER
LEGISLATIVE REVISION:

VI

THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND

ENFORCEMENT OF RECORD
QUALITY PROVISIONS
IN WASHINGTON,

1979-1981

An examination of the
factors involved in the
development of
SPA guidelines to insure
the quality and integrity
of criminal records

instructive about political
constraints which limit
attempts to
regulate the administration
of criminal justice.
As was the case

with
inspection and dissemination
provisions, interpretation
of key terms
such as audit, purge,
delete, query, and transaction
logs dictated, in

part, the substance of the
resulting guidelines.

It was evident that
law enforcement interests
had technical applications
of these key terms
which ran counter to those
definitions considered pertinent
to criminal

records privacy policy.

In addition,

policies involving controls on

the exchange of data between
criminal justice agencies were
expected to
have burdensome and unjustified
impacts upon investigative functions.

The preoccupation with the
effects of dissemination and access

policy discussed in Chapter V
obscured

a

primary objective of criminal

records privacy which is to increase
the accuracy and completeness of
criminal history records utilized in
the administration of criminal
justice.

There is some evidence to suggest
that neither law enforce-

ment or other criminal justice officials
considered improvements in the
integrity or quality of criminal records
an important policy goal
218
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^nte.,e„c. e,c.„,e

passes

~.

to

.a,Ue .ese o.:e«.es

enfo.ce.ent.

T.1s uneven aistH.ution
of ...,ens ten.e.
to p.od.e
political conflict between
police and the courts.
The difficulties
encountered by the SPA in
securing cooperation
fo. the courts and prosecutors
originated, in part. fro.
the federal
-ndate which had exempted
the judiciary and
failed to prescribe a
positive role for prosecutors.
Although the courts
originate records
regarding the outcomes or
Jisoositinn^; of
aisposuions
of ..^
cases, they are not
required
to cooperate in
furnishing that information
to law enforcement

Although prosecutors could
assume

a

role of information
intermediary

for disposition information,
LEAA did not write
regulations which would
accomplish this end. With the
state law tailored closely
to Title 28
'

specifications to the SPA had to
develop creative solutions
to these
challenging and politically
volatile problems.

The Investigative Function:
Limits To Police Reform

The

One of the factors which
contributed to SPA staff difficulties

getting law enforcement and other
criminal justice officials to
modify record keeping practices
was that almost no one recognized
in

accuracy and completeness as an
important and central objective of
both Title 28 and state law.

Almost everyone interviewed by this
author

as a part of the documentation
of this study considered limitations
on

dissemination of criminal history record
information to be the primary
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Of"

single policy objective

Thi^ „
This
perception was also
shared by noncnminal justice interests
(e.g
ACLIl
th« press,
'••^^"•^^e
the Hu»an Rights

Co^ission),

The political
environment and circumstances
which prevailed
at the time that
Title 28 was passed
probably contributed
to this
perception,
^he anti-Vietnam War
protests, revelations
oT domestic

surveillance and the Watergate
scandal had become
permanent fixtures
Of public consciousness
and the police were
no exception.
A couple
Of respondents made
occasional references to
public concern about
surreptitious FBI investigatory
practices as a factor which
precipUated regulation of police
records management and
exchange activities
These Observations were
generally framed in the
context of seeing
privacy regulation as a
form of retaliation
against the cops for
excesses of a federal agency.
The SPA and its Privacy
Administrator were mindful of
the
controversy and divisiveness
which surrounded criminal
records regulations, and thus, they
consciously avoided discussions
focused upon
the deslreability of the
mandate.
Such discussions might invite
an
endless debate, sidetracking
the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
from the
more important and critical
tasks of guideline development.
The

absence of

a

clarification of the intent and
description of objectives,

especially by state elites and other
criminal justice officials

in

positions of recognized authority,
may have forfeited an important
source of cue-giving to the criminal
justice community.
In

of

a

some respects, this failure to
acknowledge positive features

policy was comparable to the police
responses to the Ma££ and

enfo.ce.ent

int™..cea

te^s o. ne.at.e ,e.,

a new set of

.

consideration, an.
conditions

w.c.^e

pe.ce.ed effect of
co.p.o.lsin, tools
consider, essentia,
t've ,aw enforcement.

to effec

«.at has .ade the
protection of due process
ri9hts so repugnant
to law enforcement
Is that they are
considered
-consistent 1f not contradictory
to the IdeCogy
of crime control
«Mch views the crimlna,
Justice process as a
means of esta.lshing
the 9U1U Of the
accused (Pacer.
1968).
In addition, cri.e
control
emphasizes efficiency,
routine, timeliness and
finality.
The presumption Of
is the operational
expression of confidence
that police
have 1n the Integrity,
effectiveness and finality
of fact finding and
Charging processes.
Thus, the Ma^^ and
Hiranda decisions were
perceived
to introduce considerations
about Individual rights
and due process
Which limit the likelihood
of effective prosecution
and conviction.
Demand for utilization of
accurate and complete criminal
records in criminal justice
decision making, like civil
liberties due
process guarantees, puts
pressure on the police to
exercise care In
the utilization of information
in the fact finding
process.
For example
utilization of prior records
of arrest is not sufficient
to establish
guilt nor does it justify
taking shortcuts in the
investigation of

gum

crime.
In this respect,

Ma£R decision.

The

then, there are some close
parallels to the

ruling places

a

special

responsibility on law

enforcement officers to justify an
invasion of individual privacy to

obtain evidence
considered likely to
^° establish a
. ^
.
linkage
between da
suspect and a criminal ;^rf
c.
act.
s,.,larly. cH.inal
history records are
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«y.n.e..yt.epo,.eas..^^^^^^^

criminal records may
also be utili,«H

„
potentially

i^ol.ed

-c.no«led,ed

-nd

in the

by police,

emission

Of

"""^

'
a

°f identifying
suspects

crime.

Alt.o,Menera,ly

the reliance upon
past records as a
.eans to

up potential suspects
can play

-vestigative process.

=

"

a

significant role in the
police

A Seattle detective
remarked to the author
at

one time that approximately
three hundred individuals
in th. City of
Seattle were responsible
for 60 percent of all
crime.
His estimate
was based upon the fact
that these individuals
all had prior criminal
-cords. He assured me that
the crime rate would
decline substantially
If the habitual
offender statute were used
to imprison even a third
of
these persons.
The WCRPA, like the Ma££
and Miranda rulings,
regulates the

conditions under which criminal
records may be acquired for
utilization
in investigative,
pre-trial, charging and other
proceedings.
Significantly, however, the attempts
to place restrictions on
the flow of
criminal Information exchanged
for the purpose of investigative
and
other uses has proven exceedingly
difficult to achieve. What has
made
regulations in this area problematic
is that law enforcement
considers
investigation exempt from any outside
regulatory control.
{In this
regard see Milner, 1971b; Skolnick.
1974; Wilson. 1968 for representative views

.

The WCRPA and
subsequent administrative
.u,es place two
1.ponant conditions on t.e
e.c.an.e of cH^inai
.co.d

i„,o™aticn

bet«een c.i.ina, agencies,
including tne interagency
exchange of data
for t.e purposes of
intelligence „or. or
investigation.
Bot. these
condUions were consistent
with the Title 28
mandate.
First all
exchanges require a
pre-disse.ination guery to the
central siate
repository to obtain the
most current disposition
information. Second
a log must be kept
on each dissemination
which includes the
following
information:
(1, identification of the agency
or person to whom the
information is disseminated;
(2) the date the information
was disseminated; (3) the individual
to whom the information
relates; and (4) a
brief description of the
information disseminated.

While law enforcement interests
are willing to acknowledge
that the provisions generally
apply to routine exchanges of
criminal
record data, they feel that
the exchange of such information
in the

conduct Of intelligence and
investigative activities should
be exempted
from such controls.
Such regulations are considered
onerous because
Information shared in an investigative
context does not lend itself to
audit or predissemination control.
For example, concerns were
expressed
that these requirements would impede
investigations and infringe upon
the freedom needed to exchange
information on known offenders.

The

timeliness of the exchange of intelligence
information could be

jeopardized, it was argued, if detectives
were prohibited from exchanging Information on records of arrest,
without first attempting to gain

the most current information prior to
the exchange.

Z

"

subject had

a

-

right to inspect his
file

following wording:

spec...
tHp
The .section contains
the

The individual's riqht
to ^^rro^^
'"'^'^ °^ ^^^'"^^^^l
history record informatiSn^Li?
t
''^'""^ ^° ^^^^
tained in intelligence
?nves? L;°^
files and shall
^^^^ted
norb^conc^rnL^
other than that de^inL
information
as ch'^.? l^'l'"^'
mation by this
chapterVRCWri'^y :^S:97°8^):''°^'

The language found
here was not sufficient
to allay the concerns
expressed by law enforcement
that investigative
activities not be
regulated.
Therefore, it was recon^ended
that an additional sentence
be added to the list
of definitions which
stated:
'Criminal history
record information does
not include information
contained .n intelligence and investigative files."
Subsequently, this phrase was
modified
some more to state:
"Criminal history record
information does not
include intelligence and
investigative information."
This rewording seemed
innocuous to the SPA staff for
all

it

appeared to mean was that
intelligence and investigative
information
would not have to be divulged
if it also contained
criminal history
record information.
Nothing in this phrase implied
that criminal
history information was not
accessible just because

it was

contained

in such files or that the
information exchanged in the course
of in-

vestigation was exempted from
regulations on dissemination.

Evidently,

law enforcement interests did
not understand it in the same terms.

What prompted the attempt to
specifically distinguish the two
kinds of information was that it had
strategic value as

a

tool

to

Police Oepa.t.enfs1„te,n,ence
and investigative
.nes. The plaintiffs contended that
intonation collected and
maintained in these
files pertained to
political beliefs,
co^unity organizational
affiliations, sexual
preferences and other
personal information
which
was both irrelevant
to effective law
enforcement and unrelated
to the
coenission of any cri^e.
The plaintiffs also
argued that such practices
violated their first amendment
and other Constitutional
rights
In
response to their clai.s,
the Seattle Police
Department argued that
the WCRPA specifically
denied access to the
contents of investigative
intelligence files.
This tactic however was
ultimately unsuccessful.
The Seattle Police Department's
argument was unpersuasive
principally because the state
public disclosure law (RCW
42.17)
generally made intelligence and
investigative information accessible
to data subjects unless it
could be demonstrated that
disclosure would
undermine effective law enforcement.
The plaintiffs contended that
the
WCRPA did not amend 42.17 nor was
intended to regulate the conditions
of release of intelligence
information, because that was not the
intent of the privacy law:
The entire chapter is concerned with
the accuracy of informaenforcement agency which flows from
'
tlTfTrl^lV"'"
an arrest, whether or not convictions
result.
jHi/l
This fact IS clear from the definitions
of criminal history
record information and non-conviction
information.
The act
IS not about investigative
and intelligence information
"PP'^ *° t*'^ twe of information
r»n„=^^J"K^^^r''\'^°".2°'
requested
by the plaintiffs in this case.
This act creates
no right of access to this type of
information and it need
not do so, since such right is created
by RCW 42.17 (Gibbs
and Douglas, 1977)

K

'

-

e

Se.„, Pence Oepan.nt
s.s,.e„t,.

and t..s ena.ed
su.se.uent passage of
the f,.st attempt

a ,cca,

a

™nic1palUy

appea,.

Seattle c.1„a.ce

.ec..„

to

wMc. ..ea

to

.eguUte the ,-„fo™tio„
collected and maintained
1n police Intelligence
and Investigative
files
Although the outcome of
this important court
ruling denied
ponce a means to categorically
prevent public access to
intenigence
information, it had little
effect on their
predispositions to exempt
material collected in the
conduct of investigative
activities.
That
predisposition, born cut of
custom and Ideology of
effective law
enforcement, holds that an^
information utilized or
exchanged as a part
Of the conduct of an
investigation Is beyond the
reach of regulation.
Consequently, as interviews with
those responsible for
compliance bear
out the exemption of
investigative activity becomes
an exception which
swallows the rule.
One records sergeant, an
experienced consultant
with over a hundred police
departments in the state described
in a 1981
interview a widespread method
of evading the logging and
predissemlnation requirement this way:
There are great loopholes in the
law.
violations occur.
They are happening

I
can tell you how
every day.
The cops
disseminations without ogg ng
^/
hPm''°i''w"l''
them.
Hundreds of them happen on telephones
and elsewhere
'''y
investiga^:
'''''^
n
nltuZ and
"."runder
T''^'''
nature
investigative work we don't have to record
It as a dissemination.

Aside from the obvious aversion to
regulations which entail

documentation for the purpose of an audit, many
law enforcement agencies
have unnecessarily compounded administrative
burdens.

For example,

it

was estimated by a
recat-ds
records co..„„,
sergeant^ in
•

a western
Washington police
department that eo to
70 percent of iaw
enforcement agencies
have
established separate
ledgers b. „Mch
disseminations ot criminal
histor.
record information are
recorded.
Instead, a far less
cumbersome and
less expensive approach
could be employed by
which disseminations
are
recorded direct,, on a
particular

criminal history record.

When as.ed

to account for this
widespread phenomenon,

a perceptive
records manager
Of an eastern Washington
sheriffs office gave the
following explanation-

Zr^Z^^l^^l^T

legil?a"?u"?rand
criminal justice area the
wor

"W

T'^'-

ha

ioS:r?n\r^-.i--^ro^i:?ihaiTi-

s=n-n-?Lri

d u

€5 hn:^

?

and this means maintaining
a record seoaratP from
tI WCRPA do^L^'
at' og""
should be a part of the record.
I
made an effort tn
explain this to the Ad Hoc
Committee tharthi I was the
enforceme
ow er
T^lTfu'rr'.''.
suggesting
that
we
were
.
tr!il to
trying
avoid establishing a logging
process and consequently I dropped further efforts
to clarify this problem.

cnminal record files.

In

^X'

addition to the difficulties posed
by custom and predisposi-

tion for effective regulation
of record dissemination practices,
the

status of files collected by regional

information centers also presented

some inconsistencies in the
interpretation of dissemination guidelines.
The WCRPA specifically exempted
exchanges of information between

criminal justice agencies which "jointly
participated in the mainte-

nance of

a

single record keeping department as an
alternative to

maintaining separate records" (RCW, 1977:
Involved in

a

joint records center

is

1

0

.

97 030(8) (a

that all

.

)

)

.

The idea

transactions involving

a-st, Ca^ges

^^""^

and convictions
would .e .alntalned
In t.e cent.,

-

-

^^-'es in „se.
departments.
But
:o,nt panidpation does
not necessaH,. l™p,,
,,,,
center serves as a
repository for criminal
history records.
The Eastern County
Information Syste. Is
one example of a
syste™ Which assumed the
role of an ad hoc
records repository.
Offend
ers fro. five surrounding
counties are booked Into
a central county
Jan. Since jail records are
maintained within the
Eastern County
Information System, it
necessarily contains arrest
record information
on individuals whose
arrests originate from
surrounding jurisdictions
iniportantly, cases from
surrounding jurisdictions
are still adjudicated
by the court found within
the originating jurisdiction.
Thus, the

local

law enforcement agency still
has responsibility to
maintain the
record of arrest and ultimate
disposition. Yet the Eastern
Washington
Information System freely
disseminates non-conviction
Information to
"ser jurisdictions with little
observance of pre- and
post-dissemination
rules,
In a 1980

interview, an eastern county
records manager charac-

terized the practice in these
terms:
One area we are probably abusing
is that of the rules
pertaining to record keeping centers.
^""^'"^

nnl

'
^'J"
disseminations

Under the law,
^e^P^'^g center do

between members of the
M° -^^
My
interpretation of a member of center is if
data which is relevant to the WCRPA.
We house
offender information for eighty-four
agencies
''^
J'^^
SP°^^"^And since we're
nn^v"t!iJ
only
talking about arrest histories as the
record regulated
by security and privacy then my
interpretation is that
under the law-which I know we are
twisting to beat hellcenter.
you keep
criminal

IC.lrV. IZlMTll
don't think they
I

fo

It's right.

a

T7

tMnn ,'™'
t''
'°
because

uses
I

think

iiEravijaR^
ot Judicia

l

Non-Cocip p7^77^

As

indicated before, close
cooperation between courts
and law
enforcement agencies is
necessary in order to
insure that criminal
history record information
contains current, accurate
and complete
disposition information
prior to dissemination.
Vet studies by OTA
(1982a). MITRE (1977a) and
others noted in Chapter
HI, indicate that
the lack of complete
disposition information
continues to be the most
Significant deficiency of records
maintained by federal and
state
records system.
In addition, MITRE
(1977a) discovered wide
variations
in the quality of criminal
records maintained by local
jurisdictions.
Unlike the use of state records
by the central state
repository, the
availability of local disposition
information tends to be uneven,
compliance appears to be primarily
dependent upon local tradition,
priorities and commitments; the
adequacy of resources; and the
quality
of interagency relationships
among local components of the
criminal

Justice system (MITRE, 1977a:
4).

There are numerous instances in

the state of Washington in which
effective cooperation between local

law enforcement and trial courts
can and has occurred with respect
to

furnishing disposition information.

However, the chief source of

opposition to the development of more effective
mechanisms for disposition reporting in Washington has stemmed
principally from the State
Court Administrators office.
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It should be
recalled from Chapter

--.^

in

that state
.t.t. court
^^^^
admint.e Nation. Cente.
.0. state Co.t.,
„e.e .cce...
^

t-ns.

T.e i™,e.. of an
.nconstUutiona, violation
of a separation of
Powe. and executive invasion
of Judicial administration
was sufficient
to th«rt an. efforts
UAA to require oudicia,
compliance wit. the
security and privacy
regulations.
But more than principles
were at
stake in the attempt to
maintain independence
from executive or legislative regulations:
executive regulation
constituted a potential
source of interference in
the
t-ne errorts
effort<. by
hv state
cf.^
courts to implement a
unified information system.
The significance of this
factor became quite evident
almost
from the start of the SPA
rule-making process.
Phil Winberry, State
court Administrator (and as
noted in Chapter IV, the
chairman of the

Attorney General's Advisory
Committee on Security and
Privacy which
helped to draft WCRPA) was
aggressive, ambitious and
politically
astute.

He was a strong advocate
of state judicial

distinguished himself with involvement

in national

reform and had

conferences aimed

at advancing the cause of
court modernization and unification.

During
his tenure as State Court
Administrator, Winberry undertook two
related

initiatives to advance state court
unification.

One initiative was the

development (through state LEAA
assistance) and implementation of a
state court management information
system (SCMIS).
The other was the
passage of legislation amending the
state constitution to enable re-

structuring and administrative unification
of trial and appellate
state courts.

60,000

,.ntf..t.e

to produce a consensus

U:

1n«

SPA,.

Wm.e..

.lU.wMcn.s,

t.e ,.„„p
as .e su.se.uent,,

"the ™ost comprehensive
piece of Judicial
in the state"

c.a.cte.-

.efo™ ever

(Win.err„„s0:i53,.

The proposal involved
substantial consolidation
of existing trial
courts, standardization
Of Judicial selection,
tenure, compensation
and retirement, a
procedure
for discipline and
removal of justices,
justices- ;,nd
i
.
,
and, importantly,
the consolidat^on of all administrative
authority and rule-making
in the state
supreme court. While the
proposal garnered substantial
support from
the legal community, it
was most strongly
opposed by superior court
justices who stood to lose
substantial administrative
and fiscal
autonomy.
The bill was ultimately
defeated by an extremely
narrow
n.argin in the 1977
legislative session.
Since that time, there have
been no new initiatives to
undertake state judicial reform
on the scale
contemplated by the 1977 legislation.
a

Although this defeat constituted

a

major setback for judicial

reform it did not however
adversely affect efforts to develop
and implement a state wide judicial
information system. A substantial
LEAA grant
awarded by the SPA of $500,000 made
it possible to test the
feasibility
and mount the necessary political
support required to fund and imple-

ment SCMIS.

While it has taken several years
for many technical

problems to be ironed out (especially
those defining the court clerks'
data collection role), support has
gradually increased for an enlarge-

ment of the number of court jurisdictions
participating in the system.

AUhouoh

t.e state cou.t
was t.e .ecip,-e„,
0. one 0. t.e
largest state grant
awards, the SPA
was ,arae,„
largely unsuccessful
in

.

its
attempt to both 'nsure
insure if
.
,f th=
the system
was compatible
with the compreenforcement data system
an. capable of
providing the

With the disposition
information necessary

Horeover. the development
and gradual expansion
of the state court
syste. has helped
increase centralisation
of state administration
«1thout formal unification
between trial courts
and local police
wh,le undermining
effective cooperation
between trial courts
and'local
pol ice

The passage of the
state Criminal Records
Privacy act in 1977

court involvement in the
implementation of record
quality objectives
Although it was clear that
both the Title ZS and
the WCRPA legislation
exempted court records, at
least as they pertained
to limitations on
dissemination, it was, nonetheless,
necessary to require trial
and
appellate courts to furnish
disposition data to the central
state
repository.

The method chosen seemed
eminently suitable:

courts as criminal justice
agencies.

define the

The following wording was
in-

cluded in the first draft of
the regulations circulated
for Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee review and
comment:
The following agencies shall
be considered criminal iustir»
agencies for the purposes RCW
10.97 and ?hese regu atlon
Courts at any level, if they
exercise

criminal

jursdction

While law enforcement
interests were obviously
extremely
supportive of tMs provision,
tbe State Court
A*1n1strator
was

Hrmly

opposed and anxious to
remind the Privacy
Administrator that federal
exemption of the courts
precluded such a rule.
Nevertheless, law
enforcement Interests did
not consider It
unreasonable to expect the
courts to comply „lth the
provision.
Subsequently, the State
Court

Administrator mobilized support
of the Judicial community
to get the
proposed rule withdrawn.
He selected a rather
dramatic way to Impress
upon the Privacy Administrator
that the courts could not
be regulated

1n any way by SPA
regulations.

The Privacy Administrator
was invited

to a meeting attended by
a state supreme
court justice, a superior

court Judge, an assistant
Attorney General and

superior court district.

After

a

a

clerk of

a

large

brief lecture by State Court
Adminis-

trator Winberry. punctuated
several times by reference
to the judiciary
as a separate branch of
government, each participant in the
meeting
expressed concurrence with a
recommendation by the State Court Administrator that the regulation be
withdrawn.
Needless to say, their collective
recommendation was reflected
in a subsequent draft of the
regulations.

Nevertheless, the problem

of the courts' need to gain access
to criminal record information had
to be stated in

a

to regulation.

This problem was handled with new language
under the

way that did not also imply that they
were subject

general applicability section of the
regulations:

The courts and court record keeping agencies
have the right
to require and receive criminal history
record information
from criminal justice agencies (WAC, 1978: 365.50
010)

Thus, judicial

interests had not only
H.y successfullv
buccesstully eliminated
t

a-9uUt1on (wMc. a«tte.l,

had

1 Ut,e
1e,a, purchase an.way,
..t
maintained the burdens
of compliance on
Uw enforcement. The effect
Of th,s action created
a sense of
defeat and resentment
within the law
enforcement community.
Subsequent interviews
with law enforcement
offKMls indicated that many
police departments have
simply

refused

t^on until satisfied that
the courts are making
to furnish disposition

information,

a

substantial effort

m

other instances, police
are
Simply refusing to
disseminate information
(especially for individual
records requests because of
the added burden to
secure complete dispositions.
An eastern Washington
record manager's remarks are
illustrative of the resentment
of regulations considered
to be less
than even handed:
''''' °^
^^^^'"9
can't give
out arrest
lrr?.f'nr
or J^r'-'?^
conviction information because
it isn't
the source of accur te Records
la Jn'^t.'r
Again
that may^^l'^^
be challenged in the courts
esoecianv
where it involves data subject
requests
But riqhiow
apparently it is a good enough
reason becau e te courts
^'^^
^^^^^e^t
amount of eve^h ng
?hp
Vl""^
the courts
do-criminal cases-is the information
?hey
^'''^ 900d working relltion^
shiDs
T? ^hl"""^ ""'^^^li^
mandated by law, they would do it.
Th^t-;
i .
^^u^^fr^
'^^'"9 so ridiculous when they
[l
EAAl pJhmSIh
LLEAAj
excluded them.
In our county, it is less than
1600
dispositions a year that they would
have to give to us
We re on y looking at three to
four transactions a day that
they would have to give us.
The courts won more than we ever
expected.
The developregulations was going to be the one place
where we
!"rL
cou d get the information we needed.
But throughout the
whole process, we were the bastards that
had legislation
placed on us. We were the bastards who had
criminal
liability placed on us because of infractions,
but yet we
had no control over court records, so
how could we be
wrong? So we felt utter frustration when
the committee
exempted the courts.

What's even sadder is that
county wanted to
panic Da^e tJ»
in getting disposition
rfo^"' „"^
IS that we let a
State CoTt Z^J"for the courts of

»

,

""""'^

'^^

"'"'"^

^"^^t

unfortunate

lll^lZ^ftTt^lllZ:

in '98,,

[my]
'°

'"^

^---n

(in the wake of
approval of a state
appropriation)

the State Supreme
Court issued

a

t-n

court rule which
mandated participa-

Of state trial courts
in the state court
.anage.ent information
system.
The rule has further
reduced opportunities
for informal
cooperation between the
lower courts and police
i>-c.
K
In Tact,
in
fact one .superior
court Judge indicated
that he is not even
certain that such
information
«ould be collected by an
information system designed
primarily to
satisfy internal court
calender, case control and
other management
information needs.
"Getting disposition
information to the state

identification section Is", the
judge noted, "just not an
issue for
superior court justices."
counties in which there are
multiple
court districts cooperation
from the courts is uneven
and sporadic.

m

For example, a King County
records manager characterized
the diffi-

culties this way:
"^''^'''^

^^'^
administrator
traJor'in
wh^rhVn^'''"^'."'
in which
they send a disposition to use
and we update
'^'"^
""tral state repository
lin^n'r°'?'i'"^''"^

courts do It, and then not all

in this case.

We are ores"^^^ ^ourt Administrator in

nr^/r to
tn make l^j'
order
these records more complete.
In

other instances police have been able
to cultivate coopera-

tive relationships with offices of
prosecution.

In Pierce County,

a

large jurisdiction south of Seattle, the
sheriffs department and county

prosecutor have established an effective working
relationship

in

which

the prosecutor takes responsibility for
return of court disposition

patterns.

But such cooperation
Peration ,s th.
the exception
rather than the rule.

to federal and state
privacy regulation,
the exemption „. the
courts

fro. the regulations
provided the .ey Impetus
to pursue legislative
amendments In the 1979
legislative session.
That effort resulted
as
we Shan see,
1„ an amendment designed
to mandate court
Involvement 1n
criminal record privacy
at the local
level.

Law Enforcemen t Interests
Preva il-

iM^JurdeHTonMlI^^

Redistrlh,,

The adoption of the
privacy rules and regulations
In late
February 1978; the conduct
of well-attended state-wide
training sessions; the development of
draft security and audit
provisions; and

increased policy Involvement
of the Governor's Committee
contributed to
a sense of growing
momentum towards substantial
compliance.
The
Privacy Administrator now
looked for ways to strengthen
the law during
the next legislative session;
to secure carryover funds
from the

Governor's Committee to support
administrative staffing; and, perhaps
to explore potential strategies
for finding a more secure
administrative home for the WCRPA.
Neither the future of the LEAA
program nor
the SPA appeared very secure.

Yet the WCRPA assured that some
type

Of administrative mechanism would
have to be fashioned to Insure

continued efforts to bring about compliance.

However, several factors

conve,.

to dissipate the
SPA

™t™,

„Ui.te,v paving the wa. for
the assumption of
administrative authonty
over the WCRPA hy the
State
Patrol
Perhaps one of the most
important factors to
seriously weaken
the Privacy Administrator's
control over rule-maMng
and implementation
activities was the unexpected
departure of tenna Schram
as the taw and
Justice Planning Office
Administrator in late March.
Schram's resignation was prompted in
part by her disappointment
over her inability to
utilize the SPA to influence
state criminal justice
policy.
Specific
recommendations by the Governor's
Co^ittee to resolve prison
overcrowding and develop new
sentencing policies were not
given much
attention by the Governor.
In addition, substantial
reductions in
LEAA assistance made the
allocation of that money a
more painful and
contentious process. As a
consequence, the SPA was increasingly
locked
Into support and continuation
of existing projects rather
than initiation of promising new innovations.
The replacement of Schram by
the deputy administrator was not

particularly encouraging for the
health of the privacy and security
program.

Deputy Administrator Keith Weaver
had never really been

supportive of SPA control over privacy
regulation.

It put the SPA in

the awkward position of having
to say "no" to criminal justice
agencies

who had grown accustomed to getting
whatever they wanted.
did not have

a

Although they

great deal of confidence in Weaver's ability,
the law

enforcement leadership finally found an
individual sympathetic to their
concerns about the burdens of the WCRPA.

Furthermore, given his

tenuous position as acting administrator, Weaver
was eager to please

a

constituency which had

great deal of clout
on
°" the Governor's
Committee
Thus, one of Weaver's m;iin^ +ori
major tasks was to
somehow contain the
aggressiveness with Which the
Privacy Administrator
was pursuina th.
implementation
'
Of the WCRPA.
a

m

,

indeed, the ru.e-making
process had not been
completed; draft
regulations were .eing
prepared for administrative
and physical security
and audit process.
The security guidelines
involved numerous special
considerations because of
the diversity of agency
contexts in which
criminal record data was
collected and maintained.
For example, the

adult corrections division
of DSHS stores its
criminal record information ,n a computer which
serves the data needs of
all the divisions of
the DSHS.
Thus, regulations had
to be devised to somehow
li.it access
of non-criminal justice
personnel to criminal record
files.
Procedures
were devised which ultimately
created overlapping management
control
between criminal justice and
non-criminal justice personnel.
Further,
the State Data Processing
Authority contended that its
authority to
control standards for operation
of computer systems had been
preempted
if not usurped by the SPA
regulations.
Needless to say. these and
many other issues involving
security in non-dedicated joint
computer
operations complicated and slowed
the development of rules in
this area.
Vet. surprisingly, most
problems of this kind resulted in
compromises

which appeared to satisfy competing
interests.
However, there was one area of
regulations governing adminis-

trative security which produced much
opposition from law enforcement.
Title 28 regulations proposed that
criminal records only be directly

accessible to employees responsible for
control of the information

system.

The SPA staff internrot«H t^'

;

that

ances

cnmmal
„Mc.

'°

—

Justice agencies esta.Hs.

„oul.

.

t^^t not all personnel

nt„.
a

the SP. staff
propose,

s.ste. of security
clear-

W

n.U

access to those
individuals Who have a
a V1,ht" to
.now the information.
The SPA reasoned
that restricting access in this
way would increase
the likelihood that
an
effort would be made
to determine the
accuracy and completeness
of
the material prior
to release to agency
personnel (such as
patrolmen
or detectives, and
limit the avenues of
secondary dissemination
of
dated or otherwise
incomplete criminal record
material

Law enforcement members
of the Ad Hoc Advisory
Co^ittee
expressed strong opposition
to this proposal.
They argued that it
«ould be impossible and
inappropriate to control
internal access to
criminal record materials.
They reasoned that while
it made some
sense to restrict individuals
authorized to maintain and
modify such
data, it would constitute
an unreasonable burden
to centralize access
for utilization of criminal
records in an environment in
which remote
terminals had been designed
specifically to decentralize and,
thus,

facilitate access to central
files.
Evidently, the law enforcement
leadership decided that they
had had enough of the SPA's
regulatory efforts.

Consequently, the

Sheriffs and Chiefs Association
decided to use the obligatory preadoption review and comment period
as a strategic time to express
their

dissatisfaction with the overall thrust
of the SPA rule-making effort.
On May 18,

1978, the Privacy Administrator received

a

mimeographed

lette. (evident,. „l,e„
..stH.uted
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a™.,

t.e state
copies aUso
sent to t.e 0..1ce
of Pinancia,
Management (OPM,
.>ecto. to „.o. t.e
A now .eponea a„a
t.e SPA a«nUt.ato.,
st.on,,. cHtic.e.
the latest proposed
rules and urged
postponement of adoption
The letter requested
t.at the SPA postpone,
for at least sixty
days, adoption of what
the Association
termed "amendments to
the

...

Sheriffs and Chiefs
Association on your Ad
Hoc Co^lttee view these
actions as a steamroller
attempt to rush through
amendments further
handcuffing the criminal
Justice agencies who must
live with this act
from hereon." The letter wpnt
letter went on to express
their attitudes more
bluntly:

lei da;s"w"?h':fpr'el::L?i:°r?r?K

agrelmen

bfa

ag

c

'^^t

=Pend

a

es°il:ved'\r''\"''"'''"3

The letter provided the OFM
director with his first exposure
to
how politically volatile
the implementation of the
WCRPA had become.
It was evident to the
Privacy Administrator that the
OFM director was
hesitant to assume responsibility
for signing off on regulations
which
did not command solid support.
In addition, the OFM office
had in-

vestigated the fiscal

impact of an annual audit and
discovered that by

state law, local government had to
reimburse the state auditor for 25

percent of the total cost.

Thus, the OFM director did not want
to put

fede.a,

that the

and state .e,u,ato..
,„.,e„s

t™.

„e„t.

,oca,
It was also evident
to the
tne SPA
^rtinn adimrn
.a
5PA acting
strator Weaver

PHvacy Ad.i„,-st.ato. was
.eco.ing

himself 1„ t.e a,enc..

a

polUica, ,ia,„Uy fo.

Vet. Weave, was

.naMe to effectively
control
the privacy activity
because the Pn'vacy
Ad.in1st.to. had ca.efuHy
cultivated a policy-making
.ole for the Governor's
Co^ittee which
was not easily overridden.
.ever Lneiess, the
Nevertheless
th» SPA ^
administrator did
have management control
over SPA staffing and
over matters
Conse
quently, a timely lapse in
the funding for the
Standards and Goals
project. Which ended the
Privacy Administrator's
position, provided
the avenue by which his
Involvement in security and
privacy regulation
could be terminated.
Thus, on July 1
1978. the Privacy Administrator
was released from the SPA.
along with several other
employees as a part
Of a general reduction in
force necessitated by the
loss of LEAA funds.
•

,

Although more direct control
by the SPA administrator
was
encouraging to law enforcement,
the SPA and Governor's
Comittee continued to be drawn Into a
regulatory process they could not
avoid.
Governor's Committee was responsible
for decisions regarding the

The

certification of agencies permitted
access to criminal justice records.
As indicated before, this
was an area In which controversy
abounded.
Requests for Governor's Committee
certification continued to pour into
the SPA office during the remainder
of 1978, posing some difficult and

potentially unpopular decisions.
One such controversial decision by the
Governor's Committee to

recognize an eastern Washington Indian tribe
(and thus other Indian
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-

^"on ™.a.-enate.
st^ongl, oppose, to
t.e .ecislon.

Prcptea t.e State Pat.o,
leadership

Decisions

State Pat.o,

n.e tMs

,

„.„

.a. .ave

to .econsi.e.
opposition to t.ei r

administration of security
and privacy,

w.at was particularly
,a1,i ng
about the certification
process was that the
Judiciary was overrepresented and. thus, able
to dominate the
decision-.aMng

process
Th,s only exacerbated
the resentment the
police felt towards the
courts
was Simply another
manifestation of the judiciary
exercising supervision of regulations they
had successfully
eluded.

"

As the 1979 legislative
session approached, the
Sheriffs and

Chiefs Association decided
to ta.e action.

The State Patrol leadership
was persuaded to give
up its resistence to
the administration of the
privacy regulations.
In addition, the House
Judiciary Cor^ittee had
some new members and was
chaired by a conservative
Republican sympathetic to the law enforcement
community.
The Association undertook

a

two pronged attack to
include the

courts within the regulations
and to transfer administrative
authority
to the State Patrol.
That strategy was stated succinctly
in the House
Judiciary Committee report:

to

t^P
the
thP
the
the

''^'"^"^^

J^^tice agency
from the court (or
information about
r..f .n^
iJ-"" ^''^
°" P°1^'^^ because
'
courtf.rp^no?' t:equiredS^'"'
to give the disposition data to
.nZ
agency which initiated the criminal
proceeding; thus
agency must spend time and money to
obtain such

'
obtain\hp'Hr^
^l'' ^^^^V'^'
disposition
of a case

If.fto

.

^

J

dispositions
The current law places too great a
burden on law
enforcement agencies to obtain dispositions,
especially
when the information is required by
another criminal justice
agency who has no real need for the
disposition data
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Dispositions are oftpn h^^n
suming.
The State Pa rorshouiH^a'"

'"-^ ^""^

""^'^"t (Washington, House

Judiciary Committee,
1979).

The Sheriffs and
Chiefs Association
proposed two important
amendments to dea, with
the difficulties
involved in obtaining
court
dispositions,
first, a new section
was added co the law
that' required
that Whenever a court
reached a disposition,
that information would
have to be furnished
by tne
oy
the agency
aapnru "w^,.•
-xwhich initiated
the criminal history
record for the Charge
charap" (i.e.,
/'i
o
r^^i
police) as well as to
the Identification
Section Of the Washington
State Patrol.
•

•

But,

\

in addition to this
section, the Association
proposed

another amendment which
exempted criminal Justice
agencies from
satisfying requirements for
completeness (e.g., pre-dissemination
query
to the State Patrol) if
the court failed to
provide disposition information in a timely way:

^l^^s^^^^ ^^^r^-

w ich are otherwise within
the d^?

If a quick witted staff
counsel

c

\n

w

d

e

-.uested
'

e

to the House Judiciary Committee

had not recognized the implications
this amendment would have of

virtually gutting the WCRPA of its
central objectives, it would have
probably sailed through the February
5th hearing of the House Judiciary
Committee with unanimous approval.

The implications of the amendment

were that it would permit dissemination
of conviction and non-conviction

—

^° -^^y criminal

or non-crimin al justice aoencv

.

without initiating

co-Utee ,,cM. .te.ene.

the Cannes su..Uted
to the
on .e.a,.

s,,estea t.at t.e AssocU.on
propose

cc^Utee

the Association
„e.e

t.e assistant Atto.ne.
3e„e.a,

stn, .nacceptaMe

to t.e

co.Utee

Staff
Evidently, the chairman
of the House Judiciary
Co^ittee did
not Share the staff
concerns about the proposed
amendments.
At a subsequent hearing two weeks
later (February 22„d).
Chairman Irv Newhouse
scolded the staff and
committee for taking so long
to come up with a
solution.
Newhouse advised the co-ittee
that the "staff had
dragged
their feet on this bill;
that the sponsors hadn't
had a fair shake in
getting it heard and that
he wanted It through
the Rules and on the
floor for passage tonight"
(Cheal, 1979).

Although the language finally
adopted specified that the
exception applied onlj, to the
exchange of Information between
criminal

Justice agencies, It still involved
the implication that the
courts
must take the initiative to
supply disposition Information
to law
enforcement.

The new section reads in
part:

Whenever a court or other criminal
justice aqencv reaches
a disposition of a criminal
proceed ng, the court or Sther
criminal justice agency shall
furnish the dispos t?on data
to the agency initiating the
criminal history record for
that charge and to the identification
section of the
"""^^ ^™ 43.43.745
(RCw!"l980: fo*97^Mr^
Presumably this provision would now make
the court subject to

penalty and civil liability if it failed
to provide disposition
information to law enforcement agencies.

However, such an Issue would

new provision of the
WCRPA.

We have basically
ianored it
Of regulation of
cour? act Jitil^
by the State Supreme
Court
fn ?.
rule Which covert
^^is'^t^p'e

i

,

.

legitimate form
'""^^^ ^^"Pt^d
"""""J"

"Ij;
?

^

of^in'^fo^Jma^lo^l'""'^

a^tate_P atrol

Takes OverRegulaturv Revision and iittprt^

-^

In contrast to the
controversy generated
around the reporting

Of disposition information,
the legislature found
no opposition to
transfer of administrative
authority from the SPA to
the State Patrol
Thus the most important
element of law enforcements'
success resided
not so much in the few
strategic amendments secured
in the law but the

opportunity that administrative
ownership provided to make
wholesale
Changes in the SPA regulations.
Reference has already been
made to SPA
regulations which were strongly
opposed by the law enforcement
leadership in community.
Briefly,
they tended to focus upon
rollback and

tightening of provisions
pertaining to individual access
and review;
rules Which, required cooperation
from the prosecutor and
requirements
that local agencies adopt
written policies to implement the
law and

regulations.

Therefore this section focuses
upon the reaction of

criminal justice officials and
others to legislative and regulatory

changes and their aftermath.

Unsurprisingly, one of the most striking
differences between
the SPA and the State Patrol

rule-making processes was the number and

n.„omcUU,
«v,so. Co..„ee.

""'^

-

an

A

0. „.o™

—

..n ...on

3e.e.
o.

on t.e SPA

.

Hoc

.e a...,.,,,
an.

a

p... .eaH,

Ma

~.,..o.tenpeo.e-..,.e.esen...es

Of law enforcement
agencies.

co^nlt,

Bot. the Pat.o, an.
the ,aw enfo.ce.ent

„e.e anxious to avo,.
the cont.ove.s.
which s...ounde. the
development of the SPA
guidelines which had
proceeded the..
,„ fact.
as one eastern
Washington
igT^on Sheriff,
sheriff ^,hr.
u
^
who had participated
in the SPA
process (although excluded
from this
triis late.t
latest Pff..^
effort), remarked in a
1981
interview:

-ed

i^^iBf^S

r

Another record manager from
an urban western Washington
police
department expressed her
disappointment that the law
enforcement
community did not use the
opportunity It had to clarify
and/or revise
key definitions In the law
such as non-conviction data,
criminal history
record information, and
dissemination. She contended that
much of the

difficulty that criminal justice
agencies had with understanding the
restrictions on dissemination stem
from a lack of a clear distinction
between arrest and conviction
records.
As a participant In the State
Patrol rule-revision process,
she had urged consideration of
these

issues but was preempted by an
overriding concern about the impact of
the SPA regulations:
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t?ons"he;"lho:gl;i"?on\™i?urL"*'' '° ''""'"^'^
state prWacy Uw
t^e
The aJoun wL''""'"'"?'""*^*^'°"
they wanted to e"
minate^S^ovi^tLr'""!;"^ '"-pact-oriented;
status Of arrests more
^''^
hen o e ear
"^IV"""^
or provisions requiring
^''^ Prosecutor
that ll
data subjects by forwa
^^^^^^
d
o record .hin'"'"'
challenges to agencies
of origin.
Procedures 1 k» It^
"""'^ ''^
time consuming and prosecutors llfJ-H
and other agencies
wouldn't cooperate
anywa?.

f

-pact
to her.

This respondent however,
questioned the real value
of taking an
orientation towards the
revision of the regulations.
According
the WCRPA has not
really created substantia,
change in record

management practices because
law enforcement agencies
continue to he
considered and used as
"information intermediaries
in the criminal
Justice process."

She also acknowledged
that

a

routine practice,

mostly untouched by the MCRPA,
has been the utilization
of police
agencies as intermediaries to
obtain data from other
police departments
to satisfy requests by
private users.

She observed that it may
have

been a big mistake for the
State Patrol to strike

a

"need to know-

criterion from the SPA rules,
for the department which
unwittingly
serves as an intermediary may be
making itself liable for unlawful
disseminations.

She continued by saying:

"The law is thus having a

chilling affect on interagency
exchange practices precisely because
someone ultimately is responsible
for a dissemination log."
In addition to this appraisal
most respondents interviewed

concurred that the WCRPA had

a

negligible effect upon the ability of

police officers to detect, apprehend
and convict offenders.

Thus,

unlike Ma££ and Miranda where mistakes or
violations in evidence
gathering or post-arrest warnings may result
in unsuccessful prosecutions, failure to insure the utilization
of accurate and complete

——
effects

—

-"en,e

0.

tted.

.oU.ons

a.

a,so .e,a.ed

.a. no. occu.

oo.e.e

t.at .,-scove.. an.
>on,

an.

t.e

..action

Asa.e.U..otMo,1cea„.p„.s.a.e.eco.e

™ore c1.cu.spect a.o.t
the exchange of
cH.ina, .ecc. data an.
ext-n,e,. cautious In
the .Ind of 1„fo™at1on
disseminated to the p.ess
Although the amendment
of the MCRPA to
require court reporting
Of dispositions was
expected to increase
court involvement in
satisfying
accuracy and completeness
requirements, court
cooperation, especially
larger urban jurisdictions
has not measurably
Increased.
Both the
State Patro, Identification
Section as weU as police
in large urban

.

ounsdlcticns have retaliated
for continued failure
of the courts
furnish disposition
information.

non-convlctioh information on

a

For example,

to

if a court requests

subject whose file fails
to contain

disposition information, it
will not be provided
to the requesting
court.
The hope is that by
withholding

records, courts will be more
likely to discipline each
other for impeding the
sentencing process,
but there Is little evidence
to warrant this expectation.

When the State Patrol acquired
administrative authority for
the WCRPA in 1979, LEAA
stni had authority to monitor
state Implementation activities and enforce
compliance.
LEAA control was exercised
primarily through its power to
require periodic reports identifying

progress made towards
ccplunce.

sati.fi«H

.

-.--ents

very important
element-

audit

Th

---

.

the Patro,

undated
a
'

nl.n

The state of « hWashington had

~

5. federa, or state
,aw except one
t

'°

to implement
what

^

U«

systematic statewide

considered to

.

the

The SP. Privacy
Administrator had
contacted the State
Auditor
and a ha. years
earlier to develop
an audit process

-.two

J

eless. the State
Auditor. o.tice undertook
followupe^orts with
e Patrc, to see if
a new effort
could .e undertaken.
Eager to get
LEAA Off its .ac.
the Patrol reluctantly
accepted the auditors'

-commendation that an audit
plan ,e developed and
pretested.

,f the

State Auditor were
successful in getting
the Patro, to accept
the
Plan, it would, Of course,
constitute a new source
of revenue which
could Justify an increase
in its budget.
The Auditor estimated
that
would cost approximately
$260,000 to conduct an audit
which involved
one third of 310 agencies
each year for three
years.
A total of thirty
staff would be assigned
to twelve regions
across the state to conduct
the audit.

n

The plan submitted was
thorough with respect to
verification
Of procedures, documentation
of record quality and
inclusiveness of
public agencies involved in
the criminal justice
process.
The plan
was not submitted for
approval by the Patrol until
a sample audit had
been conducted to pretest
the audit instrument.
Four county jurisdictions were selected for
on-site visits including the
State Identification

Section, and the
sheriffs'
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C-"ty

^" ^'"3

diction)
diction), <;Snohomish
.
County

(a

.

fa

mpHinm

•

Urge urban jurisj

•

"^'"^''^^"^^^^^J^^i^diction), and Mason

,
,
County
(a small, rural
jurisdiction).

There was no attempt
to conduct

"

""'""^

'

;

a

systematir .audit
h-. nor
systematic
to trace

-"P^e 0. a.ests

7

r
^eas,.,u.o.conauctin,

-1"
an audit.

to

aete™ine acc.ac.

Objective was to test
t.e

Neven.eless,

n.e.o.s de.icienwere uncovered in
records .ana,e.ent
procedures in a,, three
jurisdictions surveyed.
One rer„r^o„t j ^deficiency common to
all juris-ions pertained to t.e quality
and accessi.i, ity
of dissemination
109S.
Dissemination forms
frequently failed to
specify exactly „Mc.
Charges and related
dispositions were disseminated,
they were often

c-s

.

-accessible and,

in some instances,
did not employ
standardized

elements of information.
The Snohomish County
Sheriffs Office had the
highest rejection
rate for incomplete,
inaccurate or misleading
criminal history records.
This is a surprising finding
in that the county
has a sophisticated

Offender-based infor^tion
system linking police,
prosecutor and
county record files.
In contrast. Mason County
had more complete and
accurate documentation of
criminal record information.
The difference
appeared to stem largely from
the extent of cooperation by
the courts
and jurisdictional complexitythe greater the number of
courts and
larger the prosecutors' office,
the greater the use of inconsistent

event and case numbers and thus
the greater likelihood of
incomplete
and inaccurate records.
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plan
By

"'facials,
it „as
evident from the
response
Ponse that the
th. proposed
audit involved a
far more
rigorous review of
records oiMlit,
.
^"""^^"""'^"^a^ent practices thanlocal
,
law enforcement
officials^^'^P^^t^^expected
x.
The
principal Objection
was that
the audit
.
udU fn
focused
too heavil, upon
record ,oal it.
(accuracy and
completeness) and
dissemination controls
n
'"""'^
expressed the concerns
this way:

wuhi';*°:co^:^^:^oTw:°°ec:?Sed^"?j^^^-^
completeness of our files
SI ^f,;'.^""

T" ^""'"^'^y

and

emphasis was

inappropriate. What would h^L k
survey to generally
^PP^P^'ate was a
assure that tTl
procedures to carry'

cut"Jh\Xc??!;ero'?'=^,r?a:'°^'^'

Not surprisingly,
the Patrol rejected
the audit plan and
since
that time, no new
plan has been developed
or approved.
A records
manager from a large,
western Washington urban
jurisdiction observed
that ,f an audit were
to be conducted it
would definitely renew
the
"Visibility that the WCRPA
once had when the SPA
had administrative

authority."

(CHAPTER

VII

EXPLAINING STATE AND
LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL POLICY

This stud, has sought
to identify interests
and factors which
^--ine the politics of state
implementation of federal
guidelines
criminal Justice and
what that implies for
an understanding of
policy implementation
processes.
Chapter I presented a
number of
POl.tica, factors to be
examined in the development
of state guidelines
t° provide a potentially
useful foca, point hy
which to explain state
performance and thereby
contribute to our understanding
of political
factors which limit the
regulation of criminal
justice.

-

In this chapter we
return to the conceptual

frameworks for
explaining policy implementation
processes outlined at the
end of Chapter
H as potential sources of an explanation
of what happened in
Washington
and nationwide, and why.
Although proponents of these
conceptual
fr.ne-

works present their explanations
differently, they generally
agree with
respect to the significance
of statutory clarity and
minimal change as
conditions of effective
implementation.
Thus, we follow the logic
implied by these factors to
develop an overall explanation
of the lack
of compliance and limited
change resulting from the federal
criminal
history records mandate, using
the nationwide data from Chapter
III and
additional elaboration from the
Washington case (Chapters IV through
VI).
252

—
to a

7

.1st,-„,

U,e

,.™ewo..s an.

po,U,-ca, cone, usions

enent u„.e.ete™,„e.

a.na.ee

and co„c,us,o„s
,-„™,ve co.p,e. ana
tnte.epenaent .acto.

-the.easn.ope„i.ed„c..educea.et„
success.

wMc. a.

s.p,e ,o™,as .0.

The.efo.e, accepting
the explanation
.esuUIng f.o. these
f.a.ewo..s .e,u,>es
concurrence wUh conceptual
underpinnings and
assumptions incomplete,,
formulated and perhaps
incapable of being
tested with any degree
of scientific
rigor.

When performance may
result from the confluence
of a number of
political factors, an
alternative explanation is
needed which gives more

next draws together the
data and findings from
the Washington case
to
form a more complete
explanation, since case
material presented in
Chapters IV through V. is
based upon only one state's
response, which
™ay be unrepresentative of
other states, the explanation
advanced must
be considered limited.
However, the evident uniformity
in state performance described in Chapter
III may support some
limited inferences as
to factors which may
account for similarities in
state performance.
Thus, While this study cannot
generate a conclusive explanation,
it does
suggest a plausible interpretation.
Finally, this chapter broadens
the explanation to suggest how
the factors which affect the
state implementation of federal
regulations

compare with those which shape
responses to two important court-

originated decisions (i.e., Map£ and
Miranda) which regulate the administration of criminal justice, also.

In particular,

this investigation

examines common factors
oertinonf ^„
j
pertinent
to understanding
state implementation
Of nat,ona, mandates
and determines what
this tells us about
the
efflcac. Of efforts to
implement intergovernmental
regulatory policies
1n criminal Justice.
The analysis concludes
with a discussion of
what
these common factors imply
for a »re general
understanding of policy
Implementation, intergovernmental
regulation and the /^erican
political
system

Mi^^OMlIltatutes

gT^

wTtTTIi^iggT

Consequences

'

Of the factors considered
conducive to effective policy
implementation discussed in Chapter
II, policies with clear
goals involving
little institutional change
are considered by some to
be key factors
in explaining policy
outcomes.

First, policies which are
clear in

purpose and provide specific
guidelines minimize distortion
and evasion,
and therefore make enforcement
possible.
Second, policies which minimize
the amount of change which
institutions, organizations and
individuals

must undergo in order for
implementation to be effectuated are
unlikely
to generate opposition from
elites having authority and influence
with

respect to the compliance of subordinates.
If we accept this conventional
wisdom of effective policy imple-

mentation, then nationwide patterns of
compliance with the federal
criminal

records privacy mandate could be explained
without recourse to

the details of the Washington case.

In fact,

at

a

superficial

level,

the Washington case might be used to
further corroborate the importance

of these factors for explaining the limited
support by state elites,
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underenforcement of
record an^Mi-

dissemination provisions
'
and
other responses
producing actions
falling short of
st t .
'
ves
An explanation
of patterns of
.
national compliance
based upon extent
of
change and statutory
^
claritv
clanty is described
in the next
•

•

two sections.

^raanization^^

technoJo^T^aj^
«az.nia.an.Sa.at,e.,l98,;,983,conten.t.att.ee„ect1veof -gulato.,
po„-c,

"

——

™nce.

«ni depend

T.e.

o.e.e

upon «.ethe. t.at

t.at t.e e..cac.

,oUcy

U

.e,,ato.

- -ava.aM,u.„,™o,.to

a.9et ,.oups
0. o.,anUat.o„s „.c ™.st
co^p,,
statute., mandates
Difficulties with
implementation ana,
and thus,
thus
.nrr. . .
successful
performance may
be compounded
po,1c. Involves "technology
,„.clng provisions" Involvlng extensive change
as the .eans to
achieve desl.ed chjectlves
As Chapter I Indicates,
the attempt to develop
a national CCH

U

-volvlng regulator, refer™
has been dependent
upon

the efficacy of
parallel efforts to
influence the Implementation
of Information technological reforms.
I„ order to reduce
these technological
limitations,
LEAA advanced a strategy
by which It could
achieve Its regulatory
Objectives.
That strategy Involved
the attempt to promote
Information
innovations in criminal justice
in order to change
organizational
structures, and interorganlzational
patterns of coordination in
directions which make them more
amenable to uniform regulation.

However, LEAA simply misjudged
the extent to which system
constraints constitute formidable
barriers to attempts to use
regulation
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as a means to
control

the dirertir.„

";
r;^"°"^
"
V
--orce.ent
—.n
There are two

7^;°^-^-"-—
pa

™l,,n,„ir,

"

.

technological refer..
r

,„

3hows, the ejects

^-ovations have heen
ai.erentlal
technclo. has great,,

~

increase, the e

.ecor.sinthecon.cto,pol,ce

an. investigative
functions.

Vet the application
of
information technology by
offices of prosecution
and t.
the courts has not

,

.

.

ticn systems have
been primarily
employed to satisfy
day-to-day case
management information
needs rather than
those pertaining to
charging
or sentencing processes.

police organizations,
the functions of

prosecution and adjudication
do not lend themselves
to information
innovations designed to
Increase the utilization
of criminal records
as
an additional aid or
substitute for highly
idiosyncratic and discretionary decision-making
processes.
Moreover, while state
repositories
have been substantially
upgraded, many still lack
technological
sophistication.
Second, because of the
dynamics of decentralization,
LEAA
surrendered direct regulatory
control over State Planning
Agenciesa

medium through which

it

policy making processes.

could influence and exert
leverage over state
The fact that less than
half the states have

adopted dissemination policies,
which vary from LEAA's recommended
dissemination policy is indicative
of LEAA's limited capacity
to influence state policy through
the SPA.

By this account, LEAA's theory
about the connection between
the development of a uniform
method of record keeping, organizational

257

coordination and

(^ee

a

national

e,.„,3a....S0,.

CCH was faultv
^^^Tty.

..3.

c

a,

m
Moreover,
the SPA infra-

.co.s

....

3a.e,..s

could not possibly be
effectively implemented
Hiemeniea if thp
the organizational
preconditions to regulation
have not been
effectuated.

jUl^elea ated discreB oF"^^
It 1s also contended
that statutes which
carefully structure the

>.ple.entat1on process Increase
the lUellhood of
successful performance
Factors or variables
considered to have strategic
significance as
leverage points over
Implementation processes Include
maximizing
hierar-

chical

integration among agencies
responsible for compliance;
minimizing
veto-clearance points Involved
in achieving objectives;
biasing decisionrules ,n favor of statutory
mandates; and maximizing
participation by
interests supportive of the
mandate, who are external
to the implementing
agencies (Mazmanian and Sabatler.
1981).
I„ addition, guideline
development must bring about congruence
between goals, terms and
procedures and
problems they are designed to
address.
Given the complexity of problems
associated with Improving record
quality, a period of "administrative
learning" must occur prior to final
adoption of any rules and regulations
(Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976:
401).

There has never been

a

sufficient Congressional consensus to

adopt comprehensive criminal records
privacy policy.

In

the absence of

comprehensive legislation, LEAA had the
slenderest of mandates from
substitute amendment both vague

in

wording and intent, and spare in

a

detail with which to
establish guidelines
these conditions,
UAA could e

_ i^
0P~.
atte.pted to

,t .

^"^^

'

legislative intent.

to achieve POlic.

-Wees

°ver guidelines
which

Vet

u„i,o™it. and

.™

s.uande.ed the

to advance its
own pol ic.

Yielding to interests
which sought state
nexi. i.,
discretion, especially
with respect to
dissemination polic..
The fact
that states have adopted
several different
dissemination policies
each paralleling one
of three versions
of the federal
guidelines is
indicative of the problems
inherent in the ambiguity
of LEAA's regulations and deleHitioa of
policy interpretation
and adoption to the
states
Thus,
would be reasonable to
argue that the LEAA's
Title 28 regulations lack the Clarity
of intent, unity of
purpose and finalU^ to
insure uniformity in
state compliance.
1

u

But clearly, political
feasibility was a central
consideration
in LEAA's guidelines
on limits to dissemination.
I„ the absence of
a
congressional consensus on
dissemination policy LEAA clearly
had to
fashion a policy acceptable
to diverse and competing
interest groups,
including the press, employers,
civil rights groups and
local governments.
The guideline development
process therefore served as a
surrogate

legislative process in which the
attempt at

a

uniform and precise statu-

tory interpretation gave way
to the ambiguity inherent in
the politics
of negotiation and compromise.
Although this result is not inconsistent
with the philosophy of the "new
federalism." the devolution of policy

making to state and local governments
accentuates the power and influence
of bureaucrats and special interests
closest to policy implementation
processes (Van Horn. 1979).

By this account then, issues pertaining
to

explaining the patterns
of state compliance.

—

Next, c.a.cten-st.cs
Of the

cH.nal Mtice

s.ste. 0. aecU,on

an.

.stH..t1on Of power ..e
ana voluntary
coordination between
components .nli.el.
conflict inevitable.
conjunction, these factors
.a. account for
wh. the attempt to
Increase the clarity,
specificity and uniformity
of
oWectlves through guideline
development proves
Ineffective, as Berman
Observes, In a policy
system
the autonomy of
local organizations
is well established"
(1980: 219)

t consensu
PO^c.

-

-

We

Moreover, because of these
reasons, LEAA has been
able to
exercise only negligible
enforcement of performance
standards
The
fact that most SPA privacy
plans have given way to
administrative control
by state law enforcement
suggests that In the absence
of precise specification of a state administrative
authority to implement criminal
records privacy, LEAA has
been unable to enforce
compliance.
The Washington SPA guideline
development process, and perhaps
those processes employed by
other states, merely constituted
a replay
Of the federal rule-making
process because state law
continued to reflect
the ambiguity of the mandate
and language of Its federal
precursor.
The

SPA overspecified procedures
for compliance because of the
need to
compensate for two important
deficiencies:
the lack of a precise mandate
including clearly ranked objectives
and the need to anticipate and minimize the Impact of a statute
involving substantial change.

to

7"""" .

a

on,,

1n

J

0.

..ect.n cons.te. ...
Us

tunu.to pamcpate
a

cun.. n„es

......on

,..e, i„e development

presumption prevailed 1n
favo. of

a

.e

o.

as t.e case .eveals

'

n.e.a, interpretation
of pro-

cedu.es to protect t.e
.,.ts Of in.viaua, data
subjects.
,„ ,,,e of
these advantages, however,
experience in Washington
state differed
little from national
patterns.

federal

Thus, this explanation
„ou,d suggest that
implementation of the
criminal history records
policy was limited
because guideline

development only exacerbated
problems of ambiguity in
the original
legislation at both the
national and state levels.
Also, the delegation
Of discretion to the
state and local level
Inhibited the development
of
a uniform criminal
history information system
and contributed to state
underperformance in terms of
record accuracy and quality.

^

Explainin g the Absence of Sionifi.^n. r^,
Ihe Politics o t structural
rn;;fTi7;r

Our preliminary explanation
has stressed the ambiguity
of the
federal statute, uncontrolled
administrative rule-making, lack of goal

consensus and insufficient
technological capacity as significant
factors
in explaining state responses
to the federal criminal
records privacy
mandate.
While taken together the
factors help account for some of the

differences and similarities in state
adoption of federally mandated
procedures, important features of state
responses and performance
attributes remain unexplained.

Regardless of the problems
of ambiguity ,„ the
federal regulations, the u„,fo™Uy
Of state plans and
extensive procedural
compliance
suggests that state officals
have responded In ways
required by the
federal regulations.
In another respect,
if state officials
(e g
the
governor, legislature and
state criminal justice
officials, utilized
the discretion inherent
in LEAA regulations
to develop state dissemination policies consistent
with state priorities
and preferences, then
we
Should expect effective
enforcement to originate from
state rather than
federal officials.
Moreover, in those areas
of federal regulation in
«h,ch there has been substantial
state procedural compliance
(e g
the
development of central state
repositories, individual access
and controls
for accuracy and completeness),
why has there been relatively
little
change 1n record quality or
management practices?
If deficiencies in technological

capability have largely accounted

for the failure of some states
to improve the accuracy and
completeness of
criminal records, then why is there
so little variation between
all
states, as the OTA survey indicates,
between the frequency and consistency with which records management
procedures (e.g., monitoring,

delinquent disposition reporting and
record quality audits) are conducted
and the overall

Integrity of criminal records utilized

in

administration

of criminal justice?
In

another respect,

a

comparison of the LEAA regulatory develop-

ment process with state guideline development
(albeit in one state)
suggests that they involve different policy
focuses.

The focal point of

conflict over the Title 28 regulations gravitated
around the extent of
limitations placed on access to criminal records by the
press and private

-

-.".ate the con.Ulons
o. t.e ,„tel,

^^^^^"^^

. t. .«„,t.t.n

the .ost
That thi.
"^'^ P<"i<=y area was
controversial
>Jversiai is due
H, .
primarily
»
to the f;,rt
fact .1,
that state
guidelines specified,
SDecifi»H in some
detail, the extent
„f
Of responsibility
law enforcement
and other criminal
to ensure the
inte^rit, (e
acc
g
""P^^'^-^) °f -cords
utilized in the
administration of
criminal justice.
Finally altho K
'
the comfnitment of
state offiriM
'"^''^
'"-P"--*^"' to the
development and
,
cementation
Of policy and
enforcement .ven the
indifference Of state

controversy

•

~

.

•

™^

if

•

.

r^'^"

--

:

ahle to adopt .ide-

subsequent implementation
activities?
The explanation of
implementation processes
as solely

a

function

produce a profound
misreadin, of the
importance of the
expectations and
attitudes Of implementers,
elite support and
enforcement as factors in-

voked

in

the state implementation
of federal mandates.

analysis suggests, such

a

M

the ensuing

focus fails in crucial

respects to penetrate
appearances to uncover the
political realities which
limit change in
due process protections,
management practices, and
the use and exchange
Of criminal records.

The extent to which
state and local elites
support federal
policies involving regulation
of criminal justice
processes may have
an important bearing
on whether such policies
result in institutional
change.
The interests and priorities
of state executives, legislators,

and state court
judges determine
to federa,

policies.
policies

in .inn-if

*^-> -ponse

Por
Policies enunciatinq

w--c^ ^ai, to
invoke crediMe

clear .mh

-ePo,ic.

responses

t.ereare,i.e,.

tot.

"

c

or substantia,
benefits for

P^d-e

supreme court

reactions of in-

ci.,..erties

to be few costs
to forma,

T"^'^"'"^
benefits
for comp,iance.

""""^^^

—aps,

decisions

ratification of po, icies

substantia,

pci.,:,

especial,, if these
are tbe on,, types
of
changes upon which
federa, and state
enforcement
is

to federa,

-

-Portant ways

based

pCicies are a,so conditioned

by their perceptions
and attitudes about
the scope of

their supervisory ro,e
and extent to which
po, icies addressing
this
™le might disrupt the poiitica,
status guo between
state judicia, and
law enforcement officiais
and ,oca, criminal
justice officia,s.
Federa,
and state po, icies which
seek to strengthen
enforcement powers of state
organizations which ,ac.
e,ite co^itment and local
politica, support
win probably be unsuccessful
regardless of the extent
to wh^ch additiona, powers are spe,,ed
out.

State eli te indifferpnrp
problematic enforceiiipnt

a nri

It is not evident that
having the jurisdiction
to enforce law

will

guarantee that aggressive
enforcement will occur.

Effective
implementation requires that
policy originators and officials
responsible
for impiementation
demonstrate a strong co^itment
to statutory
goa,s.

^'^^^""^^^^^^^--^^-^-^-.ton state Official
the ,Governor, the
Attorney General
and n.h
' ''^"^^"'^ J^^tice officials
.
.nH
H
and department heads)
reacted to the federal
^^de'^^l n.privacy mandate with
^

unme ,„U., ..cons

-

to

WasMngton, no. fo. that
.atte.,

«e

^si^ned

Officials did not

puMiC,

especUn.

H^^,

1n an. othe. state,

CH.,na,

a.gue, as they di. in
decisions

to .eguiate evidence
.at.e.in, and

post-a.est inte.o.ations,

that cH.1nal

.eco.ds p.ivac. would
unde^ine effective ,a„
enforcement
Pe-aps the fact that the
.eg.lation was treated as
a routine condition
Of a,d .ay have contributed
to this reaction,
but there is also son,e
evidence that cri.ina,
records privacy has
not constituted an
issue of
major concern to state and
local elected officials.

LEAA structured the state
Implementation process in
reinforced the perception by
state officials that criminal

a

way that

records

privacy was just another
condition which had to be
satisfied in order
to get federal a1d.
The linkage of compliance
to preparation of a state
Plan enabled the Washington
Governor for example, to
delegate the task
to the SPA and the Governor's

enunciate

a

policy response.

Co.ittee and, thus, avoid having

to

Since the Governor's Committee
was domi-

nated by state and local criminal
justice officials, there was little
concern and every reason to
expect that criminal records privacy
would
be given the same perfunctory
response as other guidelines.
The state
planning process had to result in
some form of concrete action and
draft
legislation would be a persuasive
response to the LEAA guidelines.
The

fact that the Attorney
(^eneral
y General'

•

<:
s

ah,,
Advisory
Conimittee was unable
to

persuade the Governor
to suDoort
.
support tho
the independent
commission concept
•

-e-tin.
;

-

state agencies to
assume

administL

the reflations
made the prospect
o. passage o.

legislation extremely
unlikely.

Pnont.

Of state officials
.ut because it was
,nst.u.enta, to t.e
achievement of ot.e. a.en.as.
see aspects, it was a
Cassic case
Of log .Oiling.
The State Pat.o,
supported passage of the
WCRPA in
exchange for Governor's
Co^ittee support for
expansion of Us law
enforcement powers. The
State Court Administrator
was willing to
support passage if that
would help free the
Judicial Council fro™ an
unwanted administrative role.
The House Institutions
Committee chairman
supported it because it was
linked to the creation
of a Department of
Just,ce.
Finally, a majority of
legislators voted in favor
of the bill
because the SPA staff had
persuaded them that LEAA
mandated a state law
and that the Governor
(through OCD) supported this
avenue of compliance.
What is most conspicuous in
this enumeration of reasons
for
eventual adoption is the relative
absence of focus on the
substantive
aspects Of policy.
Other then the News Association's
aborted attempt
to hold the WCRPA hostage
for its own privacy amendment,
there was no
real

controversy regarding the purpose
of the law's dissemination
policy
or any other aspects of the
legislation.
What is surprising is that the
WCRPA became so controversial long
after passage.
In

most instances, states have insured
that criminal records

privacy regulation is housed in an
agency with state-wide policy
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e„.o.c™e„t aut.oHt..

T.at t.e states

--M.so..so.s,„ent.sc.s.„„nMn.cate,
san,, ste. fro.
an1„ade,uate aut.on'ty
Unlike most other 5t;itoc

a-nmrati.
'y-'-''-

.ve

not

.oes „ot neces-

o. J„n-3.ict1on.

w^.u^
Washington
initially chose to
lodge

authority in the State
Planning .gency.

--

While several

make this possible,
the reasoning
which prevailed ever
since the Attorney
General
general 'ss Advisory
ah.
Committee
proposed an Independent
secuHt, and pn-vac.
co..,ssion .ad been
accepted by the legislature
that regulatory authority
for crl.lna,
records privacy should
not be lodged In an
operational criminal
justice
agency.
I„ fact. Its initial
accomplishments were Indeed
l.p.esslve
State guideline development
resulted In regulations
more forward loo.in,
than most states in
areas such as inspection
provisions, record guality'
dissemination controls and
audit.
Also noteworthy
Washington was
the conduct of extensive,
state-wide training sessions
involving law
enforcement leadership and
participation of nearly
one-thousand criminal
just,ce personnel.
Regardless of leadership
attitudes towards the law,

m

its legal

requirements were being
disseminated widely in the
criminal
justice community.

There was, however, slippage
In leadership support
and political
environment conducive towards SPA
implementation. OCO reorganization
and transfer of the SPA
program to the state budget agency
combined with
a gradual dismantling of
the LEAA program, a turnover
of Law and Justice
Planning office administrators,
and increased non-cooperation
of the

'

—

P

se.ve. to enco.a,e

-™toae.n

-

co™.ete.

a

e.ons

state

a.

.ca,

U«

-t.e...Uto.act..a..esta.n.eSP

p.t.cte.

,..ess an.
a.o.t to ac..e
added entc.ce.ent powe.
through the conduct
of state-«,de
audU
The ,.adua, dissipation
and e.oslon of
leadership co^it.ent
-PPort 1s said to constitute
a significant
reason for ineffective
regulation (Bardach, i977a;
Maz.an1an and Sahatler,
,98,,.
Perhaps
this factor alone
explains what happened
in the case of
the SPA's
atte.pt in Washington
to i„ple.ent the
WCRPA.
Perhaps-but there was
no overriding co^it^ent
to see the regulatory
process through-state
Officials had typically
been Indifferent to
.ost federal conditions
of
aid; but What they
were not indifferent to
were regulations which Involved controversy.
Criticise and pressure fro.
,a„ enforcement cou,d
not be ignored for they
were a significant block
on the Governor's
Co^ittee and had captured a
substantial percentage of
LEAA allocated
funds
It is to the source and
role of this criticism that
we now turn
to establish the importance
of the linkage between
elite support and the

beliefs, expectations and
attitudes of Implementers closest
to policy
execution.

The political realities of
anticipated change
An Important recurring
preoccupation in the history of social

and political

throught

is

to somehow penetrate the
appearances of social

structure to reveal the reality to
observers as well as participants.

Such an endeavor
continues to be

a

difficult f..,
^^tficult
task kbecause, as
Connolly
up with thu
^^'st,„ction are those
between theory and
,-d.oln
Ideology, thought
and action, the
i-'is actual
and th
the possible, and
conscousness and
self-consciousness" (,981.-

Observes
uuberves,

.
"hn,
bound

-

63).

Since the discrepancies
between appearance
and reality .ay
^
0. .or.s, the distinction
between necessary and
.erely

--ty

gained understanding
.ay require theorists
and agents to
reconcile or
reliefs and revise their
interpretations and
expectations
to confor. with newly
discovered social necessities;
or, alternatively
transfer, social structures
in ways which wil,
satisfy real interests
The images of
institutional structure,
capacities of role-bearers
within the. and perceived
possibilities of change are
sustained by political
interpretations.
These interpretations,
although both plausible
in
ter.s of the .oral ideals
and/or fears they underpin,
are typically
undersupported by available
evidence.
Nonetheless, as Connolly
suggests,
they seek

-1^

'

in

thTh*oir'':a?"'as1t'""'^^r^"''"5
fhf r"^'.'''

will help to so ?d??v

'

"^-"t^-^^lar way

articulation

Appearances play an important
strategic role in political
conflict involving policies and
their consequences.
An essential purpose
of politics is to strike an
acceptable relationship between the
distribution of power and affected
interests.
Importantly, the results of
political conflict may both
redistribute power among the participants
and result in a differential
distribution of burdens and benefits,

responsibilities and opportunities.

Part.es to

a

political dispute
t.e.efore have important

i,.,
ncenI

tives to trade upon
pu.poned discrepancies
between appearance and
in ways calculated
to advance thei.
favo.ed policy positions
contending interests
involved in a policy
issue a.e unlikely to
reveal
their real interests or
power positions in order
to gain leverage over
consequences of policies they
favor.

-my

A recurring theme in the
literature on law enforcement
and
criminal Justice reform,
replayed in

significant ways in the
attempt to

Implement policies in Washington
to regulate criminal
justice information systems, is that
attempts at reform fly in
the face of
reality.

Wilson's analysis of the futility
of prospects for change
unequivocal ly

asserted

is

The patrolman is neither a
bureaucrat nor a professional
but a member of a craft.
As with most crafts, his
ha
o

P

sc°r

pHSns" slo'h^rT^^
'° behave-U

theory no^ ^ules.

°'

^

has,

se?"fttail ed

in short,

neither

^^^"9^ ^ ^^^^^ I'nto a bureaucracy will
no./"^
be
perceived by the members as a failure
of confidence and a
withdrawal of support and thus strongly
resisted efforts
to c ange It into a profession
will be seen as ?;releva
and thus largely ignored (Wilson,
1968:
283).

Yet Milner, acknowledging serious
attitudinal and structural constraints,

suggests

a

pivot upon which change may turn:

Changes that are necessary to make the
exclusionary rule
unnecessary may be so basic as to require
adoption of a new
paradigmof criminal justice administration, a
paradigm
emphasizing the values and norms necessary
to gain police
restraint. ... At the very minimum this
would seem to require that groups outside the police organization
more
actively encourage police restraints.
Existing reference
groups might advocate this goal more explicitly,
or new
groups might become a more integral part of
the process.
In
any case such exchanges in police behavior
are unlikely
unless other changes in the criminal justice system
take
place.

m l'VZ°[lTsZ:lelT ITK' ^"-P'^ "

police restraint*
Though the Court's
''''' p'^^ so™
?ofe
o^e^to de^e,::;'''*
program seems effect'lve^y*?,-^?^^
°P ^."""'p^s and
expl? ft
still influence
institution miqht
attitudes anH hfS'
™y act as a cataly t fo? chan„! k"?'
"^ysIt
certain values and"^
Prestige to
hus encouZin^
from others in a
interest and support
better no,?^^^^
to implement
these v'ater^i^l^^.J^^-^I^PgP-g-^'necessary

^

The case study Of
one state's efforts
at implementing
a federal
^J'lTeaeral
mandate highlights the
Dnlit,v = i
-gmficance of police
opposition to
regulatio
emulation Of information
utilised in the conduct
of pol ice in.estigaons an
the significance
of state court
support of and
involvement in
implementation of such
regulations. What is
significant about law
enforcement's reaction
to criminal records
privacy regulation,
even
-ough it differed in
important respects from
prior Supreme Court
civil
liberties decisions, is
that the policies
were considered
equivalent
This is surprising
because there are two
important objective
differences
between the Ha£, and
^iranda decisions and
criminal records privacy
First, improvements in
record quality resulting
from accuracy and
completeness guidelines are
designed to enhance police
identification
Of repeat offenders and
therefore to increase their
influence over
decisions made at subsequent
stages of the criminal
Justice process
including bail, charging
and sentencing.
This would appear to
constitute
an important incentive
for compliance.

/

Second, unlike its civil
liberties predecessors, sanctions
for
failure to comply with
criminal records regulations
do not affect case
outcomes.
The effects of inaccurate
or incomplete records are
not
equivalent to illegally seized
evidence or improperly administered
warnings.
Cases are not dismissed or
reversed if problems surface at
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tna,

in the

integHt, of cH.lnal
.eccds used

P-ecuto.s. cha.,inMecisicns
greatly influenced

In fact fin,.,,

'

an. success in
p,ea .a.,ain,n, a.e

the nu..e. of p.io.
a.ests and convictions

(Oaco.y.„80.Wei™e..,,80).

Given t.ese differences
it is not o.ious
Why police anticipated
cn'^ina, .eco.ds pHvacy
regulations to Have an
adve.se effect compatible
to t.at expected
wit.
and
Why state prosecutors
cared so littip
.
nttle ;,hn,.^
about the implementation
of state

Mi^,

guide! ines.

However, law enforcement
interests were not alone
in mischaracterizing the point and
exaggerating the consequences
of the
federal mandate and state
regulations.
The ACLU, representatives
of
the Washington Public
Disclosure Commission and
other liberal interests
accentuated and exploited the due
process dimensions of the
regulations
because they believed that the
inspection provision constituted
the
strongest mechanism to secure
enforcement and compliance.
No doubt
similar perceptions by police
reinforced their views. On the
one hand,

proponents of strengthened due
process rights fully expected
liberally
construed procedures for records
access to instigate needed reforms
in
the records management practices.

On the other hand, expecting
such

procedures to inundate law enforcement
agencies with records requests
and time consuming challenges
and appeals, law enforcement interests

steadfastly, although initially
unsuccessfully, resisted these attempts.
The paradigm popular among students
of criminal Justice policy

which explains outcomes of policy
regulating criminal justice in terms

of the conflict between crime control and
due process values misses the

-

—-

anes

-

- co..on

0. appea^nces

of how the path
to„a..s

Thereby, the process
of

.efo™

,s

..esU..M„,

t.e

conceived an. repudiate.

.e.c™ ,eco.es

a caHcatu.e of
itself
„hich
the proponents and
opponents of change act
out thei. beliefs in
selffulfilling ways.

cast in these terms,
the conflict between
opposing interests
over state guidelines has
paradoxical results.
Although attempting to
thwart efforts to create
burdensome guidelines imposing
due process
protections, law enforcement
interests found themselves
drawn into an
ever widening spiral of
interpretative regulations as
a defense against
having alternative
interpretations of due process
rights imposed upon
them and as an offense to
contain efforts to enlarge
regulatory access
to intelligence files.
Also, the single-mindedness
with which due
process proponents carried
their efforts all but obscured
the path
toward real reforms which lay
in the improvement of the
quality of records used in the entire
criminal justice process.
Unfortunately,

record quality provisions are
not self-enforcing but necessitate
elite
support, permanent administrative
mechanisms, enforcement and long term
oversight.
Law enforcement's political agenda
was revealed in another way
as well.

Under court sanctions resulting from
community activists-

pressure to end the collection and
maintenance of information resulting
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from political
surveillanro
"en lance, i„
law

P-ervin, discretion

enforcement interests
were intent upon

perceive, to .e inherent

~-

""'"^^

:r°den. access
s-cess

in t.is

-Pliance

to material

in

t.e ,n.sti,ati.e

CO..

.e

.e.

as a too,

accessible t.rou,.
ot.er state law.

effort was t.warted

an

w.en

.favorable S.p.eme Co.t

to provisions w.icH
re.ulatea interdepartmental
dissemination

Of investigative
material „hic. included
reference to criminal
records
Finally, therefore,
what the Supreme Court
civil liberties
decisions and Washington
implementation of the federal
criminal records
mandate suggest is that
expectations about policy
consequences, regardless of whether they
i-ney are well fn.mjoj
founded, can be an
important political
factor in explaining
responses to external
regulation.
Perhaps it is
not surprizing then that
when appearances have
been successfully severed
from political purposes
that police are willing
to acknowledge, as an
eastern Washington records
manager did in 1981, that
expectations were
not only greatly overdrawn
but that had the WCRPA
preceeded Miranda it
would have obviated the necessity
for that decision.
The WCRPA made
clear to at least some law
enforcement personnel what Miranda
had clearly
failed to do, that the integrity
and accuracy of information
used in

investigation of suspects of crimes

arrest and possible conviction.

is

as

important as securing an actual

In this way,

reforms in record manage-

ment processes have been viewed
by some as an asset rather than
a
liability.

These insights underscore the importance
of law enforcement

investigative practices as

a political

factor limiting effective

^

--lation

0. cn-.,na, Justice
1n.o™at,on s.ste. an.
Us ,.p„n .0
understanding the
Interests fo^atlve
In
in the
tne uU1„at
Ultimate outcome of ^urh

"^^^^^^''^"-^^^----'---s.ct^

-

the space In
„h1ch to

..the. .n.e.stan. the
,ap hetween p.:

cedural compl lance
and actual change.
Judicial

IndependPnrp, ...H^rrn

burdens of compTianc?

~

Almost Immediately
after LEAA published
Its initial draft
-9Ulat1ons 1„ 19^4 the
National Center for
State Courts challenged
the .ustlce Department
and LEAA^s authority
to regulate the
Judiciary
Wh>le strenuously arguing
that the separation
of powers doctrine
pro-'
hibued such an effort,
state court Interests
chose to case their
Objections In broader terms.
The National Center
contended that LEAA's
actions ..indicate a clear
departure of LEAA from Its
traditional and
Often stated policy of
not Imposing federal
regulations on the
states.
(1974: 2).
Moreover, the LEAA draft
proposal was criticized
for exceeding Its
statutory authority by requiring
.

.

state plans.
This criticism is somewhat
surprising and inconsistent
for

judicial recipients of generous
LEAA grants have complied
with all other
conditions of aid before and
after the Title 28 regulations.
Why this
mandate should be any more
onerous than other forms of
executive regulation is not obvious.
The National

Center also challenged the
desireabil ity of the

creation of new state organizations
to implement plans.

planning entity tS
carrv ouJ ^h^
gulations or whethe"an
ex stlno

What evidence of

„

ItT/T'

^'^P^'""^

'^"^

tMs

.ina suggests therefore
is that state
judicial
-terests challenged the
attempt to create new
sources of state policy
making authority which
invited jurisdictional
conflict.

While these efforts were
underway to force LEAA
retraction of
these onerous aspects of
the regulations (between
February 1974 and
March 19. 1976. when LEAA's
revised regulations were
published,, the
Washington State Court
Administrator assumed a leadership
role in
producing a state privacy plan.
In fact, as minutes
of the Attorney
General's Advisory Committee
indicate, a motion was
passed which made
the Clerk of the Courts
(an elected official in
Washington) subject to
the management and control
of the Superior Court for
the purposes of
the state plan (Washington
Attorney General's Advisory
Committee on
Security and Privacy, 1975:
2).
The idea was that if state
and trial
courts were included under the
regulations, then they should assume
a
supervisory responsibility over
court record keeping functions.
Thus,

whatever the outcome of the final
regulations, the courts stood to
advance their organizational interests.
Even after LEAA regulation of the
courts was withdrawn in 1976
the State Court Administrator continued
to be heavily involved as

sponsor of state legislation.
in initial

The State Judicial

a

Council was proposed

legislation, and seriously considered until
replaced by the

Office of Community Development, as
administrative authority for WCRPA.

While it is not altogether clear why the
state court leadership should

continue to pursue
an administrative
role

Z-n..

I ator.s

state court

o.ice

.......

^^'-^

-

^

-"-1-ation

-

it

possi.e

-^"ce

to use

testate

state court

a.inis-

denied previous,,
t.rou,. other .eans.
The attempt
atte.pt
to implement a
state court
'"'°™^*^°"
P-ving difficult and
, ,
,
federal
mandate requiring
coordination of records
processes between
cn.inal Justice agencies
could help remove some
organisational Carriers
moreover, acquisition of
state regulator, authority
was consistent with
existing state court
policy authority and
may have offered an
attractive
-y by Which to at least limit further executive
encroachment on Judicial
organizational interests
while increasing
administrative control over
trial court activities.
,

'

We have already noted
the commonality of
police perceptions of
the supreme Court civil
liberties and criminal
records privacy as policies

-posing due process considerations

on the conduct of law
enforcement

Officers,

interestingly, unlike the
police, the courts have not
interpreted criminal records
privacy in due process terms.
Remarks made by
Judge George Mattson help
explain this interpretation
while providing
additional insights about
police reactions.

^

received by either courts or
police
°' ^i^^l^^ile the c
1
1
bert es decisions'"
'"'P'"-*^"*
°"r attempt to secure
convicJionf the
cunvictions,
Jhi WCRPA
wrppfposes more of a civil liabilitv
P-Pose a"e o;1:ch*iignificance
icaScTiollt'h'^r
to either us or'"r''
law enforcement
The essential purpose of the
WCRPA is the protection of
police agencies from having to
divulge a lot of data they

with^jL"'^"^*

??ab^urfo'? thTu'e lf7,l''''- I'^y
^formation

to avoid civil
for criminal

court'^in'ie^?elJeS^?n'^?:e^?L^e'\^?
I''''
influence the development
oJ thf Ti'''^-

^^"-^

Justice purposes

^

^^'^

the
try to

system because it Sw
information
c^eaLVJlf'^f^°
ments that are either ZTnlT
court docubut we have been
confidential,
nabl
^'0%^
o
access to court records withne^c. agreement on how to control
have al.ys
ic1es^„.,c.

™^elSr p.rilt^-^:-?:^,-}

These .e.a.s su,,est.

.en. t.t w.at .eal,.
separate, couns

an.

po^ce

was not so ™uch
objective differences in
the i.pact of the law
on functions and routines
(although there are so„e
important differences
in this
regard), but the impact
on organizational
Interests resulting fro.
differential burdens of
compliance.
As the Washington case
documents, therefore,

the problems of

enforcement of record guality
provisions and compliance
largely reflected
political-organizational conflict
between police and courts.
Thus

the

eventual

efforts by law enforcement
interests to redistribute
the burdens
Of compliance (by lifting
civil liability sanctions
imposed on police
for failure to furnish
complete dispositions) unmasked
institutional and
organizational conflicts underpinning
a policy involving
overlapping
jurisdictions with uneven responsibilities
for compliance.

There was widespread resentment
by law enforcement officials
about the inequity of Title
28 and. thus the WCRPA. in
exempting the
courts.
Moreover, reactions of state
elites reinforced the view that
since police were the primary
custodians and intermediaries for
the

documentation of all transactions related
to the compilation of criminal
records, their compliance was what
was
necessary.

Perhaps these factors,

combined with the SPA regulatory authority,
provided law enforcement

--e.Ut1o„s

an., t.e.e... to

unae^.e

an

,.p„.an. p.pose o.

"sed and exchanged
,n the administration
of criminal justice
Ever since the
Menarl decision Implementation
of criminal .eco.ds
Pnvacy Involved a collective
.espons,h11 it, fo.
.eco.d ,„al1ty-a

^esponsl.llU. that Implies
Interagency and
1ntero.1sd1ct1ona, coordina-

tion

^

all

components of the criminal
Justice process.
The exclusion
Of the courts fro.
that ^ndate and
ambiguous .ole fo.
prosecutors has
re,nforced. as we see In the
Washington case, a sense
of Inepulty of
burdens-a„ unegual shouldering
of responslhll Ity hy
law enforcement
That the courts eluded
the mandate and continue
to fall to provide
complete disposition information
has been an Important
factor 1n Justifying
non-compliance.
If the state court has
not considered Us
participation
cruical to satisfying the
criminal records privacy
mandate, then It can
hardly be expected that
police would take their own
responsibilities
seriously.
It may, by this account,
then be unsurprising that
the most
serious problem with the quality
of criminal history records
continues to
be the lack of complete
dispositions.
Thus,

the politics of regulation
of criminal justice is bound

up in a system in which
differences in organizational

capacity, power

and intergovernmental and
interorganizational relations work to inhibit

rather than support the accommodation
necessary to facilitate change
the management of criminal

history records.

in
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"'^
na,

-'-^-f
pcncy intended

state an. local
ef.ons to ,-.p,e.e„t

to

-.u,ate cn-.„a, Justice
,„.o™at,o„
syste.s p.ovides
contrasting explanations
of national cutco.es.
Ou.
f-st explanation focuse.
upon t.e p.i.ac. of
t.e technological
c.an.e,
^"""'"^'^
facto, accounting
;
for the li.ited success
in achieving
performance objectives
The
difficult, wUh this
explanation is that it is
hoth misleading and
inconsistent:
what is misleading about
it is its overemphasis
on technical
factors such as statutory
intent and content which
underplays the ro,e
Of politics in dictating
outco.es.
Explanatory inconsistency
is the
ultimate result for we are
unable to reconcile wide
variations in state
policies (particularly between
states with comprehensive
policies vs.
states lacking such policies)
with the nearly universally
poor performance and lack of change among
all states.

—

-

The importance of each of
the factors accentuated in
the second

explanation (i.e., elite indifference,
anticipated change and differential enforcement) help remove
these inconsistencies in
interpreting the
national data.
There are several state responses
which suggest substantial

indifference of state executives
(and substantial opposition

by local elected officials)
as a significant explanatory
factor.

First, with the exception of the
Governor of Arkansas (U.S.

Department of Justice, 1974a: 4) who
expressed mild criticism of the
regulations, neither other governors nor
their national association took
the opportunity to comment on LEAA's
initial regulations in 1974 or 1976.

e,ecte.

"

ofnc.U. t.o.,.

association of Counties
exercised strong criticism
of dissemination
P-isions and cost implications
fo
cipa, information
systems
second, few state
executives demonstrated
a willingness
to
assign administrative
authority to an independent
agency (only four
states).
Clearly, most state
executives (and/or
legislatures) showed
deference to state and
local law enforcement
interests as to the

appropriate administrative
entity.

With few exceptions,
state law

enforcement agencies have
assumed administrative
responsibility. A
significant number of these
also have statutory powers
sufficient to
impose a uniform policy for
dissemination
of records on local

law

enforcement agencies.
Finally, given the small
number of statewide audits
conducted
by 1982,

it

evident that state enforcement
and executive and legisl
tive oversight have lacked
aggressiveness.
is

The Washington case also
reinforces the importance of law

enforcement practice and federalism
together in contributing toward
an
understanding of national patterns.
First, police demands for the

independence of investigative activity
stems not only from

a common
ideology of crime control but
from opposition to federal and
state regulation.
Intelligence activities, as the
Washington case indicates,

often include surveillance of
political activity currently unregulated
by most states and localities.

Thus, there are strong incentives for

individual departments to resist controls
in this area because of the

potential

intrusion by elected officials and citizens,
such as in the

,

CO

.

"
;:r'7"^
two..
"

--------- ,.enje
t.e Law En.o.e™e„t

When ccnf1de„t1a,ny1s
breeched

Intem.ence UnU (O.o.e,

,,.8,

.eguUtc.

intrusions.
Second, not only is
credulity of the
UK likelihood
iKeiihood of aggressive
enforcement stretched
.y state ,a„ enforcement
administration of federal
and state mandates,
but it is evident
from the Washington
case that
acceptance of Jurisdictional
authority is woefully
lacking,
state level
law enforcement is
Just not recognized as a
legitimate source of regulatory authority by local
law enforcement, and
state police or highway
patrols are probably not
eager to risk the political
conflict of
aggressive enforcement.

Moreover, conflict over
state jurisdiction
contributes to the
relevance of Judicial independence
in explaining evident
problems in
state enforcement of federal
mandates and state policy.
What was
conspicuous about state court
opposition to LEAA guidelines
was the
usurpation of existing lines of
state policy-making exercised
by state
courts.
As the Washington case
clearly suggests, state court
justices
clearly supported the principle
of privacy while trial court
judges
were largely indifferent to what
was perceived to be a police
administration issue.
State courts clearly have their
own administrative

problems to work out with respect
to exercising policy and
administrative jurisdiction over lower courts.

Federal and state regulations

involving administrative reform have
evidently overlooked the importance
of judicial power in determining
the viability of record management
reforms.

As the Supreme Court civil

liberties policies indicate, if

,e,s.t.e po..es ...
.po.
regulations.

and Congressional PnliVu
So far we have begun
to construct an
explanation

of certain
recurring performance
features of the state
implementation of the
congressional privacy mandate.
Importantly, state response
patterns to
TUle 28 exhibit a contrasting
portrait of extensive
procedural adoption
yet underutilization of
procedures; and expansion of
the regulatory
jurisdiction of state law
enforcement but limited evidence
of actual
enforcement.
There are similarUies between
these state responses and
performance attributes and the
consequences of the Ma££ and
Miranda
decisions.
There has been extensive
procedural compliance and newly
emergent organizational practices
but little evidence of actual
change.

The Washington case provides
insights into why this has
occurred.
so doing,

In

contributes towards our understanding
of policy implementation processes and the political
factors which impede as well as
it

facilitate policy innovation and
regulatory reform

in

criminal justice.

There is an important dimension of
policy emerging from this
study which has a bearing on explanatory
frameworks seeking to identify

relationships between factors shaping
implementation processes and
outcomes.
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fede.a,poncy .a. define

the substantive
mandate and goal:Is
of the
implementing organization
by specifvinn tK
.
°' '^''^'^
treatment philosophy
ohil
.
or rights and
the ^pecinc
specific kinds
kinH. of
.
services to be
.
Hni,delivered
or regulations
to be administered
second fed
i
'''''''
influence the structure
of .an organization,
for example,
examnlp kby
prescribing
or ;,ftomn^attempting .to change
its
location
location with respect
y
to state or
•

local

government, its governanrp
governance nv^
or decsion making
structure, the actual
funct,cns it performs,
or its position
within the policy
s.ste.

aspects Of how an
organization perfo^s.
particularly how employees
conduct routine tasks
and exercise discretion
in applying
procedures to
individual situations or
clients.
Most studies seeking
to explain the
politics involved in implementation processes treat
the substance of the
policy as a aiven or
unalterable feature of the
context.
However, there are to
important
reasons why policy should
not be treated as an
independent variable.
First, as this study
suggests, the policy which
actually gets implemented
IS largely the
product of the actions of
state and local rather
than
federally mandating institutions.
Second, we have found a
problematic
relationship between policy
objectives enunciated by policy
originators
and the expectations of
implementers.
It is probably misleading
to
assume that implementers'
responses are governed largely
by their understanding of the policy intent.
Implementers may respond instead
according to expected political
consequences of compliance.
Thus,

adaptive behavior resulting from
such anticipatory reactions may
not be
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between organizations
within

a

policy syste..

last two aeca.es,

c

r

^"--^--^^

~.

.3de.a,cH.ina,Mticepo,icy

.as
to specify .ot.
st.ct.ra, ana p.ocea.a,

aracteristics of
i.p,™enting organizations
as we,, as wit.
t.e s„..
stantive approach.
Thus, federa,
po, icy-.a.ers

have expanded their

-tervention through mandates
and conditions of
aid which prescribe

the structural and
procedural .eans .y
„hich they expect
policy to he
MPle^ented as well as the
ends they desire to
achieve.
So,

the policies we have
compared involve dual
objectives
Procedural policy provides
guidelines for decisions and
actions, and
standards by which to appraise
their appropriateness
(Davis, 1975)structural policies are designed
to alter organizational
roles and'
functions or intergovernmental
relations.
These types of policies are
not always carefully
distinguished nor acknowledged
by either policy
originators or implementers.
Nevertheless, they have important
implications for the efficacy of
policies designed to structure
the discretion
criminal justice officials have
in executing their functions.

What our analysis of criminal
records privacy and Supreme
Court
civil liberties policies
suggests is that attempts to reform
the criminal

Justice system necessarily entail
both aspects of policy.

The structural

aspect of policy consists of formal
relations between components constituted by differences in
organizational structure, authority and
power,
mission and function in the criminal
justice process.
there

is

a

At another level

layer of procedural relations (both
formal and informal)

involving policy interdependence, common
value systems (e.g., the
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^aeclog. Of

cH.eco„t™i,.,oaU.„.

incentives .o.co.p„ance.
T.ese
unde.„1„, p.ocedu.1
bases account fo.
„.at .aMnovit.
P.ess.an
and Re1n;,9;e) .i,.t
.escn^.e
as t.e "settle.,
c.a.acte. o.

justice and

Us capabHit,

possibility Of Change.
cedural change alone a.e

Of the syste..
are .ore

mely

than procedural

to absorb policy

.efo™s and li„it

Tbus, policies advancing

H.ely

cH.na,

.efo™

the

based on p.p.

to be derailed by the
i„fo™a, aspects

,n contrast, policies
which promote structural

change

to sharpen conflict
between cri.ina, Justice
components
ones by triggering a
dialectic process by which
com-

pliance burdens may be absorbed,
deflected or redistributed
and power
shifts avoided, reconciled
or redirected towards
a new political
equil ibrium.

Given this dimension of
policy then, the connection
between
the Washington case and Ma2£
and Miranda now becomes
clearer.
First,

state officials are unlikely
to treat federal regulatory
policy with'a
sense of urgency unless organizational
interests are either threatened
or advanced by compliance.
Federal policies which seek to
alter inter-

governmental relationships create the
conditions in which organizational
and jurisdictional conflicts are
likely to emerge.
Therefore, state
official responses and actions are
conditioned by the opportunities

created and limits imposed by such
alterations for existing organizational

Federal

strength, responsibility and
interorganizational relations.

policy may provide opportunities for
expansion of state power

while imposing new responsibilities and
constraints which make that

expansion politically unrealistic and unfeasible.
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-'^

no. exc.sivel. 1n

The,> sense of priorities

1s

te™s of o.,an,.atio„a,
powe.
mnuenced In important ways

'

t.e

attuudes and behavior of
those with the .est
i.edlate and direct

-ponsl.nit,

for compliance,

state officials, whether
state Justices

administrators or legislators
search for evidence
of the wa.s the
po11c;
win affect existing custom
and
practice.

The responses and the
guide-

lines Which eventually
emerge will necessarily
reflect the compromise
Which must Ultimately
5e struc. between
satisfying policy objectives
and maintaining organizational
prerogatives while limiting
their disruption of existing practice.
Third,

It is more difficult
for state and local

criminal justice
Officials to evade policies
predicated on structural reform
because they
are likely to produce
contradictions in interorganlzational
relations

which put one or more of

Us

elements In

a

bind.

Structural policies

are likely to create such
effects partly because of
functional interdependence Of the components of the
criminal justice system and Its
sensitivity to disruptions in
power relations.
As Dolbeare and Hammond
(1971) have noted elsewhere In their
study of state implementation of
the Supreme Court prayer decisions,
"style issues" provide greater lever-

age to state elites and lower
level

Implementers to dictate responses

largely because they do nothing to
alter existing structures of power
and preference.
As we have shown,

procedural policies with structural

tions have a different character:

implica-

they seek to alter underlying patterns

of power and preference making non-decisions
(or non-responses) more
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transparent and

see ll.Ued co^lance
neaH.

unavoidable, w.e.e
policies impose une.ua,
burdens and disrupt
power relations between
organizations who ™ust
i.ple«nt the. and co.ply
it is n.ely that
the
organizations affected will
attempt to redress the
imbalance and restore
the political equl ibrium.

others (Bynum, 1982;
Zal.an. 1982) have noted
in studies of
sentencing policies the
significance of anticipatory
reactions to

laws

specifically designed "to be
broken."

What they discovered is
that laws

predicated on so.e expected
degree of non-co.pl iance
™ay be better able
to achieve desired goals
then those requiring
universal compliance
Their studies show, for
example, that determinate
sentencing legislation
designed to li.it judicial
discretion may actually increase
prosecutorial
discretion.
Thus, leverage over case
outcomes is simply shifted from
one set of officials to another
rather than eliminating it
altogether.
As zalman hypothesizes in
his study of sentencing
reform In Michigan,
the legislature perceived this
to be

a

desirable state of affairs because

it feared that

imposing a law with no options
would exaccerbate prison

overcrowding.

Thus, the legislature may have
expected that the law

would be "mandatory" only when the
prosecutor intended

it to be

mandatory

Implicatio ns for the American Political
System
These findings also raise Important issues
regarding the structure of accountability involved In state
implementation of federal

guidelines.

It is at the state level where the
connection between

executives, legislatures and
bureaucrats appears most tenuous
and
problematic.
Given a complex intergovernmental policy involving
criminal

justice information
systems 5t=t<>
systems,
state „
executives and legislatures
have
sown a surprising lac.
of interest in the
organizational
social ana
,

a*.n,strative consequences
of the ,ro„t. an.
utilization of information

technology in criminal
justice.

Moreover, the ever-expanding
and deepening complexity
of the
national network of
criminal Justice systems
may actually outstrip
the
present capacities of
federal, state and local
officials to either
control its growth or
insure its accountability.
This is evidenced
.y
the fact that there is
no uniform national
policy, but rather fifty
state
policies which are underenforced.
Federal regulatory policy
as implemented by LEAA. according
to the profile of
national performance
presented here, has had
regressive effects on
representation processes
More specifically, the
combination of grant-supported
proliferation of
information technology and
state-based regulatory policies
has reinforced
local control over informational
relations in criminal Justice.
These
relations continue to be dictated
by law enforcement custom
and practice
and local public values.
Similarly, as the analysis in
Chapter II

indicates, the Supreme Court civil
liberties decisions in Ma££ and
Miranda, while increasing political
visibility and policy-making by
state courts, have nonetheless
produced wide variations

in

policy and

enforcement while at the same time
reinforcing local police practice.
From this perspective, then, in contrast to
Van Horn's (1979)

contention, federal block grant programs do not necessarily
increase
the involvement of state and local elected officials
nor increase

accountability to the public with respect to these issues.

Nor is it

clear that the aftermath of the Supreme Court civil liberties
decisions

^as

resuued

in

incease. state cou.t
enforcement of ConnUutiona,
protections (Poner and
Tarr. ,,82).

„,at t.ese e.a.ples
of federal
1nvc,ve.ent do indicate
1s t.at federal and
state officials are
una.le
to determine the „a.
in «Mc. federal
and state policies
are actually
Implemented.
Instead, a ver. powerful
coalition of federal,
state and
local law enforcement
interests, combined wit.
institutional

power
conflicts, have dominated
both policy-making and
implementation, thus

dusolving the distinction
between the powers and
roles of state
Officials and bureaucratic
implementers suggested by
Maz^anian and
Sabatier (1983).
Tarr concludes his study
of state court responses
to Supreme
court establishment cases
with the comment that a
major benefit of noncompliance is that It avoids
the disruption of
long-standing and
widespread state practices that
compliance would entail.
Tarr sees an

important implication of this
for understanding the
governance role of
State courts:
Such programs could not exist,
of course, without broad
popular support.
These findings, in turn JomDel
one ?o
acknowledge the vital importance
of thrS^mocra? c "oV
ponents of judicial role: state
court judges Save
consistently decided cases in such
a way as to
reserve
sentiment in the state
1977''?33)
(?ar?!
Of course, the risks of reversal
tend to make non-compliance

ineffective, as Tarr points out, so
that the advantages must lie elsewhere.

Instead, the advantages of non-compliance
consist in enabling

judges to avoid the criticism they face
by invalidating programs,

especially those strongly supported by public
opinion.

Such

a

response
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pom,-caWo.es a. poMc.val.es.
Glick and Vines (197?-

^/ln^

^

Of the state
judiciary in state
politics
^

with
t.e state.

•

their investigation

.t.t«
'tate court judges
generally
do not associate
the "interests"
involved
"ivuivea in 1-tin..1 .tigation
with interest
•

fo^a, Jud1c1a, process
J"<'9es.

is

strong,, condemned

^--stMs

„st

state

ccun

analysis suggests,
state co.ns as „el,
as state
executives exe.dse an
Important Influence eve.
.o„ legislative policies
get implemented.
Policies intended to

refo™

the administration
of criminal
justice must be sufficiently
Important to state executives
and legislators that they would
accept the political ris.s
and conflict with
state Judicial and law
enforcement Interests which
would be necessary
to achieve policy change.
That this intervention
may therefore reguire
compromise between branches of
government over policies which
Involve

overlapping jurisdictions between
executive, legislative and
state
court functions may be an
unavoidable but necessary
consequence.
The
separation of powers doctrine,
enunciated long ago by James Madison
was not intended to prevent
but to encourage a vigorous
interaction
between branches of government
so that the public Interest
might be
better served.

Surely there is overwhelming public
support for crime control
through law and order.

Courts and legislatures draw upon
this public

sentiment to justify an aggressive
posture toward law enforcement.

ponce and prosecutors
have ovpr
hand! H and
.
handled
resulting outcomes.

th.

n

''''' ''^'^

The factors in.
^^'"'^. ^°
criminal
.
iu.t.v. system
justice
contributinq
^ing to thP..
^
these noutcomes
i„volve maintenance
of
organizational autonomy,
and stability of
political power.
0^ PolUical
nn
The factors
pytprn.i
external .to .u
that system involve
uive ine
the sen.r.t..
separation of
powers and preponderance of public
sentiment for
fnv^ law
i.
and order compared
to the
.e,at1ve,. wea. intensU.
of .e.a„. fo. t.e
protection of ™i„o.U.
H,.ts
What 1s problematic
therefore about legislative
and judicial

-terventlon

Hghts

is

In tbe criminal
justice policy s.ste.
to protect Individual

t.at the state and
local

Implementation of a federal
mandate
necessarily reflects
primarily the Interests
and pr,or1t1es. beliefs
and attitudes of state
and local criminal
justice officials, and
other

-terests secondarily,

m

this Instance, the
Interests In the mainte-

nance Of the organizational
status quo In criminal
justice merges with
majority preference.
There Is nothing rationally
Inconsistent with
this posture, only that
the neglect of minority
rights may often be the
concession extracted for this
consistency.
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